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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the ethical issues raised by sex selection for the individual, 
family and society. Techniques like sperm sorting and preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis have made it possible for parents to select the gender of their offspring 
even before they are born. These new reproductive technologies do raise some 
important ethical questions for us. This thesis briefly considers the morality of the 
technology being used to achieve sex selection before going on to discuss if there 
is anything morally objectionable about sex selection, in and of itself. In this 
thesis I argue that parents ought not to place value on gender when it comes to 
their children since gender is a morally irrelevant factor in the parent-child 
relationship and parental love should not be conditioned by characteristics like 
gender. Hence, this preference of theirs regarding sex cannot be justified. I discuss 
the right to reproduction, how it applies to sex selection and the limits on 
procreative liberty. I argue that a right to reproduction, reproductive freedom or 
reproductive autonomy does not entail a right to sex selection. I also discuss how 
sex selection could impact children, children's right to an open future and make a 
case for sex selection as a harm to the child. I analyse Kant's `Means and Ends' 
formula and apply it to sex selection, thus concluding that the choice of a 
particular trait, like gender by a parent undermines the principle of respect for 
individuals and thus instrumentalises the value of children for their parents. The 
thesis also looks at discrimination and the impact of sex selection on women and 
society. With reference to the current situation in India and China where sex 
selection has led to horrific consequences I discuss the implications of the current 
situation for society today. 
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1. Introduction 
It was while taking a module on `Current Developments in Heath Care Ethics' 
during my Masters at Leeds that I first heard of this new reproductive technology 
called sex selection. For me, it had only been a few months in England; I was still 
in that stage where I'd convert pounds to rupees before making any purchase. 
That day, that class, the mention of this innovative technology left me thinking 
about innumerable things. Most of all, it got me thinking of where I came from 
and the particular relevance of this technology in the context of my social system. 
As a woman from India, I was intrigued and baffled by it. In the months that 
followed, I found myself getting deeply interested in the moral issues that 
surrounded this technology; in the years that followed, my questions, my concerns 
had gone beyond the terrain of an Indian problem and ethic. This thesis is the 
culmination of that interest and the journey I undertook because of it. 
Sex selection is a new reproductive technology. At their heart, the reproductive 
technologies change the activities and processes by which children come into 
existence, and they intimately involve individuals beyond the traditional mother 
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and father in those activities and processes. As a result of these changes, the 
reproductive technologies potentially affect the relationships of the people 
involved in reproduction and the nature and significance of the activities and 
processes of reproduction themselves. At issue in controversies over the 
reproductive technologies are exactly what changes these technologies do or 
might bring about, whether these changes are good or bad and what should be 
done about them. 
A common objection raised against new reproductive technologies is that it is 
unnatural. The Vatican objects to unnatural procreation. One response is to call 
the Catholic prohibition a naturalistic fallacy, that only what is natural is right. A 
second response is to claim that manipulation is an important aspect of human 
nature - that it may even be a duty to use human ingenuity to harness nature for 
the benefit of mankind, to interfere with nature so as to battle with diseases and 
accidents and prevent premature death. Another objection is against the use and 
discarding of embryos, invoking the moral status of the embryo. Other objections 
skirt around designer babies, eugenics, the safety and risks involved in these new 
technologies and the treatment of women and children in ways that are considered 
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unethical. Some of these objections have been discussed in detail in the chapters 
that follow. 
In this thesis, I will be formulating the problem for the moral permissibility of 
trait selection, sex selection in particular. Besides introducing the topic of sex 
selection and briefly discussing the medical technology now available for it, I will 
be concentrating on the moral difficulties that arise with sex selection, the reasons 
why sex selection raises moral issues. Even though my main concern is with sex 
selection, I do refer to the selection of other traits as well that might seem as 
problematic or less than selection of sex. 
With advances in medical science and technology, it is now possible for parents to 
select some kind of traits they would like their children to have. The question 
whether parents should be allowed to select the traits of their children has sparked 
off debates in medical, legal, social and philosophical circles. Techniques like 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) have made selection of some traits a 
reality. Nov, the selection of some traits like gender has generated discussion 
amongst bioethicists and in society in general. In countries like India and China 
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where there is a marked preference for males, or for that matter a developed 
country like the USA where there still exists a strong general preference for boys 
as first borns, the permissibility of sex selection would have bearing on important 
philosophical concepts like duty, harm, equality, rights, liberty, the value of 
human beings and also justice. 
This thesis is mainly about the ethical issues that sex selection raises for the 
individual, the family and society. The `individual' in question here can be the 
parent, the parents and the child who lie at the centre of this debate, those who 
stand to gain or lose because of the innovative techniques now available for sex 
selection, by `family' I refer to the parent-child relationship and the way sex 
selection can/may/does influence it, and by `society' I wish to study the impact of 
sex selection on a broader scale, going out of the homes and relationships of the 
individuals directly involved in it. 
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There are two important questions that need to be considered when analysing the 
problem of sex selection and these are as follows: 
a) The question regarding the techniques being used to achieve the end, that 
of sex selection and whether the available technology raises any ethical 
problems 
b) The second and more important of the questions, one that I am particularly 
interested in, is analysing the motive, the intention of parents as they go to 
a clinic to ask for a child of a particular gender, if there is anything 
morally problematic with this demand regarding their future child and 
whether it has any ethical bearings on the parent-child relationship and the 
duties that parents have towards their children. 
Also, trait selection in general raises concern for us because it involves decisions 
which are being made for another human life, another person in the future. 
However, we as a society allow parents to exercise their right to procreative 
liberty and make decisions for their children all the time. How then, is this 
scenario different? Trait selection might be different, and this thesis will try to 
ascertain if it is in fact so, and whether it presents us with a problem regarding any 
harmful impact on the future child. In order to restrict the individual liberty of 
people, it needs to be shown that some kind of harm is resulting from their actions. 
Again, harm can be assessed on two different levels: one, on the level of the 
individual and the other, on the level of society. 
When I started researching this topic, I realised that much of the literature 
concentrated on ethical issues raised by sex selection as a new reproductive 
technology and the morality of the methods used for sex selection seemed to 
dominate the discussion. In this thesis, I want to explore the issue from outside of 
the purview of merely the technology being used. Here, I would like to point out 
that my thesis does not focus as much on policy regulations or recommendations 
regarding sex selection or even the technology behind it, but more on parents and 
children - children who are born, unborn and even those not yet conceived. This 
thesis is also about a social climate where parents and children share a 
relationship based on love. 
The concept of choice lies at the heart of this thesis. The array of new choices that 
has opened up to parents and prospective parents through advances in medical 
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technology and through genetics needs to be taken into consideration. I am 
interested in the way these choices influence parents and the decisions made by 
them that limit or expand the choices that will be available to their children as 
they grow up to be adults themselves. The new possibilities throw open a question 
before us: how should we think in ethical terms of parents' choices with regard to 
their children's future lives? 
The next chapter explores the meaning of sex selection, briefly discussing the 
history of sex selection and traces the origins of the interest that man has had in it. 
It also looks at the motivations for sex selection, some of the reasons that people 
give for wanting to go for it. Chapter 2 also looks at how sex selection is possible, 
the technology available today to make it happen -a discussion of the methods, 
success and failure rates and how popular they are. I discuss the law on sex 
selection, not only the current UK law but I also consider laws in the US, India 
and China regarding sex selection. In this context, I also look at different cases 
that have come up in the UK courts with a comparative study of what the situation 
is like in the US, India and China. I want the thesis to examine the situation in 
different socio-cultural settings and look at both the developed and the developing 
worlds. 
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Most people opposed to sex selection have concerns about the morality of embryo 
selection, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis or PGD. Chapter 3 answers the 
question: What is wrong with sex selection - is the technology being, used morally 
objectionable? I discuss and evaluate different positions on the moral status of the 
embryo and argue for a gradualist position concluding that the early embryo used 
in embryo selection or PGD does not have a moral status and that discarding it or 
not implanting it would not be unethical. 
Chapter 4 is a theoretical analysis and account of parenthood and will be applied 
to questions that arise in later chapters. I examine parenthood as a role from which 
rights and duties stem. I look at different theories for parental rights and duties, 
and critique the `Children as Property' claim. In this chapter, I also examine 
parenthood as a relationship of love, arguing that parents ought not to place value 
on gender when it comes to their children since gender is a morally irrelevant 
factor in the parent-child relationship and parental love should not be conditioned 
by characteristics like gender. Hence, their preference cannot be justified. 
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Chapter 5 focusses on Reproductive Autonomy and Harm. In this chapter, I 
discuss the concepts of autonomy, liberty, reproductive freedom, the importance 
of reproductive autonomy. I discuss the right to reproduction, how it applies to 
sex selection and the limits on procreative liberty. I argue that a right to 
reproduction, reproductive freedom or reproductive autonomy does not entail a 
right to sex selection. I also discuss how sex selection could impact children, 
children's right to an open future, involving the concept of harm. 
Chapter 6 is a discussion of Kantian ethics, in particular the `Means and Ends' 
formula. As I apply it to sex selection, I discuss how this could lead to 
commodification. I argue that the choice of a particular trait, like gender by a 
parent undermines the principle of respect for individuals and thus 
instrumental ises the value of children for their parents. This chapter also looks at 
discrimination and the impact of sex selection on women and society. I discuss 
the current situation in India and China where sex selection has led to horrific 
consequences and the implications of the current situation for society today. 
15 
2. History, Technology, Law and Cases 
The question about determination of sex and other characteristics is a very 
complex one indeed and before I go on to discuss the ethical issues raised by it, it 
is important to know more about its background. It is important to know what pre- 
selection of sex means, its origin and its history, the reasons why couples want to 
opt for it, the techniques available to achieve it, the risks involved in the 
techniques employed for sex selection, the legal stance regarding sex selection, 
the most recent cases that have called for judgement with regard to these new 
technologies, a cross cultural survey of sex selection involving a discussion of the 
Indian situation, and, in general, everything that sets the stage for the reality of the 
problem that I am set to examine. 
2.1 History of sex selection 
`Sex selection' is not a recent phenomenon. We might have the technology to 
achieve it now, and that definitely is new but human interest in it is not. ' Scx 
selection' ordinarily refers to a choice by parents regarding the sex of their 
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children. Gender of the unborn has always been a matter of curiosity for the 
parents to be, their family and friends. In fact, it is not merely restricted to those 
who have been visited by the stork; people have also been interested in it when 
contemplating their future, a happy life with children, for most. 
Many historical documents present us with evidence that humans have always 
tried to actively influence the sex of their offspring. The earliest document that 
mentions this subject is a Chinese manuscript dating back to 4,400 years. IA 
document from the ancient Egyptian era indicates that if a pregnant woman's face 
was of greenish hue, she would have a son, thus suggesting their concern with the 
gender of their offspring. 2 There is also some evidence that the Greeks prescribed 
methods to ensure that the child born was of the gender they wanted. Levin3 
discusses many of these theories presented by a number of Greek philosophers. 
Anaxagoras argued that the male partner could determine the sex of the child, the 
right testicle containing the male semen and the left the female. In the eighteenth 
century, French noblemen seemed to have followed his theory in getting their left 
testicle removed to guarantee a male heir. Hippocrates believed that men and 
1 Gordon, M. J., (1958), The Control of Sex', Scientific American Nov., p. 87 
2 Nenmviz, M. R., (1981), 'Technical Aspects of Sex Selection' in H. B. Holmes et al (ed. ) The 
Custom-made Child? Nomen-centered Perspectives (Clifton, NJ; Humana Press), p. 181 
t Levin, R. J., (1987), '1luman Sex Pre-selection', Oxford Reviews of Reproductive Technology 9, 
p. 162 
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women secreted different substances and the mixture of these substances gave rise 
to males, females or hermaphrodites. Aristotle's theory was that females were 
formed because of the lack of their parents' heat. Females were supposed to have 
grown in the left uterine horn and males in the right. Aristotle, therefore, advised 
women to think male and lie on their right side after intercourse to focus 
generative heat there since he believed that was the source of male children. 
Hence, the historical evidence we have seems to suggest that sex selection has 
been in the running for a long time now. In the next section I discuss the different 
methods of sex selection that are and have been in practice. 
2.2 Sex selection: methods and techniques 
The methods of sex selection range from preconceptual, periconceptual, to 
postconceptual, abortion and infanticide. Discussions of sex selection usually tend 
to hover around `embryo selection' which refers to a process of taking eggs from 
4 Nentwig, M. R., (1981), 'Technical Aspects of Sex Selection' in II. B. llolmes et al (ed. ) The 
Custom-made Child? Women-centered Perspectives (Clifton, NJ: I lumana Press), p. 181 
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a female, fertilizing them in vitro, i. e. outside of the woman's body. and then 
letting the fertilized egg divide to the 8 or 16-cell blastomere5 stage. After this, the 
egg is tested for the presence of certain undesirable genes or defects. If such 
defects are present, the embryo is discarded. Usually, several cultures are done at 
a time, and the process continues until a defect less embryo can be found. 6 
2.2.1 Preconceptual method of sex selection 
The most reliable preconceptual method of sex selection is flow cytometric 
separation of X and Y sperm, which is 85% effective at producing a girl and 65% 
effective at producing a boy. 7 The sperm sorting technique pioneered at the 
Genetics & IVF Institute in Fairfax, Virginia involves no loss of human life at any 
stage. What is involved, rather, is the separation of male sperm from female 
sperm. This, then, is a technique for separating sperm carrying aY chromosome 
(which would create a male embryo) from sperm carrying an X chromosome 
sA `blastomere' is a cell produced during the cleavage of a fertilized egg. 
http: liwww2. merriam-webster. com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm 
6 Menezo, V. J., Bellet, V. et al, (1997), ` Embryo Selection by IVF, Co-culture and Transfer at the 
Blastocyst Stage in Case of Translocation', Human Reproduction 12, pp. 2802-2803 
7 Fugger, E. F, Black, S. H., Keyvanfar, K., Schulman, J. D., (1998), ` Births of Normal Daughters 
After Microsort Sperm Separation and Intrauterine Insemination, In-vitro Fertlisation, or 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, Human Reproduction 1 3, pp. 2367-2370 
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(which would create a female embryo). The process involves adding a fluorescent 
dye to the sperm which enables sperm sorting, since "girl sperm" carry more DNA 
than "boy sperm. " When the sperm is sent through a flow cytometer in which a 
laser beam causes the dyed DNA to glow, sperm that would create a girl should 
produce a brighter glow than sperm that would result in a boy. 8 According to 
Robert Winston, Professor of Fertility Studies, Imperial College, London, the 
risks involved in sperm sorting or this commercially trademarked technique called 
MicroSort is that it may change the nature of the DNA itself and result in long 
term damage to the children born. 9 
2.2.2 Periconceptual method of sex selection 
Periconceptual choice of sex is based on the observation that conception close to 
ovulation is more likely to result in a boy. Other "folk" methods which include 
positioning during intercourse, vaginal douching e. t. c., are commonly employed 
8 Sutton, A. H., (2002), 'Sex Selection Via "Sperm-Sorting": A Morally Acceptable Option? ', The 
Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, available at 
http: //wwx\,. cbad. org/resources'reproducti\, e/sutton_2002-1 1-04. htm 
9 Mayor, S., (2001), ' Specialists Question the Effectiveness of Sex Selection Technique', British 
, IIeo'ical Journal 323 (7304), p. 67 
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throughout the world but the effectiveness of periconceptual methods has not been 
well documented. 10 
2.2.3 Postconceptual method of sex selection 
Postconceptual medically assisted sex selection is possible by in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) and Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), or by employing prenatal 
testing (chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis, ultrasound) and termination of 
pregnancy, or infanticide. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) which 
requires IVF and intracytoplasmic injection is a means to genetically analyze a 
single cell from an 8-cell embryo in order to determine more accurately if it is 
4normal'. 1 1 So, in short, Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis or PGD is a complex 
test which examines the genes of a newly conceived embryo, and can detect 
certain genetic or chromosomal abnormalities. The test is done at a very early 
stage after conception - before the embryo has even had a chance to implant or 
settle into the lining of its mother's womb (hence the term preimplantation). In 
10 Carson, S. A., (l 988), `Sex Selection: The Ultimate in Family Planning', Fertility and Sterility 50, 
pp. 16-19 
Savulescu, J., (1999), -Sex Selection: The Case For', Medical Journal of Australia 171, 
pp.. 173-37S 
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order for this to be possible the embryo must be produced in the laboratory using 
the well-established techniques of in vitro fertilization (what are commonly called 
'test tube babies'). Only those embryos which are found to be healthy are then put 
back into the mother. 12 PGD was originally developed to sort out human embryos 
with inherited diseases, and is one of the most reliable and popular methods which 
provide an alternative that does not involve abortion. However, some risks of 
failure run in this procedure too. 
Last year, the BBC reported that the Genetics unit at London's Guy's Hospital 
developed a new technology called Preimplantation Genetic Haplotyping (PGH). 
13 The test looks at the whole DNA of a cell rather than focusing on a specific 
mutation in one gene, making it quicker to identify diseases in embryos. The new 
"DNA fingerprint" test of a cell can spot from a genetic signature that a condition, 
such as cystic fibrosis, is present, the scientists behind it say. PGH involves 
testing parents and any existing children or relations carrying or with a genetic 
condition, to identify the faulty units of chromosomal DNA. Using this 
information, it is possible to take a cell from the embryo, treat it in the lab to 
12 'Q&A: Preimplantation genetic diagnosis', BBC News, 10 May 2006, available at 
http: /inews. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/health/47582I 7. stm 
1' Ryan, C., (2006), 'Embryo Test 'Offers Parents Hope", BBC. \'ews, 19 June, available at 
http: / ncNw, s. bbc. co. uk/l/hi'health/5079802. stm 
171) 
create more copies of its genetic material and then look for markers that show an 
embryo carries two copies of these faulty units, or haplotypes. This would mean it 
would be affected by the condition. The technique has been used to test for 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD). It primarily affects boys, who inherit the 
disease through their mothers. Families with a history of the condition are 
currently offered embryo sex testing and no male embryos are implanted, as it is 
not possible to tell if they have the condition - even though they have a 50/50 
chance of being affected. But with the new test, doctors are able to see if an 
embryo carries the tell-tale DMD haplotypes seen in its parents, meaning more 
embryos can be selected for use. The Guy's team have applied to the Iluman 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority for licences to test for other genetic 
diseases, such as fragile X- syndrome which affects one in 4,000 boys and 
myotonic dystrophy, which affects upwards of one in 8,000. 
2.3 Motivations for sex selection 
There are various reasons for which couples want to make use of the methods and 
technology available for sex selection. In order to be able to assess the morality of 
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sex selection, I think it is important to know the motivations that guide would be 
parents to choose the gender of their offspring. 
2.3.1 Avoidance of disease or a genetic disorder 
Most people wanting to make use of these techniques are those who want to avoid 
having a child with a particular disease. One of the most common reasons given 
by couples going in for sperm sorting or PGD is to avoid sex-linked genetically 
inherited disorders. There are a number of serious disorders which are linked to a 
particular sex and are genetically inherited and most of them can prove fatal. Sex- 
linked disorders such as haemophilia and some muscular dystrophies are caused 
by genes located on the X chromosome and have severe impact on one's quality 
of life, causing suffering and pain, physical and mental impairment and often 
cutting short the patient's life. Colour blindness which is also a sex-linked 
disorder is neither serious nor fatal. Women are less prone to X linked disorders 
because they have a normal X chromosome which usually compensates for the 
abnormal one while males do not. 14 A sex-related genetic blood disorder, 
'a Mahoney, M. J., (1997), `Genetic Diseases' in Barry. L. Zaret et al(ed. ) The Yale Uiiive city School 
o/ . 1ledicine Patient's 
Guide to Medical Tests (Houghton Mifflin Co. ), pp. 500-505 
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haemophilia, which mostly affects the males leads to constant internal bleeding 
which can without treatment cripple a person's life with severe pain, joint damage. 
disability and early death. Tragically, only 25% of the people suffering from 
haemophilia receive treatment. '5 
A genetic disorder, or genetic disease is a disease caused, at least in part, by the 
genes of the person with the disease. A number of genetic disorders are due to the 
change of a single gene, resulting in an enzyme or other protein not being 
produced or having altered functionality, they are called monogenic disorders. 
The change can be trivial and relatively harmless in its effects, such as colour 
blindness, or lethal such as Tay-Sachs. Other disorders, though harmful to those 
afflicted with them, appear to offer some advantage to carriers; as in carriers of 
sickle cell anaemia and thalassemia appearing to have enhanced resistance to 
malaria. Several hereditary diseases are sex-linked, meaning that they afflict one 
sex much more commonly than the other because the mutation is located on the X 
(or, rarely, on the Y) chromosome. 
15 World Federation of Haemophilia, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http:, '/'xN-NN-xN,. wffi. org/index. asp? lang=EN 
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The inheritance pattern of single gene disorders falls mainly into four categories: 
a) Autosomal dominant in which only one mutated copy of the gene is 
needed for a person to be affected by an autosomal dominant disorder. 
Each affected person usually has one affected parent. There is a 50° 
chance that a child will inherit the mutated gene. An example of this is 
Huntington's chorea. 16 
b) Autosomal recessive in which two copies of the gene must be mutated for 
a person to be affected by an autosomal recessive disorder. An affected 
person usually has unaffected parents who each carry a single copy of the 
mutated gene (and are referred to as carriers). Two unaffected people who 
each carry one copy of the mutated gene have a 25% chance with each 
pregnancy of having a child affected by the disorder. Diseases include 
cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, Tay Sachs disease. ' 7 
c) X-linked dominant which are caused by mutations in genes on the X 
chromosome. Only a few disorders have this inheritance pattern. Females 
are more frequently affected than males, and the chance of passing on an 
X-linked dominant disorder differs between men and women. The sons of 
a man with an X-linked dominant disorder will not be affected, and his 
16 Firth, I IN., Hurst, J. A., Hall, J. G., (2005), Oxford Desk Reference -Clinical Generics 
(Oxtbrd: Oxford University Press), pp-6-7 
17 Ibid., pp. 8-9 
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daughters will all inherit the condition. A woman with an X-linked 
dominant disorder has a 50% chance of having an affected daughter or son 
with each pregnancy. An example of this is X linked hypophosphatemia. 18 
d) X-linked recessive which are caused by mutations in genes on the X 
chromosome. Males are more frequently affected than females, and the 
chance of passing on the disorder differs between men and women. The 
sons of a man with an X-linked recessive disorder will not be affected, and 
his daughters will carry one copy of the mutated gene. With each 
pregnancy, a woman who carries an X-linked recessive disorder has a 50% 
chance of having sons who are affected and a 50% chance of having 
daughters who carry one copy of the mutated gene. Diseases include 
haemophilia, Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy. 19 
Embryo selection or PGD is generally used to test for single-gene defects like 
cystic fibrosis. If a family knows that they are at risk for a disease like cystic 
fibrosis, Huntington's disease, Sickle Cell Anaemia, or Muscular Dystrophy, they 
may opt to use PGD in order to have a child that will not be at risk for these 
diseases. 20 Cystic fibrosis (CF) is the most common genetic disorder affecting the 
lungs, sweat glands and the digestive system. The symptoms of CF usually 
'x Ibid., pp. 32-33 
19 Ibid., pp. 34-35 
20 'Risk-Free Babies'.. Veit"sitc'c'k, II March 2002, p. 5 
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develop during early childhood. Both lungs and pancreas produce abnormally 
viscous mucus. This mucus begins to build up and starts to clog the opening to the 
pancreas and the lungs. The mucus in the lungs can become a growth medium for 
bacteria, resulting in chronic respiratory infections and eventual permanent 
damage to the lung tissue. As lung function deteriorates, CF patients develop 
pulmonary hypertension and eventually a failure of the right side of the heart. 
Death usually occurs from severe infection or heart failure. These thick secretions 
also obstruct the pancreas, preventing digestive enzymes from reaching the 
intestines to help break down and absorb food. The disease can be diagnosed by 
symptoms such as a high salt concentration in a baby's sweat or by genetic testing. 
Males are also frequently sterile because of the obstruction or absence of the vas 
deferens. Daily chest physiotherapy and aerosol breathing treatments are very 
commonly prescribed for CF treatment. Typical physical therapy involves manual 
chest percussion (pounding). CF patients are typically hospitalised somewhat 
regularly, often every 6 months depending on the severity of the case. Patients 
often have intravenous antibiotics. Due to advances in medical treatment, the 
median life expectancy of a newborn with cystic fibrosis increased from 4 years 
(in the 1960s) to 32 years today. These procedures include the intake of digestion 
enzymes, nutritional supplements, percussion and postural drainage of the lungs, 
improved antibiotics and inhalation of aerosols containing medication. 2' 
21 Firth, I I. V., Burst, J. A., Hall, J. G., (2005), Oxford Desk Reference : Clinical Genetics 
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Huntington's disease is characterised by abnormal body movements called chorea 
and loss of memory. The symptoms include loss of cognitive ability (thinking, 
speaking), changes in personality, jerking movements of the face and body in 
general and unsteady walking. These symptoms develop into dementia and 
cognitive decline (not mental retardation which is an older term referring to the 
lack of development of mental ability rather than loss of it. ) and an advanced form 
of jerking, chorea. It usually takes between 10-25 years for the disease to kill 
someone, and it is invariably fatal. The disease onset is in the 30s and 40s in most 
cases. One interesting fact about the disease is that it contributes to a chemical 
imbalance that leads many victims to commit suicide. This is also believed in part 
to be a result of the position in which sufferers find themselves. There is no 
treatment to help stop the progression of the disease. Fortunately, there are 
treatments available to help reduce some symptoms of the disease. Unfortunately, 
these treatments aggravate other symptoms like bradykinesia and dystonia (very 
slow movement and stiffness). There are also treatments to control abnormal 
movements and emotional symptoms like antidepressants, sedatives, and 
tranquilizers. 22 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 292-294 
22 Ibid., pp. 354-356 
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Sickle cell anaemia is a disorder in which red blood cells may change shape under 
certain circumstances. This causes the cells to become stuck in capillaries which 
deprives the downstream tissues of oxygen and causes a restriction in blood 
supply which results in necrosis. The disease usually occurs in periodic painful 
attacks, eventually leading to damage of internal organs, stroke, or anemia, and 
usually resulting in decreased lifespan. Most patients with sickle cell anemia have 
intensely painful episodes. People who are known carriers of the disease often 
undergo genetic counseling before they have a child. 23 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy is characterised by rapidly progressive muscle 
weakness which starts in the legs and pelvis and later affects the whole body. 
Boys with DMD develop weak muscles because the muscle fibers that were 
present at birth are destroyed. Symptoms usually appear in males between I and 6 
years of age, however females, on rare occasions, can develop the disease. By age 
10, braces may be required for walking, and by age 12, most children require use 
of a wheelchair for mobility. Bones may develop abnormally, causing skeletal 
deformities of the spine and other areas due to contractions. Muscular weakness 
and skeletal deformities contribute to frequent breathing disorders. The 
deterioration of the cardiac muscle of the heart wall occurs in almost all cases. 
23 Ibid., p. 335 
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Intellectual impairment occurs in approximately 30% of Duchenne's patients. but 
does not worsen as the disorder progresses. There is no known cure for Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy. Treatment is aimed at control of symptoms to maximize the 
quality of life and activity is encouraged. 24 
One should be aware however of the fact that although an embryo may test 
negative for a certain disease and will not grow up to develop that disease, when 
the adult reproduces, he or she could still pass on genes to his or her offspring that 
contribute to that particular disease. For example, a woman posesses the as 
double recessive genotype for a certain recessive disease, so we know that she 
will develop it later in life. Her husband's genotype is Aa, and thus he will not 
develop the disease. Fertilized embryos from this couple could be either Aa or aa. 
Embryo selection will eliminate all the embryos that are aa, so the Aa embryos 
will grow up healthy, but will still be able to pass on a defective a gene to their 
offspring. 25 Thus, embryo selection is a one-generation solution only. 
24 Ibid., pp. 308-31 
25 Campbell, N. A, Reece, J. B., (2002), Biology 6`h ed. (SF, London: Benjamin Cummings), 
pp. 23 S-247 
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However, embryo selection or PGD, like in vitro fertilization, is still a very 
lengthy and expensive process. Many trials may be necessary before a blastomere 
can be found that does not possess the undesirable genes. If multiple trials are 
required to obtain a viable fertilized egg, the process will involve the discarding 
of embryos that do not possess the desired genetic makeup. In addition, it is very 
important to realize that embryo selection is only truly useful for single-gene 
defects. When one gets into a discussion of testing embryos for specific traits, like 
height, and attempting to select an embryo because it will produce a taller child, 
the process becomes dicey. The problem is that many traits, like height, are 
influenced by more than one gene, it isn't feasible to test for all those particular 
genes. 
2.3.2 To balance one's family 
Moving on from selection for reasons centring around avoiding disease or picking 
for a certain trait that normally counts as a disability, in the last one or two 
decades there has been a talk about sex selection for `family balancing'. Couples 
who already have one or two daughters want to use the technology to have a son 
because they feel that their family would become balanced or in other words, 
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complete, with children of both the sexes. There were appeals made to courts in 
the U. K by couples who wanted to go in for pre-selection of sex for reasons of 
balancing their family but in accordance with the current HFEA Act, which I 
discuss in the next section, they were denied permission. 
2.3.3 A matter of cultural preference 
The sorts of reasons I have discussed in the above two sections are more common 
in the Western countries. Going to the East, especially in Asian countries like 
India and China or parts of Africa, where sex selection is usually practised in the 
form of foeticide and infanticide, people have other kinds of reasons for wanting a 
child of a particular sex. In these countries, there is a strong preference for males 
for reasons pertaining to culture, traditions and religion. 
In China, certain religious rituals can be performed only by a male offspring. 26 So 
is it in India, where funeral rights like lighting the pyre of the dead parent, 
26 Warren, M. A., ( 1999), ' Sex Selection : Individual Choice or Cultural Coercion? ' in H. Kuhse 
and P. Singer (ed. ) Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. ), p. 138 
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amongst the Hindus, is not granted to a daughter, a duty which can be fulfilled 
only by a son. 27 In a family where there are no sons, the body may be lit by 
another male relative but not by the deceased's daughter. In fact, females are not 
even permitted to go to the funeral ground. 
In India, the society being predominantly patriarchal, the family name gets passed 
on from the father to the son. People bearing only daughters feel that there is 
nobody to carry on the lineage. Daughters are even denied property rights. In the 
Hindu Undivided/Joint family the eldest male member or `karta' is empowered to 
make all the decisions concerning the family business, property, marrying off the 
children, paying off the family's debts and all others regarding the family 
members' welfare. 28 
According to the Hindu Succession Act 1956, women do not get a share in their 
ancestral property. The property gets passed on from the karta to his son and in 
the event of his having no offspring or only daughters, to his wife or the next 
27 Limbu, R., (2000), `Breaking Barriers from the Bench', Asia Times ,3 March, 
available at http: l'/NN, NN, NN,. atii-nes. com/ind-pak/BC03DfOl. 
html 
28 Chaturvedi, S. and Kumar , 
R., (2000), ` Law Panel Proposes Equal Share in Ancestral Property 
for I lindu Women', The Indian Express, 12 May 
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eldest male member in the family. Currently, women in India have no rights by 
birth. They can claim an equal share in their parent's self-acquit-ed property and 
can demand dwelling rights in their parental house only in the event of their 
divorce, widowhood or desertion by husband. 29 
Hence, in Asian countries, there are numerous socio-religious reasons for 
preferring a son over a daughter. 30 To have a daughter is economically straining 
as well. It is the duty of the parent to marry off his children. To marry off a girl 
the parents have to pay a huge dowry to the boy's family. So, from the time a girl 
is born her parents start saving up for her dowry. Everyday one comes to hear of 
numerous incidents in India related to atrocities on women like bride-burning, 
beating, extreme physical and mental abuse, torture, domestic violence and 
sometimes even murder, just for the reason that her parents didn't pay the boy and 
his family the promised sum of money or because they are unable to meet their 
increasing demands after marriage. 
29 The Hindu Succession Act (1956), Act No. 30, Sections 1-3 ], available at 
htth: //ww ww. indianlegaleagle. com/bareacts/hsa/01. htm 
30 Mallik, R., (2002), `A Less Valued Life: Population Policy and Sex Selection in India', Center 
for I Iealth and Gender Equity, available at 
http: //\\"\N-ww,. genderhealth. org; 'pubs NlallikSexSelectionlndiaOct2002. pdf 
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On the other hand, sons can contribute to their families' support early in life, by, 
working in the fields, or in a factory, in an industry, or make a living by selling 
goods, something that women cannot. The schooling of men is always given 
priority over that of women. They inherit property on their parents' deaths, bring 
brides home and give their children their families' names and status. Where 
parents have no public financial support, they have to depend on their sons for 
maintenance in their old age, since daughters leave their parental home at 
marriage and, if unmarried, lack means to support dependents. In the light of such 
a social setup, parents more often than not voice a preference for the male sex. 
2.3.4 A matter of personal preference 
Lastly, there is a class of parents who want a child of a particular sex as a matter 
of personal preference. Just as some people prefer the colour white over black, 
some parents prefer girls over boys and so they want their child to be of the sex 
they like. Some couples prefer bringing up a girl rather than a boy because they 
would like to personally experience that. They may feel that boys are naughtier or 
more difficult to control and hence, prefer bringing up a girl. 
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Some of the reasons discussed above might seem serious and compelling while 
some others might seem trivial and frivolous to opt for sex selection. In this thesis, 
I will argue that some of the reasons cited above provide us with grounds that 
make sex selection morally permissible while others do not. 
2.4 Law and Cases 
2.4.1 In the United Kingdom 
At present, medically assisted sex selection for non-medical reasons is banned in 
the U. K, Canada and Australia. 31 The British law states that parents can only 
select the sex of their child if there is a substantial risk that gender-related 
hereditary or genetic diseases could be passed on. The most reliable technique 
which can be employed for sex selection, Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
is regulated in the U. K by the Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority (HFEA) 
which says that it should be used only for detecting serious, life-threatening 
31 Jansen, R. P. S., (1998), `Evidence Based Ethics and the Regulation of Reproduction', Human 
Reproduction 9, pp. 2068-2075 
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conditions and not for minor genetic abnormalities. 32 The Authority in 1993 made 
it clear that PGD for sex selection for social reasons would not be licensed. " The 
selection of certain traits in a child using new reproductive technologies has been 
controversial in the UK courts recently. 
In 2003, a UK appeal court judgement overturned a ban on the use of tissue 
typing treatment to help save the life of a terminally ill boy. The appeal court 
allowed the parents of a boy with beta thalassaemia to go ahead with PGD to 
preselect an embryo that could be a bone-marrow donor for their terminally ill son. 
Raj and Shahana Hashmi wanted to undergo in vitro fertilisation treatment and 
PGD to screen embryos to provide a genetic match for Zain, their 4-year-old son. 
In December 2001, the Hashmis were the first couple in the UK to be approved by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) to use embryo 
selection by tissue typing to create a suitable bone marrow donor. However, after 
two failed attempts at obtaining a suitable match, a high court ruled that the 
14FEA had acted outside its powers. The three appeal court judges overruled the 
High Court decision from December 2002 which said the HFEA did not have the 
power to license the technique under current legislation. The HFEA welcomed the 
'' Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) (Norwich: HMSO), C. 37, available at 
NN'Nv\w'. hmso. gov'. uk'acts icts1990/Ukpga_19900037_en_1. htm 
331 luman Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Revised Code of Practice (2001), 5`h edition, 
available at \\-N\, N\-. hfea. gov. uk/ 
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decision and said it did not fear that the ruling would open the way to so-called 
"designer babies", with preselected features such as eye colour. 34 
The judges were unanimous in ruling that the case hinged on the interpretation of 
two provisions of the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: whether the 
proposed treatment could be described as providing treatment services "for the 
purpose of assisting women to carry children", and whether it involved a practice 
to determine "the suitability of an embryo to be placed in a woman". The judges 
ruled that these clauses did not have to be interpreted in the very narrow way 
claimed by the campaign group, Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE) which 
had brought the case against the HFEA. In the Hashmi case, the couple needed 
assistance in order to have a child that was healthy and a tissue match for Zain; 
the `suitability' of the embryo in their case depended on these same characteristics, 
which would together ensure both the well-being of the new child and of the 
whole family. It is within the powers of the HFEA, the law lords decided, to 
weigh the ethical issues involved in each licence application and decide whether 
or not to allow treatment. 
34 Ashraf, 11., (2003). 'UK appeal court upholds embryo selection ruling' , 
The Lancet 361 (9366). 
p. 13 54 
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In reaching their conclusions, the judges also took account of the 1989 Warnock 
report and the subsequent White Paper, which led to the 1990 Act. Both mention 
the potential for the development of treatments with much wider application than 
simply assisted reproduction for infertile couples. It does not seem reasonable, 
concluded the judges, for parliament to sanction such research but prohibit its 
application in medical practice. The judgement also points out the very specific 
nature of the licence granted for the Hashmi's treatment: it applies only to their 
case, and the HFEA has insisted that every case will be considered on its 
individual merits. 35 Based on the appeal court judgement in the Hashmi case, in 
2005, the House of Lords ruled unanimously that the practice of tissue typing 
could be authorised by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(IIFEA). 36 
A contrast to the Hashmi case was that of the Whittakers who had asked 
regulators to allow doctors to use IVF techniques to select a baby who would 
provide a perfect tissue match for their three-year-old son Charlie. He had a rare 
blood disorder and required a perfect match so he could undergo a bone marrow 
;s `Appeal Court judgement in the Hashmi case', The Human Genome, 23 May 2003, available at 
http: i- genome. ww"ellcome. ac. uk, 'doc° 05Fwtd020987. html 
3" Andalo, D., (2005), ' Law Lords Back'Designer Babies", 28 April, available at 
http: /%'society. guardian. co. uk/healthnews 0,8363,1472256,00. html 
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transplant and live a normal life. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) ruled the procedure could not be carried out by doctors in the 
UK. Charlie Whitaker was suffering from Diamond Blackfan Anaemia (DBA) 
which meant his body didn't produce enough red blood cells. His only chance of 
living a normal life was if bone marrow could be donated by a sibling who was a 
perfect match. 37 
In June 2003, Jamie Whittaker was born in Sheffield but the whole procedure 
took place in the United States. Doctors in the UK then planned to use stem cells 
from the blood in Jamie's umbilical cord to "kickstart" Charlie's body into fighting 
his condition - and creating a healthy supply of red blood cells. Jamie was 
genetically matched, while still an IVF embryo, to his brother. He was one of the 
nine embryos produced by his parents. Two tissue-matched embryos were 
selected and implanted in his mother's womb. Jamie was the one that survived. 
The HFEA had ruled that there were both legal and ethical uncertainties: the 
selection technique required one cell from the embryo being removed by biopsy 
and tested. Suzi Leather, the HFEA chairman was quoted in the Guardian as 
saying: "We don't know what the longterm consequences of that will be for the 
37 English, V., Romano-Critchlev G. et al, (2002), `Ethics Briefings', Journal of , tk /ical Ethics 
2S(6), pp. 3ti4-385 
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child being created". 38 Critics suggest this ruling is in contradiction with the 
Hashmi case. 
There is an important distinction between the two cases. Zain was suffering from 
a genetic disorder, which under current HFEA legislation made it ethically 
permissible to carry out a biopsy on any new embryos to ensure the ne«w baby was 
not suffering from the same disease. One cell was sufficient to test both whether 
there was a risk of the genetic disorder and whether there was a perfect tissue 
match. In the Whittaker case, Charlie's disease was not hereditary. Thus Jamie's 
embryo was subjected to a biopsy, with all its accompanying risks, not for the 
benefit of Jamie, but for his brother. HFEA rulings distinguish between biopsies 
where there is a significant risk of a serious disease (the Hashmis), and one where 
there would be no benefit to the embryo, but to another person (Charlie). 39 
In 2000, the Mastertons from Dundee were at the centre of a controversy when 
every clinic in Britain refused to allow them to choose the sex of their child. The 
couple, who had four sons had lost their three year old daughter, Nicole in an 
38 'The Price of Life', The Guardian, 20 June 2003, available at 
http: üwww. guardian. co. uk/genes'article, '0,2763,981115,00. html 
39 Ibid. 
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accident and were wanting to use PGD to have another child but were insistent on 
having a female only. They were adamant that they were not trying to replace 
Nicole but only wanted to get the "female dimension" back into their family again. 
Their case sparked a national debate when they, unsuccessfully, tried to overturn 
the British ban on sex selection. With no luck with the HFEA, the Mastertons 
traveled to Italy to undergo PGD but were unable to produce any female embryos. 
They donated their male embryo to a childless couple. 40 
2.4.2 In the United States 
It's interesting to note that the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM) is of the opinion that sex selection by sperm sorting is acceptable for 
reasons of gender variety. A background paper for the President's Council on 
Bioethics points out the ambivalence in the ASRM's ruling that allows sex 
selection by sperm sorting but not PGD. The ASRM seems to have kept 
vacillating between concerns about gender bias and concerns for the embryo, 
asserting that the "discarding of embryos based on their sex surely deserves more 
40 Seenan, G., (2001), ' 'Designer Baby' Parents Give Away Male Embryo', 5 March, available at 
http: 'iwww. guardian. co. uklgenes'article/0,2763,446411,00. html 
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consideration"41. The Genetics and IVF Institute where MicroSort is performed 
has decided to use it only for family balancing and avoidance of genetically 
inherited sex-linked diseases. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, in May 2001, has allowed MicroSort to be performed for 
gender selection if certain guidelines are adhered to. 4, In line with such rulings for 
nonmedical reasons, there are some people in the U. K. too who feel that legal 
restriction on sex selection should be lifted and the HFEA should relax its laws. 
In the US, a case that attracted a lot of criticism was that of a deaf lesbian couple 
who sought a sperm donor with a family history of deafness in order to have a 
child they hoped would be deaf. They were criticised for deliberately creating a 
deaf child, for denying their child a hearing aid, and for raising the child in a 
homosexual household. News of the couple choosing to have a deaf child was 
only revealed after the birth of their son Gauvin. 43 With PGD now, the selection 
of a desired deaf child which would suit the needs and environment of its parents, 
has become a reality. 
41 President's Council on Bioethics, (2002), Staff Background Paper: Thinking About Sex 
Selt'ction, available at http: //bioethics. gov/background/background2. html 
12 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, (2001), ` Preconception 
Gender Selection for Nonmedical Reasons', Fertility and Sterility 75(s), pp. 861-864 
43 Spriggs, NI., (2002), 'Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who is Deaf Like Them', Journal of 
. tfc'clical 
Ethics 28(5), p. 283 
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2.4.3 In China 
China has national legislation prohibiting sex selection, in particular ultrasound 
tests to reveal the sex of the foetus. However, the law is hardly enforced and often 
flouted. 44 In June 2004, the Institute of Philosophy of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences co-organised a workshop with the Research Center for Bioethics 
of Peking Union Medical College, to propose improved legal controls on sex 
selection techniques. Criminal sanctions were proposed for clinics that unlawfully 
identify foetal sex and/or perform sex based abortions. Limiting the sale of 
diagnostic ultrasound and other equipment to licensed medical facilities was 
proposed, with quotas on use. 45 
2.4.4 In India 
In 1988, the Indian state of Maharashtra enacted the Regulation and Use of Pre- 
Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act to prevent misuse for detection of female 
-'a French, H. W., (2005), As Girls "Vanish", Chinese City Battles Tide of Abortions', . \'L W 
York 
Time. 17 February, p. A3 
', Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, (2004). Action Recommendations 
on Correctin the Birth SeX Ratio Imbalance (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) 
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foetuses. In 1994, the Indian Parliament enacted the Pre-Natal Diagnostic 
Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, which drew on some 
provisions of this law. The focus of the 1994 Act is on regulation and punishment 
of misuse of "pre-natal diagnostic techniques, " which include procedures and tests. 
"Pre-natal diagnostic procedures" mean "all gynaecological or obstetrical or 
medical procedures such as ultrasonography, foetoscopy, taking or removing 
samples of amniotic fluid, chorionic villi, blood or any tissue of a pregnant 
woman" for pre-natal tests (section 3(i)). Such tests mean those "conducted to 
detect genetic or metabolic disorders or chromosomal abnormalities or congenital 
anomalies or haemoglobinopathies or sex-linked disease" (section 3(k)). 
The Act appears comprehensive in regulation of genetic counselling centres, 
clinics and laboratories, and physicians, medical geneticists and others, including 
patients and their family members. "No person conducting a pre-natal diagnostic 
procedure shall communicate to the pregnant woman concerned or her relatives 
the sex of the foetus, by words, signs or in any other manner" (section 5(2)). 
However, the Act governs only treatment of a "pregnant woman" and diagnosis of 
"a foetus". The Act does not appear to govern new techniques such as PGD, nor 
sperm-sorting preconception techniques. 
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On coming into effect in 1996, the Act was hardly enforced by the central and 
state authorities, and was openly disregarded. In 2000, a petition for enforcement 
was filed in the Supreme Court of India by two non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), resulting in the Court's order of May 4,2001.46 In 2003, the Government 
of India made its previously enacted anti sex selections laws of 1994 more 
comprehensive as the "Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques 
(Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act". 47 
Two years ago, an Indian couple who already had two daughters filed a petition in 
the Bombay High Court seeking permission to undergo treatment to have a male 
child. They said they loved their girls but wanted a son to complete their family. 
Being "God-fearing Brahmins", they did not want to undergo abortion if they had 
a female child and hence, wanted to make use of PGD which is banned under the 
Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act. 48 
The Union of India told the Bombay High Court in its affidavit that there was no 
question of lifting the ban since the Act had been passed by Parliament to prevent 
"'Supreme Court of India, (2001), Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEH, -1 T) 
and others v. Union of India, SOL Case no. 340 
a' Pereira, M., (2006), 'Female Foeticide: Unfair Deal for the Fairer Sex', Hindustan Times, 6 July 
2006 
Bhuyana, N., (2007), ' We Love our Girls but Want a Son, Says Couple', Hindustan Times, 28 
February 2007 
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any catastrophe resulting from a severe sex ratio imbalance in the country as is 
anticipated by the Government of India. 49 It might be worth noting that the case of 
China and India is special in many ways and I will take a closer look at it in a later 
chapter. 
49 `Ban on Sex Determination Needed for Balance in Society', The Times ot India, 27 %larch 1007 
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3. Trait Selection and the Moral Status of the embryo 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the most popular technology available today 
to achieve trait or sex selection is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) which 
basically involves removing one or more eggs from a woman's ovary, placing 
them in culture medium in a glass dish, and then adding sperm to the culture. This 
leads to fertilisation in eighty percent of the eggs thus treated. The embryo is then 
kept in culture for two to three days, while it grows and divides into two, four and 
then eight cells. After this, the embryo is tested for genetic defects or traits 
including gender. The defectless embryo or the one of the desired sex, as the case 
may be, is then implanted into the woman's uterus. It should be noted that this 
procedure is done at a very early stage after conception - before the embryo has 
even had a chance to implant or settle into the lining of its mother's womb (hence 
the term pre-implantation). It examines the genes of a newly conceived embryo. 
The other technique which is used mainly for sex selection is flow cytometric 
separation of X and Y sperm with the chosen and sorted sperm then being made to 
fuse with the ovum. Hence, this second procedure does not involve the creation of 
several embryos; there is no screening for genetic or chromosomal abnormalities 
and no question of destruction of embryos raised in this second procedure. 
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Several questions have been raised regarding the selection procedure and the 
implications it has on the moral status of the embryo. The question that arises here 
is whether anyone is wronged by these selection procedures. Can the sperm that 
was not sorted lose out on anything? Was the embryo that was not implanted 
because it did not have the desired traits, wronged in any way because the 
opportunity to become a being like you and me was taken away from it? Do any 
of these questions make sense? Are they even remotely relevant? The simple 
answer is No. Neither the sperm that was discarded in the drain, nor the embryo 
that was not implanted, is the sort of thing that can be wronged, the sort of thing 
that can `lose out'. In a nutshell, there was no one present at those two stages. No 
one. Some people who have opposed sex selection have opposed it on grounds 
that PGD does a moral wrong to the embryo. Helen Watt has argued that there is a 
serious problem in defending PGD because the embryo is the same individual as 
the child who may be born, with the same moral status as the older human being, 
the same organism, with the same interests. 50 
In the light of this argument opposing PGD and sex selection, I am going to 
discuss in this chapter the several positions that have been adopted on the issue of 
`o Watt, H., (2004), ' Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Choosing the "Good Enough" Child', 
tlcalth Cart' ýlncihsis 12(1), pp. 54-55 
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the moral status of the embryo and formulate my own arguments on this topic, 
concluding that if embryo or sex selection is to be opposed, it cannot be done 
from the perspective of the embryo's moral status. The meaning of moral status 
and the question whether the embryo is the same individual as the child will also 
be discussed. Much of the discussion on trait selection, sex selection, embryo 
selection has focussed on the morality of the technology being used, with 
objections being raised on the creation and discarding of embryos. I will stress 
here that the question regarding the ethics of the techniques used to achieve sex 
selection is only a secondary one for me and therefore, this thesis will only very 
briefly touch upon this discussion. 
3.1 On `being the same individual' 
John Harris presents an argument similar in nature to Watt's in his `Beethoven 
fallacy'51. It is claimed by many disability rights activists that aborting a child 
because it was congenitally deaf would mean that one had just aborted Beethoven. 
However, one could argue that neither Beethoven nor anyone existed when the 
51 Harris, J.. (1992), l1'ondent'oman and Superman (Oxford: Oxford University Press). p. 179 
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abortion was done. Elizabeth Anscombe 52 makes this point much clearer by 
arguing that a human zygote is alive, and is a human thing, a new beginning of 
human life, and not a part of any human being. By `human' is only implied the 
biological components of the cells that form the zygote. 
What Watt's claims amount to is that the newly fertilised egg, the early embryo 
and I, are the same individual. It is obvious that the zygote that gave rise to me 
and I, the adult are not the same individual; clearly, the former is a unicellular 
being totally devoid of consciousness whereas I am a conscious being consisting 
of millions of cells. So the claim that the zygote and I are the same individual 
must rely on a different sense of `individual'. Now, there is definitely a genetic 
continuity between the zygote and me so that we share the same genetic code. It 
might also be thought that we are the same single thing, so the zygote is from the 
first moment of its existence already a particular individual. However, as we shall 
see, recent scientific findings do not support the view that fertilisation marks the 
event when a particular, identifiable individual begins to exist. 
52 Anscombe, G. E., (1985), '\Vere You a Zygote? ' in P. A. Griffiths (ed. ) Philosophi' and Pruclice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 11 1-115 
51 
It is true that the life of the fertilised ovum is a genetically new life in the sense 
that it is neither genetically nor numerically continuous with the life of the e`g`g or 
the sperm before fertilisation. Before fertilisation, there were two genetically 
distinct entities, the egg and the sperm; now there is only one entity, the fertilised 
egg or zygote, with a new and unique genetic code. It is also true that the zygote 
will, other things being equal, develop into an embryo, foetus, and baby with the 
same genetic code. 
The process of twinning raises doubts over the numerical continuity of the zygote 
and the adult. After fertilisation, a genetically new zygote is formed, X, which has 
a specific genetic identity which gets repeated in every cell once the first cell 
begins to split. If on day 8, the group of cells which is X divides into two separate 
identical cell groups which continue to develop and after nine months, identical 
twins are born, is there a question of which one of them is X? The twinning 
process is quite symmetrical and both twins have the same genetic blueprint as the 
original X. However, it cannot also be said that both of them are X because that 
conflicts with numerical continuity: there was one zygote and now there are two 
babies. Is it feasible to suggest that when the original cell split, X ceased to exist 
and two new individuals, XI and X2 came into existence? If one ere to concur 
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with that suggestion, it would no longer be true that the existence of babies N1 
and X2 began at fertilisation. There are also cases in which two eggs get fertilised 
and two zygotes come into existence and then as the zygotes begin to divide, the 
two embryos combine to form a chimera and will continue to develop as a single 
organism which will eventually become a baby. In this case, who do we say is the 
baby, zygote 1 or zygote2 or is the baby someone altogether different? 
With fertilisation, a new organism does come into existence and has a new genetic 
make up but until 14 days after fertilisation, the cells that make up the zygote can 
undergo cleavage to form twins, and then we have two materially distinct carriers 
of the life that started with the formation of the zygote. Hence, till the possibility 
of twinning has ceased, that is till after the formation of the primitive streak, it 
cannot be said that an individual has begun to exist. Since early embryonic cells 
are totipotent, that is, an early human embryo is not one particular individual but 
rather has the potential to become one or more different individuals, it cannot be 
claimed that the baby born is the same individual as the zygote. It is only 14 days 
after fertilisation that totipotency has been lost and the development of the 
primitive streak precludes the embryo from becoming two or more different 
individuals through twinning. Prior to this phase, it is not even certain that the 
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embryo will gradually become a human being; it is very much possible that it 
could be a malformation of the placenta (or a hydatidiform mole) which will 
never have the capacity to become human. An embryo at conception and a few 
days after that is at best a cluster of cells with no distinction between those cells 
that will become an individual, unique embryo and those that will become the 
placenta. 
Hence, PGD and embryo selection cannot be objected to on these grounds since 
they involve very early embryos, two or three days old that have grown to the 8- 
cell stage. Besides the point of individuality, there are concerns raised regarding 
the moral wrong these procedures do to the embryos. For this we need to explore 
the meaning of moral status. 
3.2 Moral status 
To have moral status is to be morally considerable, or to have moral standing. It is 
to be an entity towards which moral agents have or can have moral obligations. 
To have moral obligations towards someone or something means that that entity 
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has a moral status and that we may not treat it in just any way we please; we are 
morally obliged to give weight in our deliberations and actions to its needs, 
interests or well-being. We are morally obliged to do this not merely because 
protecting it may benefit us or other persons but because its needs have moral 
importance in their own right. 
The concept of moral status is a means of specifying those entities towards which 
we believe ourselves to have moral obligations, as well as something of what we 
take these obligations to be. Ascriptions of moral status serve to represent very 
general claims about the ways in which moral agents ought to conduct themselves 
towards entities of particular sorts. An important feature of this concept is its 
generality. Moral status is usually ascribed to members of a group rather than 
merely to specific individuals. Moreover, it is usually ascribed on the basis of 
some property or properties that are thought to be possessed by all or most group 
members. Therefore, the moral obligations that are implied by the ascription of 
moral status to an entity are obligations to that entity. While adult, mentally able 
human beings may be said to have full moral status, a stone has none. 
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The debate regarding the moral status of embryos has been going on for years and 
it has found an important place in the literature on abortion, from the moral, legal, 
social and biological perspectives. Within this debate, there are two extreme 
positions, the conservative and the liberal. In what follows, I am going to discuss 
the different perspectives on this issue and in the later half of the chapter argue for 
my own. 
3.3 Different perspectives on moral status of embryo 
3.3.1 The conservative position 
The most extreme antiabortion position holds that a fertilised human ovum is a 
human being, with a right to life, like any other human being. For the conservative, 
it is humans, all humans, who have moral status as such. This is often called the 
extreme conservative position. The argument for this view has two parts. First, the 
conservative points out that the foetus is indisputably genetically human. 
Moreover, it is not merely a human cell, like any other cell of the body. At 
fertilisation, the egg and the sperm combine to form a new genotype. The 
fertilised egg or the single celled zygote has the full complement of 23 pairs of 
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chromosomes, one in each pair from each parent. From this single cell develop all 
the different types of tissue and organs that make up the human body. Fertilisation 
thus marks the spatiotemporal beginning of a new human being. John Noonan 
points out, "The positive argument for conception as the decisive moment of 
humanisation is that at conception the new being receives the genetic code. It is 
this genetic information which determines his characteristics, which is the 
biological carrier of the possibility of human wisdom, which makes him a self- 
evolving being. A being with a human genetic code is man. " 53 
The second part of the conservative argument maintains that, after fertilisation, 
there is no event or change in the unborn that has such moral significance that we 
could say that now we have a human being and before this event it was not human. 
Traditionally, birth has been held to mark the beginning of human life. At birth, 
the foetus is separated from the mother and is no longer physiologically 
dependent on her. Birth as a dividing line has the advantage of being objective 
and definite. However, the conservative denies that birth has such enormous 
moral significance. For him, a change in the location cannot have such drastic 
53 Noonan, J. T., Jr., (1970), ' An Almost Absolute View in History' in J. T. Noonan, Jr. (ed. ) The 
; 1I n czlih of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press). Reprinted in J. D. Arras and N. K. Rhoden (eds. ) Ethical Issues in Modern tfcdicine, 3`d 
edition (Mountain View, Calif.; Mayfield Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 261-265. 
58 
effects on the moral status since there is not much difference between a newborn 
moments after birth, and a foetus moments before it is born. 
The conservative then moves backwards through pregnancy, dismissing other 
suggested landmarks. Viability, defined as "when the foetus is potentially able to 
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid' 54 is said to be one of the 
important cut off points. The argument might be that before the foetus can survive 
independently of the mother, it is really only a part of her body, like an organ or a 
limb. However, a viable foetus though within the body of the mother is not merely 
a part of her. A mere body part is not capable of living on its own. A viable foetus 
can be separated from its mother and remain alive. The conservative responds that 
it is a mistake to identify independent existence with separate existence. The 
nonviable foetus can surely not exist independently of its mother, but it is 
nevertheless a separate individual, with its own genetic code. It is not merely a 
part of the pregnant woman's body. Moreover, the conservative denies that 
independent existence has the moral significance ascribed to it by the viability 
criterion. Babies and young children are also dependent on the care of others for 
54 Rove v. Wade (1973), 410 U. S. 1 13 , p. 160 
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their survival and people dependent on iron lungs or respirators are not less 
human, less worthy of protection, than the rest of us. 55 
Nor does the conservative find moral relevance in any earlier stages, like 
quickening which refers to the mother's ability to perceive foetal movement. 
Probably the view that human life begins at quickening stems from the 
biologically inaccurate view that the foetus is not alive before it moves. We now 
know that even the single celled zygote or the sperm or ovum for that matter are 
alive , there is no reason to base moral status on the foetus's ability to move and 
even less reason to make its moral status depend on its mother's alertness in 
detecting movement. 
The foetus begins to look recognisably human between 12 and 16 weeks of 
gestation. It inay not look much like a baby, but it is clearly a human foetus. There 
is clearly a difference between an early foetus and a late one, the former being 
difficult to distinguish from an animal foetus at the same stage of development. 
But does this difference in appearance have moral significance? The conservative 
ss warner, R., (1974), `Abortion: The Ontological and Moral Status of the Unborn' , 
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denies that it does, on the grounds that this suggests that deformed human beings 
who do not look like other people lack human moral status. 
Finally, it has been suggested that human life begins when brain waves first 
appear. After all, the absence of brain function marks the end of human life. The 
extreme conservative attaches no more significance to the emergence of brain 
waves than to any other developmental stage in the life of the unborn. If the 
embryo is not killed, it has a good chance of acquiring brain waves, human form, 
the capacity for movement, viability, and every other human feature. The extreme 
conservative therefore, concludes that no stage or feature can have decisive moral 
significance such that procedures like abortion are permissible before the foetus 
attains it, but not after. For them, every successive stage is just development from 
the beginning. 
So, the first part of the extreme conservative position attaches moral significance 
to the genetic humanity of the foetus. The second argues that this humanity is 
present from conception onward. Baruch Brody, who holds a modified 
conservative position, bases the moral status of the unborn on its being human. 
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However, he, unlike Noonan, does not agree than humanity begins at conception. 
Brody argues that a functioning brain is essential for being human. When the 
brain stops functioning, the person dies and goes out of existence. By the same 
reasoning, the foetus starts to count as human when its brain begins to function. 
So the human being who begins when brain function starts is not identical with 
the embryo whose brain has not yet begun to function. 56 
The onset of brain function, taken as a physiological occurrence, is not different 
from any other change in the foetus. The significance of brain function lies rather 
in its connection with or the capacity for mental states, such as conscious 
experience. Brody suggests this when he says, " One of the characteristics 
essential to a human being is the capacity for conscious experience, at least at a 
primitive level. Before the sixth week, the foetus does not have this capacity. 
Thereafter as the electroencephalographic evidence indicates, it does. 
Consequently, that is the time at which the foetus becomes a human being. " 57 
Brody, B., (I 975), Abortion and the Sanctity ofLife (Cambridge, Mass.: The h1 IT Press), p. 1 11 
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However, the phrase "capacity for conscious experience" is ambiguous. It might 
refer to the physiological capacity of a being to have conscious experiences at 
some point in its development. The foetus at six weeks after conception certainly 
has the capacity for conscious experience in this sense, but so does the single 
celled zygote. So this must not be what Brody intends. In another sense of 
`capacity', a being has the capacity for an experience x if x occurs, given the 
appropriate stimulus. A frog has the capacity to feel pain if, on being subjected to 
certain kinds of stimuli, the frog feels pain. However, in this sense of `capacity', 
neither a zygote nor a six weeks old foetus has the capacity for conscious 
experience. The emergence of brain waves is only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition of conscious experience. 
The physiology of pain perception indicates that the foetus during the first 
trimester and probably well into the second trimester, is not sentient. The neural 
pathways are not sufficiently developed to transmit pain messages to the foetal 
cortex until 22-24 weeks of gestation. 58 If the early foetus is not sentient, it is 
unlikely to have conscious experience of any kind. The ability to feel pain would 
precede more highly developed cognitive states, such as thoughts, emotions, and 
58 : nand, K. J. S. and Hickey, P. R., (1987). ' Pain and Its Effects in the Human Neonate and 
Foetus', The, Vc'i+" England Journal of . tIedicim', 317 (21), p. 1 322 
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moods. Now, if the capacity for conscious experience is a necessary condition of 
humanity, as pointed out by Brody, then the foetus is not human until the end of 
the second trimester. This criterion for moral status supports a liberal, rather than 
a conservative stance on abortion. 
There is also another modified conservative position which maintains that 
implantation has moral significance, because the numerical identity of the unborn 
is decided then. Implantation begins approximately on the sixth day following 
fertilisation, and takes about a week. Mary Warnock notes, "Both the internal and 
external processes of development are crucial to the future of the embryo. If the 
inner cell mass does not form within the blastocyst, there is no further embryonic 
development; while if implantation does not occur, the blastocyst is lost at or 
before the next menstrual period. "59 
The chances of an embryo's developing into a foetus improve significantly after 
implantation occurs. This is one reason for choosing implantation as the decisive 
moment of humanisation. Another reason is that implantation coincides with the 
59 Warnock, M., (1985),. 4 Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embrovologi (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 59-60 
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formation of the primitive streak which is the precursor of the spinal cord. After 
the primitive streak forms, embryonic fission, which produces identical twins, 
cannot occur. As Mary Warnock says, "Before 14 days, the embryo hasn't yet 
decided how many people it is going to be". 60 The chance of twinning, though 
very small, makes it impossible to say that at fertilisation there exists a unique 
human being. Once implantation has taken place, there is only one, unique 
individual. Adoption of this implantation criterion for humanity would rule out all 
surgically induced abortion as well as abortions induced by certain pills that occur 
after implantation. However, it would permit abortion caused by the morning after 
pill or menstrual extraction and indeed some birth control devices such as the IUD 
may prevent conception by preventing implantation. They are actually therefore 
very early abortion techniques which work strictly not as contraceptives, that is 
not by preventing conception but by ensuring that any egg that is fertilised will 
fail to implant in the womb. 
Now, there is an objection to the conservative position which maintains that the 
assumption that genetic humanity is relevant to moral status, is radically confused. 
60 Lockwood, M1., (1988), ' Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When does Potentiality 
Count'. '', Bioethics 2(3), p. 190 
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This will be dealt with in the next section and it is from this debate that the 
personhood view takes its name. 
3.3.2 The position on personhood 
Proponents of the person view accuse the conservatives of believing that all 
humans have moral status as such, for being `human'. They maintain that the 
conservative position is based on a narrow interpretation of the word `human', 
that it ignores a deeper understanding of moral status and the kinds of beings it 
can be attributed to. A human foetus is undeniably genetically human but this 
sense of human lacks moral relevance, according to person-view proponents, such 
as Mary Anne Warren. It is not genetic human beings who have a special moral 
status and a right to life, but persons. The special moral status cannot be based on 
anything so arbitrary as species membership but must instead be defined in terms 
of the possession of certain psychological and cognitive capacities, including 
consciousness, self-awareness, reasoning, language, self-motivation. Warren 
concedes that the possession of all these capacities may not be necessary for 
personhood, but a being who possessed none of these characteristics is clearly not 
a person. So a foetus is clearly not a person and even a late gestation foetus with 
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some degree of conscious awareness has fewer of the person-making 
characteristics than does a dog. Warren therefore concludes that it is not seriously 
wrong to kill a foetus. 61 
A worrisome objection to the person view is that it justifies not only abortion but 
also infanticide. A newly born infant is not significantly different from a late 
foetus in terms of person-making characteristics. A newborn is conscious and 
sentient, but then so is a late-gestation foetus and so are many nonhuman animals. 
If the advocates of the personhood view set the requirements for it low enough to 
include newborns, they will have to acknowledge the personhood of late gestation 
foetuses and also most animals. So if infanticide is wrong, then so is killing 
animals for food. On the other hand, if they require more than sentience for 
personhood, neither animals nor human babies will be persons. Most people 
would regard this true for animals but would object to the killing of babies. 
Michael Tooley, another proponent of the person view maintains that the 
opposition to infanticide is not based on rational principles. It is a mere taboo, like 
the taboo against masturbation or oral sex. 62 
"' Warren, M. A., (19733), ' On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', The . t/onist 
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One objection to Warren's analysis is that it relies on an ambiguity of the word 
4 person', between its descriptive and normative senses. In its descriptive sense, 
the word `person' refers to a being with certain psychological traits, such as 
consciousness, self-consciousness and rationality. In its normative sense, a person 
is someone with full moral standing and, in particular, a right to life. Warren 
simply assumes that all and only descriptive persons are normative persons. She 
overlooks in her account an explanation of the moral significance of the capacities 
that make someone a descriptive person. Without this explanation, the person 
view is also an arbitrary criterion. 63 
The moral significance of rationality and self-consciousness lies in their 
connection with moral agency. A moral agent is someone who is responsible for 
his or her own actions, who can be held accountable, praised and blamed. This 
requires the ability to consider the merits of possible courses of action, decide 
which is the best thing to do, and to act on that judgement. Such activity is 
possible only for intelligent, reflective and self-aware beings. Moral agents are 
also capable of moral reasoning, which involves detachment from one's own 
63 Feinbeirg, J., (1986), 'Abortion' in T. Regan (ed. ) Matter of Life and Death : Netiv Introductory 
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personal perspective and interests. Due to their ability to engage in moral 
discourse, to change their behaviour in response to rational considerations, to 
refrain from injurious behaviour if others are willing to refrain likewise, moral 
agents thus possess a unique moral status. 
Like Warren, Tooley maintains that all and only descriptive persons have a right 
to life. Whereas Warren takes this to be self-evident, Tooley has an argument 
which starts by adopting Feinberg's interest principle. According to the interest 
principle, all and only beings that can have interests can have rights. Tooley takes 
this one step further and argues that particular rights are connected with specific 
sorts of interests. So, an individual cannot have a particular right R unless that 
individual is capable of having some interest I that is furthered by its having right 
R. 64 The desire protected by a right to life is a desire for one's own continued 
existence. The thinking behind this may be that your life is your own and does not 
belong to anyone else. To have this desire to go on living your own life, one must 
possess a bundle of fairly complex concepts, including the concept of something 
continuing to exist and the concept of a continuing subject of experiences. In 
addition, the desire for one's own continued existence is a desire that this subject 
of experiences should continue to exist. Thus, to have the desire for continued 
64 I oolev, M., (1983), Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 100 
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existence, one has to be able to think of oneself as a subject of continuing 
experiences. Tooley concludes that only beings who have this concept can have a 
right to life. 65 
Two responses might be made to this argument. It might be argued that a desire to 
live does not require the concept of oneself as a continuing subject of experiences. 
All that is necessary is the capacity to have desires in general, and a preference for 
survival, which can be expressed in some form in one's behaviour. Plants cannot 
have a desire to live, because they do not have desires at all. But conscious, 
sentient beings who struggle to avoid death may be said to want to live, and so to 
have an interest in continued existence. 
The other response to Tooley takes account of the two senses of the word 
`interest'. Whatever promotes a being's good or welfare is in its interest, let's call 
it interest 1. The things that one wants or pursues, the things in which one takes an 
interest, are interest2. Only beings that have the concept of a self can have an 
interest? in continued existence. But it doesn't follow that only beings with a 
Tooley, M., (1984), 'A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide' in J. Feinberg (ed. ) The Problem of 
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concept of a self can have an interestl in continued existence. Rights can surely 
protect interests 1, as well as interests2. So, if continued existence is in a being's 
interest, it can have a right to life, even if it cannot take an interest in its own 
continued existence. Is there any reason to deny that life can be in the interest of 
animals, babies and other individuals without concepts of self? 
Tooley gives us the example of a preconscious embryo that develops into a person, 
Mary. Mary has a happy life and is glad that her mother did not abort her. So it 
may be said that it was in Mary's interest that the embryo from which she 
developed was not destroyed. However, Tooley argues that it is a mistake to think 
that therefore not killing it was in the embryo's interest. The embryo, he says is 
not a subject of consciousness and does not have any interests at all, and so cannot 
have an interest in its own continued existence. 
He extends the same reasoning to children as well. A human baby that is sentient 
and has simple desires, but is not yet capable of having a desire for its own 
continued existence, even if it will develop into an individual with a happy life, 
Tooley denies that it is in the baby's interest not to be killed. He says that we 
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mistakenly attribute to the baby an interest in continued existence because we 
wrongly identify the baby with the adult person she becomes. NVe then think that 
because it is in the adult Mary's interest that she was not destroyed when she was 
a baby that it must be also in the baby Mary's interest not to be destroyed. Tooley 
maintains that such an identification is justifiable only if there are causal and 
psychological connections between adult Mary and baby Mary. 66 
It can be objected that Tooley assumes that there are no causal or psychological 
connections between a baby and the adult person she becomes, which is very 
much opposed to the research findings of psychology. And, even if there is a 
radical discontinuity between the baby and the adult it becomes, it does not follow 
that the baby cannot have an interest in its own continued existence. The baby 
cannot take an interest in its continued existence because it lacks the necessary 
concepts for that desire. Still, life can be in the baby's interest. Life is in a being's 
interest if the experiences that comprise its life, on the whole, are happy and 
enjoyable ones. Such a life is a good to the being in question. Infants, animals, 
severely mentally retarded humans, can enjoy their lives and we can certainly 
preserve their lives for their own sake. It is only when life is miserable that we 
66 Tooley, M., (1984), 'A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide' in J. Feinberg (ed. ) Th1' Problem of 
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begin to doubt whether continued existence is a benefit. If this is right, then we do 
not need a self-concept to have interestl in continuing to exist. All that is 
necessary is the ability to enjoy one's life. Continuing to live is then certainly in 
the baby's interest, because of the value to him of his life right now. A right to life 
protects his interest1 in his life. So it could be concluded that there is no bar to 
ascribing a right to life to newborns. 67 The same could be said of the late 
gestation foetus as well. 
There is another sophisticated conservative position which acknowledges that 
zygotes, embryos and early foetuses do not suffer from being aborted, nor does 
death deprive them of happy lives. Nevertheless, it maintains that even a zygote 
has an interest in not being killed. This interest in continued existence does not 
derive from the kind of life it has now, but rather from the kind of life it will have, 
if it is allowed to develop and grow. Such arguments are known as arguments 
from potential. 
67 Strong, C., (1991), ' Delivering Hydrocephalic Foetuses', Bioethics 5(1), pp. 7-11 
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3.3.3 The potentiality argument 
The basic idea behind this argument is that it is wrong to kill, or otherwise prevent 
the development of, a human fertilised egg because it possesses the potential to be 
a descriptive person. It is potentially like us and so we cannot deny it any rights or 
other forms of protection that we accord ourselves. A fertilised egg does not now 
have any of the properties of a person. It isn't even sentient but this does not 
matter because left alone and allowed to develop, the zygote will become a person. 
So, it is not yet just like us. The argument concludes that we should not interfere 
with its natural development towards becoming a rational, self-conscious being. 
Hence, we should treat a potential human subject as if it were already an actual 
human subject. 68 
A standard objection to the argument from potential is that it involves a logical 
mistake. The mistake consists in thinking of a potential person as a kind of a 
person, and on this basis ascribing to a potential person the rights of other persons. 
But potential persons are not persons, they do not now have the characteristics of 
68 Buckle, S., (1988), ' Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2(3), p. 227 
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persons. For if A had rights only because he satisfies some condition P, it does not 
follow that B has the same rights now because he could have the property P at 
some time in the future. It only follows that he will have rights when he has P. He 
is a potential bearer of rights as he is a potential bearer of P. 69 Hm ever, it could 
be said that the defender of the argument from potential is only saying that 
potential persons ought to have the same rights as actual persons. 
Don Marquis argues that abortion is seriously immoral for the same reason as 
killing an adult human being is. 70 What makes killing wrong is not primarily the 
effects on other people, or the threat to the fabric of society. What makes killing 
wrong is the effect on the victim. The loss of one's life is one of the greatest 
losses one can suffer. The loss of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, 
activities, projects, and enjoyments that would have otherwise constituted one's 
future. When I am killed I am deprived of the values of my future. Hence, 
abortion is prima facie morally wrong. Marquis maintains that this is not an 
argument based on the wrongness of killing potential persons, since the central 
category here is of having a valuable future like ours. For him, the value of one's 
69 Benn, S., (1984), ' Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for Persons' in J. Feinberg (ed. ) The 
Problem of. ahortion 2"d ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Punblishing Company), p. 14 
70 Marquis, D., (1989), ' Why Abortion is Immoral? ', The Journal of Philosophy 76(4), pp. 183- 
202 
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present life is irrelevant, what matters is the future of which one is deprived by 
death. 
The strongest objection to the argument from potential is that it seems to make 
contraception morally wrong. If the objection to abortion is that it deprives the 
zygote of a future like ours, then the same complaint can be made of contraceptive 
techniques that kill sperm, or prevent fertilisation. Why don't gametes have a 
future like ours? Why aren't unfertilised eggs and sperm also potential people'? 
John Harris argues that to say that a fertilised egg is potentially a human being is 
just to say that if certain things happen to it , like implantation and certain others 
do not, like abortion, it will eventually become a human being. But the same is 
also true of the unfertilised egg and sperm, that if certain things happen to the egg, 
like meeting a sperm and likewise certain things happen to the sperm, like 
meeting an egg, and thereafter certain things do not happen, like meeting a 
contraceptive, then they will eventually become a new human being. 71 However, 
very few defenders of the potentiality principle are willing to accept this 
conclusion. R. M. Hare is perhaps the only potentiality theorist who is willing to 
71 I larris, J., (1985), The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London : Routledge & 
Kegan Paul), pp. I I-12 
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accept that not only is abortion morally wrong, but so is contraception and 
abstinence. 
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Although the chances of any particular sperm becoming a person are very small, 
why should that prevent its being a potential person? Is not every entrant in a 
lottery a potential winner, even if the odds of winning are extremely low? Every 
gamete may be said to have the potential to develop into a person, even though 
very few do. Rosalind Hursthouse maintains that thinking about potentiality in 
terms of the chance to become a human being involves confusion about the 
conception of potentiality. It is not the probability of a foetus' becoming a human 
being that make it a potential person, but rather the fact that this is the result of 
natural development or what the foetus will become if nothing external 
intervenes. 73 
It could be said that while neither the sperm nor the egg is a particular potential 
person, each is potentially some person, that is the person it will develop into if it 
fuses with another gamete. Why should its potential personhood be diminished 
72 1fare, R. M., (1975), ' Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Pubic Affairs 
4(3), pp. 201-222 
7 ' Hursthousc, R., (1987), Beginning Lives (Oxford: Blackwell &Open University), p. 80 
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because we are unable to say which person it will be? As Singer puts it. 
"Potentiality is one thing: uniqueness is something quite different". ^' From a 
consequentialist standpoint, there is no crucial difference between the fertilised 
egg, on the one hand, and the sperm and unfertilised egg on the other. The sperm 
and egg when considered jointly, also have the potential to produce a future 
human subject, even though that potential is not activated until fertilisation occurs. 
75 Buckle refers to the deontological version of the argument from potential as 
well, which he calls `respect for capacities of individuals' argument. Respect is 
due to an existing being because it possesses the capacity or power to develop into 
a being which is worthy of respect in its own right. Respect is owed to such a 
being because it is the very same being as the later being into which it develops. 76 
It is the identification of the zygote with the later person that makes both a zygote 
a potential person and entitles it to respect and concern. Neither the sperm nor the 
unfertilised egg has the same genetic code as the being who develops from their 
union, so neither is the same being as the fertilised egg. Although the sperm and 
egg considered jointly have the potential to produce a human subject, they do not 
have the potential to become a human subject. However, what makes it seriously 
" Singer, P., and Dawson, K., (1988), ' IVF Technology and the Argument from Potential', 
Philosophy and Public. I ffnirs 17(2), p. 96 
75 Buckle, S., (1988), 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2(3), p. 241 
"' Ibid., p. 2A 
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wrong to kill entities that can become persons, but not at all morally wrong to 
destroy entities that can produce persons? 
A different perspective in the abortion debate which could be bracketed in the 
liberal position comes from Judith Jarvis Thomson. It is the argument that centres 
on the mother's right to her body and considers that the status of the embryo is not 
important when deciding whether to have an abortion or not. 
3.3.4 The argument from bodily self-determination 
In 1971, J. J. Thomson came up with a different view on the abortion debate. " She 
noted that most debates about abortion centre on the moral status of the embryo, 
whether it is a person and can have a right to life. This is because people have 
generally thought that if we accept the premise that the foetus is a person, then it 
follows that abortion is always wrong. The argument goes like this: All persons 
have a right to life (let us assume that for the sake of argument). The foetus is a 
77 Thomson, J. J., (1971), 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public. -1 if sirs 1(l), pp. 47-66 
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person, and so it has a right to life. The mother has the right to decide what 
happens to her body but the right to life is stronger than the , roman's right to 
decide, and so outweighs it. So the foetus may not be killed. 
Thomson challenges this argument. She argues that even if we grant the 
personhood of the foetus, abortion is not necessarily wrong since in some cases 
abortion does not violate the foetus-person's right to life. For her, having a right 
to life does not entitle a person to whatever he or she needs to stay alive, and in 
particular does not entitle him to the use of another person's body. She illustrates 
this with her example of the unconscious violinist who has been found to have a 
fatal kidney ailment, and you alone have the right blood type to help. So the 
Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped you and the circulatory system of the 
violinist has been plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract 
poisons from his blood as well as your own. This is a matter of nine months only. 
Thomson questions whether it is morally incumbent on you to accede to this 
situation. This example perfectly exemplifies the pregnancy situation without 
casting any doubts on the personhood of the victim. Given that the violinist is a 
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person, do you murder him or violate his right to life if you unplug yourself? 
Thomson's central theme is very well demonstrated here, that the right to life does 
not necessarily include getting whatever you need to live. The right to life does 
not imply a right to use another person's body. 
It could however be objected that the foetus does have a right to use the pregnant 
woman's body because she is partly responsible for its existence. By engaging in 
intercourse, by knowing that this may result in the creation of a person inside her 
body, she implicitly gives the resulting person a right to remain. Of course, this 
argument would not work in a case close to the violinist example, that of 
pregnancy due to rape. A woman who is pregnant due to rape does not voluntarily 
engage in sexual intercourse, and so cannot be said to have given the foetus the 
permission to use her body. According to Thomson, the foetus whose existence is 
caused by rape has no right to use the pregnant woman's body. Killing it therefore, 
does not violate its right to life. But what about pregnancies resulting from 
voluntary intercourse? Thomson responds that even when the woman voluntarily 
engages in sex, she may not be responsible for the presence of the foetus. She 
argues that responsibility for an outcome depends on what one has done to 
prevent it. She suggests that if one has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent 
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something from happening, then she has not been negligent and should not be 
held responsible for its having occurred. So whether the woman can be said to 
have given the foetus a right to use her body would depend on such variables as 
whether she was using a reliable contraceptive that happened to fail. 78 
Some critics of Thomson like Warren have objected to her defence of abortion for 
concentrating exclusively on rights. The real question, they say, is not what 
constitutes giving the unborn person a right to use one's body, but rather the 
conditions that make aborting the foetus morally permissible. This gives us a very 
narrow defence of abortion. 79 
78 Ibid. 
79 Warren, M1. A., (1973), ` On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', The . t/Qnist 57(1), pp. 43n 
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3.4 A different stand: my gradualist position 
Before I go on to spell out my arguments on this issue, I would like to tie in the 
concept of moral status that we discussed earlier with a theory of value. This is 
important for my purpose since I intend to establish the value of life for a being. 
Something can be said to have an instrumental value, that is it is valued only as a 
means to gain an end. Money for instance is valued only because of what it can 
buy, and what those things mean to us and how they contribute to our pleasure or 
well being. A thing can be said to have a limited value, that is its value is limited 
to a certain characteristic, like the capacity to feel pain. Since the value is limited 
to this characteristic, the obligations are limited to it. So we may kill animals for 
meat and fur, as long as we do not inflict pain unnecessarily. Individual value 
however, involves treating an individual as an end in itself and their value is based 
on intrinsic characteristics which refers direct obligations toward the being as a 
whole. 
So in order to ascertain the moral status of something, that is to find out what 
moral obligations we have toward something, we need to first fix what kind of a 
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value can be attributed to the being/thing in question. For this we need to look at 
the object of our study in question and ask why it has any value at all, when it 
begins to acquire this value and what is it that gives it the value that requires our 
moral consideration. In this thesis, my main concern is the embryo, the child and 
the adult human and even though my position may have immense implications for 
other creatures, I will not be taking those into consideration since it does not serve 
my purpose and answer the question on which this thesis is based. 
Let me begin with a category that without any doubt or dispute is believed to have 
such value that its life requires protection and anyone who violates this is said to 
have done a grave moral wrong to the subject in question. The category I am 
talking about is that of adult humans. Let me add here that adult humans therefore 
belong to the category of persons, which is just a label for those beings who have 
individual value. So why is it that my life has a value that requires others to 
refrain from doing any harm to me and my life, and to take my needs, interests 
and wellbeing into consideration while acting? What is it that accords adult 
humans the individual value that requires them to be treated as ends in themselves? 
The answer lies in the fact that I am a rational, moral being, who values his own 
life, is self-conscious as also conscious about others, who has the ability to think 
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of himself as an entity that continues over time and one who has the ability to 
make future plans for his life. John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding defines a person as a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from 
thinking and seems to me essential to it. 80 
So it is this capacity for self-consciousness coupled with minimal intelligence that 
is not only considered the necessary condition for moral agency but minimum 
condition for almost any deliberative behaviour. It is these capacities that allow 
individuals to value their own existence and that of others. It allows individuals to 
take an interest in their own futures and to take a view about how important it is 
for them to experience whatever future is available. On this account the wrong 
done to an individual when his existence is ended prematurely is the wrong of 
depriving that individual of something he values. 81 What comes out of this is that 
adult persons have full moral status, we accord them individual value because of 
certain defining characteristics and abilities that they have; in a nutshell, that they 
go Locke, J., (1690'1964), Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A. S. Pringle-Pattison (ed. ) 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 188 
81 Harris, J., (1985), The Value of Life (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 17 
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have value because they can value their own lives. I will come back to this later 
when I tie this in with my argument on the moral status of the embryo. 
Hence, on Locke's view, a stone or a plant would be a non-person, something 
bereft of moral status. We do not take away anything from them that they would 
prefer not to have taken from them. For this activity of conceiving a harm, it has 
to be able to value that which is being taken from it. However, taking the life of a 
sentient creature will count as a moral wrong that may have something to do with 
causing pain or suffering to it. 
Talking about the value of life, I would like to bring into discussion the view held 
by Ronald Dworkin 82 . Dworkin argues that human life is sacred or inviolable 
because of what it represents or embodies, that once a human life is begun, it is 
very important that it flourish and not be wasted. According to Dworkin, 
something is sacred or inviolable when its deliberate destruction would dishonour 
what ought to be honoured. He goes on to state that it is a kind of cosmic shame 
when a species that nature has developed ceases, through human actions, to exist. 
S2 Dworkin, R., (1993), Life's Dominion : An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (London 
I larperCollins) 
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There are two problems that I see with this view. Firstly, it begs the question as to 
why human life is sacred, why it ought to be honoured, what is in it that requires 
moral protection and sustenance. It seems as if Dworkin is talking of human life 
as a valuable thing in itself, without the involvement of the being at all who is 
going to live this life and what his own life means to him. What does `human life' 
mean anyway ? On his account, we would have to save every `human life' that 
came into existence, does that mean measures should be taken that every 
conception results in the birth of a child? On the talk of the species, I do not see 
why we are morally obliged to protect a particular species that is causing immense 
harm to persons. If a plague spreads in a city, there is no reason why we should be 
morally obliged to protect the particular species of rats that are causing the disease 
and leading to the death of people who matter morally. 
Dworkin goes on to argue that the life of a single human organism commands 
respect and protection no matter in what shape or form because of the complex 
creative investment it represents and because of our wonder at the divine or 
evolutionary processes that produce new lives from old ones. If that holds true for 
single human organisms, it should also hold true for certain plant or animal forms, 
because there may be a hugely complex creativity at work that escapes our 
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understanding and which might cause wonder in us. Mutations in genes. 
cancerous cells, viruses, why should they be left out of that complexity, creativity, 
processes that happen in nature which leave us in awe of them? We would thereby 
be required to allow all of these to flourish and be morally obligated to do so! 
Moving away from adult human persons then to embryos or foetuses that they 
came from, the question that needs answering is what kind of beings are these 
foetuses, do they fall in the purview of moral consideration, do they have any 
value, what about their moral status, what kind of obligations do we have towards 
them, or do they not matter at all? In answering this question, I am going to move 
away from the traditional camps, that of the conservatives and the liberals. The 
entire debate on abortion and killing of the foetus seems to be centred on the 
question of personhood. It seems as if an answer to that question gives us an 
instant answer to the all important moral question regarding the permissibility of 
killing a foetus. The conservatives seem to be saying that conception is the 
beginning of human life and since human life is sacred, the foetus should not be 
treated in any which way as one wants. The liberals stand on the extreme end of 
this debate and oppose the conservatives by arguing that a foetus does not have 
the properties that an adult human has, it has no characteristics that qualify it as a 
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person, and therefore, we have no obligation to respect them. Thus, the tussle 
between the two camps continues and the central question which comes up in the 
debate is whether the foetus is a person that needs to be protected, who is harmed 
by the act of killing. The conservative answers this question in the affirmative and 
thus becomes an antiabortionist whereas the liberal answers this question in the 
negative and becomes a proabortionist. However, neither agrees with the other 
and the dispute continues over the moral status of the foetus and the stance on the 
moral permissibility and implications of killing it or treating it in ways humans 
desire. 
I am uncomfortable with these two positions and I do not find myself belonging to 
either camp. One of the reasons for it being that I am unhappy with the very 
question itself on which the entire debate revolves. Rather than asking the 
question whether the foetus is a person or not, the dog is a person or not, whether 
the lives of any of these creatures is in any way similar or dissimilar to the life of 
an adult human being, we should be asking what sort of a being the creature in 
question is, what sort of a value do we attribute to its life. 
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I have two main reasons for making the claim that I am attempting to redefine this 
debate, by shifting the focus from person to moral status on account of the gradual 
acquisition of value and respect. Firstly, the personhood debate so far has only 
yielded answers in the form of Yes or No, in the form of an All or Nothing with 
respect to the value of the foetus. The personhood debate polarises itself on the 
two extreme ends of the scale called moral status and does not allow the embryo 
to have anything apart from either `a moral status' or `no moral status'. In this 
chapter, I wish to reject the extremes of the personhood debate and argue for 
`some moral status' for the embryo and allow more flexibility to the debate. 
My second reason for moving out of that debate is due to the nature of the 
questions that I ask, which seem to be very different from those that the 
personhood debate addresses. Whereas the personhood debate deals with more 
practical questions, such as whether abortion is permissible or not, questions 
which may have to have a Yes or a No with regard to the moral status of the 
foetus, the kind of questions that I am interested in answering in this thesis does 
not deal with the same kind of practical issues, those that have to be answered 
either directly in the affirmative or the negative. My main questions related to the 
moral status of the foetus are concerned with choices, what kind of parental 
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choices are permissible, when does the State have the right to interfere, what can 
cause harm and what kind of harm. What I am interested in knowing is when the 
foetus begins to matter morally, when does the biological human life begin to 
attract moral considerations from other moral agents, why does anyone have to be 
morally considerate of adult humans and would that apply to foetuses which 
became them. My questions can have answers which lie anywhere between the 
two extremes of the scale of the moral status of the embryo. My answers can 
attribute `some moral status' to the embryo. 
I remove myself from the debate where the fulcrum is the adult human being and 
all comparisons have that as their point of reference. To be more precise, the 
personhood debate asks a very specific question; how does a foetus compare to a 
person, where the standard example of a person is the adult human being. Rather 
than focusing on adult human beings as unquestioning examples of personhood, 
we should ask why do adult human beings possess moral status and whether 
foetuses, without being adult human beings, can share in this status. 
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In the discussion carried above, I have tried to ascertain why and what gives adult 
human beings full moral status. In what will follow, I try and question if the 
foetus could count as a being with any value and thus if any moral status could be 
accorded to it. In doing so, I shall look at what makes the foetus what it is and 
whether its characteristics give rise to moral considerations to the foetus. 
Before embarking on a fully-fledged discussion of this topic, I want to set aside 
the talk of moral status of the foetus and the philosophical arguments regarding it. 
Instead, I want to talk a little bit about the reactions that people normally have 
when abortion is mentioned, their intuitions regarding embryos and their 
importance. One comes across very emotive responses when the option of 
abortion is mentioned to a woman who is pregnant, or even generally when the 
discussion of abortion is thrown open. And this reaction is very different from 
what one comes across if the option of surgery is mentioned to someone who is 
suffering from appendicitis or even cancer. There is a belongingness, there is an 
attachment that is so vividly present in matters of removal of the foetus and so 
vividly absent in matters of removal of a cluster of cells or an appendix. And this 
might be because of the nature of the entity that we are talking about, the foetus as 
opposed to an organ of the body or a mass of tissues and cells. There may be 
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psychological reasons against abortion, the emotional distress that one goes 
through when thinking that one is actually making a decision that will stop 
something from becoming one's own child, or that one is curtailing a process that 
would result in a human life, which may be considered valuable in itself. I am not 
appealing to any of the general gut reactions of people as the basis of my 
philosophical position and arguments on this topic. However, having said that, it's 
always very interesting to look out and see what and why people feel the way they 
do. It might just be a pointer in a direction that I want to head in! 
Coming back to the central theme of this section, according to the theory which I 
am going to discuss here, the foetus has a varying moral status. Initially, it is like 
a bit of tissue or an organ of the body. As it develops gradually, it becomes in 
most morally relevant respects, like a lower animal, then like a higher one, and in 
the later stages of its development, it is like a baby and has equivalent moral 
status. This view seems to be the only reasonable reaction to the difficulties that 
we have encountered with the previous ones, the conservative and the liberal. 
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If we want to hold on to the premise that infanticide is wrong and research on 
babies and breeding them for that purpose is totally impermissible, then any of the 
liberal views about the status of the foetus would require birth as the all important 
boundary line. But the fact of premature birth tends to shift the birth boundary line 
back to viability and the possibility of advancement in medical technology 
threatens to shift the viability boundary line all the way back to conception. In 
trying to maintain that babies are, as the conservative view maintains, like adult 
human beings when considering questions of killing, the liberal views are actually 
driven towards the conservative. However, a defence of an early abortion to avoid 
risks to the mother's life or because the pregnancy has resulted from rape, and 
holding the belief at the same time that that killing is not on par with the killing of 
a baby for the same reasons, would require a moral distinction between the early 
and late foetus, and hence, one would have to abandon the conservative view. 
Therefore, the gradualist position seems to be a sensible compromise to deal with 
the difficulties that arise with the liberal and the conservative views. 
The argument of the gradualist borrows a premise from each of the conservative 
and the extreme liberal views. It agrees with the conservative that there is no 
morally significant difference between a newly born baby and a baby about to be 
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born. It also agrees with the extreme liberal view that there is no morally 
significant difference between the fertilised ovum or the embryo in its early stages 
of development and a piece of tissue or organ of the human body. It also agrees 
with both views that the development from fertilised ovum to the baby that has 
been born is gradual, but unlike the other views it does not try to infer from this 
that the foetus has the same moral status through out its development. The 
gradualist position holds that from the fact that the development is gradual, one 
can infer that so too is the development of moral status and standing. Also, the 
conservative and the liberal views select a precise point, conception, birth etc., as 
the threshold of moral standing, implying that the transition from no standing to 
full standing occurs abruptly. In doing so they rest more weight on these sudden 
events than they are capable of bearing. A view that avoids this defect will allow 
full moral standing to be acquired gradually. It will therefore attempt to locate not 
a threshold point but rather a threshold period or stage. 
As we saw earlier, both the established views attribute a uniform moral status to 
all foetuses, regardless of their dissimilarities, each counting a newly conceived 
zygote the same as a full term foetus, despite their enormous differences. The 
gradualist position avoids this defect by assigning moral status differentially, so 
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that the threshold stage occurs sometime during pregnancy. A drawback of the 
uniform approach adopted by the established views is that neither of them can 
attach any significance to the development of the foetus during gestation when 
this development is the most obvious feature of gestation. The gradualist position 
by basing the differential moral standing of the foetus in part on its level of 
development avoids the defect of the established views. So then, the moral status 
of the foetus must be gradual, differential and developmental. It also must connect 
moral standing with the empirical properties of such beings. 
Warren Quinn 83 has written extensively on the gradualist position of the moral 
status of the embryo. He points out that even a very early abortion stands in need 
of moral justification in a way that the surgical removal of a mere mass of tissue 
does not. Abortion is primarily of importance because of its impact on the 
organism that is killed and removed. However, early abortion occurring before the 
organ systems of the foetus are complete is not morally equivalent either to the 
killing of an adult or the killing of an infant. The early foetus not only fails to be 
morally protected by the same kind of right to life that mature persons possess but 
its moral status also differs in some important way from that of the neonate. This 
83 Quinn, \V., (1984), `Abortion: Identity and Loss', Philosophy and Public Affairs I (1) 
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is so because of the kind of being it is in those different stages, because of its 
ability and inability to do and not do certain things, to feel and not feel certain 
things, the building of certain capacities that bring it closer to the category that 
deserves respect on account of its nature. Quinn is quick to add that the early 
foetus is not as the conservative thinks, under the same moral protection as a 
mature human being but it is also not morally negligible as the liberal seems to 
think it is. He goes on to say that as pregnancy progresses abortion becomes 
increasingly problematic from the moral point of view, there is more that is 
required to justify an abortion at six months than at one month. 84 
I however disagree with Quinn in that early abortion on my view is not in need of 
justification, because I do not see it any differently from a mere mass of cells 
which is `human' only in that it is biologically and genetically similar to an adult 
human. As I have shown earlier, this mere mass of cells does not even contain an 
individual, so there is no being at that stage who can be said to be harmed in any 
way, to whom it is of any importance that it is not killed. What appeals to me in 
Quinn's theory is that there is a gradual attainment of respect and moral 
considerations. However, I disagree that this process begins from the time 
conception takes place. Quinn cites the example of the building of a house, 
Sa Ibid. 
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materials are gathered, the foundation is laid, wooden skeleton is erected, 
plumbing and electrical work is done, bricks are laid and so on till the house is 
completed. But in all this there is no point at which a house suddenly begins to 
exist, the degree to which it exists increases as the work progresses. In the theory 
that I outline, I am going to admit of degrees in moral status which would in turn 
affect what we owe to different beings, in this case the embryo. 
Since my gradualist position treats the early embryo as no different from a tissue 
or a bundle of cells and therefore assigns no moral status to it, we are left to think 
when the foetus begins to acquire moral status and what the criterion is for it. This 
will also clarify why the early embryo has no moral standing. A criterion of 
sentience for moral standing can be justified as the beginning of assigning any 
moral status to the foetus, for our purposes. Sentience is the capacity for feeling, 
in the most basic form, it is the ability to experience sensations of pain and 
pleasure and thus the ability to enjoy and suffer. In its more developed form, it 
includes wants, aims, and desires, thus providing the ability to be satisfied and 
frustrated, and then this can go on to include tastes, attitudes, values, moods, 
emotions, sentiments and passions. Consciousness is a necessary condition of 
sentience for feelings are states of mind of which their owner is aware. However, 
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it is not sufficient for we can have conscious beings who utterly lack feelings. 
And it is in the virtue of being sentient that creatures have interests. If morality 
has to do with the promotion and protection of interests, then we owe moral duties 
to all those beings capable of having interests and this includes all sentient beings. 
It makes sense to think of sentience as admitting of degrees. When considering 
the perception of pain, one creature may be more or less sensitive than another. 
More developed and rational beings also possess a higher degree of sentience 
since the expansion of consciousness and intelligence opens up new ways of 
experiencing the world and therefore new ways of being affected by the world. 
More rational beings are capable of finding either fulfillment or frustration in 
activities and states of affairs to which less developed creatures are, both 
cognitively and affectively, blind. It is in this sense of a broader and deeper 
sensibility that a higher being is capable of a richer, fuller and more varied 
existence. The fact that sentience admits of degrees enables us to employ it both 
as an inclusion criterion and as a comparison criterion of moral standing. The 
animal kingdom presents us with a hierarchy of sentience. Non sentient beings 
have no moral standing and among sentient beings the more developed have 
greater standing than the less developed. A criterion of sentience can thus allow 
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for a gradual emergence of moral standing in the order of nature. It can explain 
why no moral issues arise in our dealings with inanimate objects, plants and the 
simpler forms of animal life. 
This criterion of moral status also ties in neatly with Peter Singer's principle of 
equal consideration of interests which acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests 
impartially. True scales favour the side where the interests is stronger or where 
several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but 
they take no account of whose interests it is that they are weighing. 85 If a being 
suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into 
consideration and no matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality, 
Singer argues, requires its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering of 
any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing 
enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account, nothing that we 
can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. Hence, the limit of 
sentience is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. 86 
Singer, P., (I 979), Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 19 
86 Ibid. , p. 
50 
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The adoption of sentience as a criterion determines the location of a threshold of 
moral standing. So the minimal characteristic required to give the embryo a claim 
to consideration is sentience. Until that point is reached, the embryo does not have 
any interests and like other nonsentient organisms like a human egg or sperm 
cannot be harmed in a morally relevant sense by anything that we do. We can of 
course damage the embryo in such a way as to cause harm to the sentient being it 
will become if it lives, but if it never becomes a sentient being, the embryo has 
not been harmed because of its total lack of awareness and therefore, lack of 
interests as well. Since sentience admits of degrees, we can in principle construct 
a continuum ranging from fully sentient creatures at one extreme to completely 
non sentient creatures at the other. The threshold of moral standing is that area of 
the continuum through which sentience fades into non sentience. 
As the foetus develops, its psychological capacities mature and it becomes more 
closely related to its future self. Its interests also increase on this scale of 
development since slowly the levels of consciousness and therefore sentience also 
start attaining a higher degree. First trimester foetuses are clearly not sentient, 
third trimester foetuses possess some degree of sentience, it seems that the 
threshold of sentience falls somewhere towards the end of the second trimester. A 
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late abortion is more morally objectionable since as the developed foetus matures, 
the psychological capacities become more advanced and the degree to which it 
would be psychologically continuous with itself in the future increases gradually 
and correspondingly. This is how Jeff McMahan brings his account of time- 
relative interests account of the badness of killing into the debate on abortion. 87 
Joel Feinberg discusses gradualism as a modified version of the potentiality 
argument and attacks it on the same grounds that are raised as objections to the 
potentiality view. 88 1 would like to clarify here that the gradualist does not accord 
moral status to the embryo on the grounds that it will someday become an adult 
person who is given full moral standing. The gradualist position in turn looks at 
the foetus, its own properties, the nature of the being it is and whether any of that 
is of moral relevance and requires moral consideration on our part. It does not ask 
for any moral protection in virtue of the kind of being the foetus will become 
some day. On the other hand, it completely overlooks the potential of the embryo, 
concentrating at what every stage of development does to the embryo, in terms of 
providing it with more interests or capacities. 
87 McMahan, J., (2002), The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford 
University Press), p. 276 
'8 Feinberg, J., and Levcnbook, B. B., (1993), `Abortion' in T. Regan (ed. ) Matters of Li/cc and 
Death. Neu Introductory Essaus in Moral Philosophy 3rd ed. (New York: Tata McGraw 11i11), pp. 
207-212 
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I have argued thus in this chapter that a gradualist position based on sentience 
which thus generates interests is a defensible position to take on the moral status 
of the embryo. It is the only position which takes the moral relevance of the 
development of the foetus into consideration in the moral paradigm and justifies 
why an early abortion is not as bad as a late abortion. Since PGD and embryo 
selection deal only with very early embryos, sex selection or trait selection cannot 
be objected to on the grounds that unethical methods are being used to achieve the 




In this chapter I am going to look into the concept of parenthood, the various 
accounts of parenthood, list the different rights that we give parents with regard to 
their children and discuss the theories of parental rights. In this chapter I am also 
going to critique the `Children as Property' claim and develop an account of how 
parenthood is a relationship of love. 
4.1 The parent and the child 
The relationship between a parent and a child is a very unique one. From the day a 
baby first opens his eyes to the world, unable to provide for himself and attend to 
his needs, unable to make his wants understood, in the fragile, incomprehensible 
cradle of childhood, a bond is formed with the one who fends for him, listens to 
his cries and turns it into a smile, rocks him to sleep with a gentle touch, treating it 
like a delicate bud that needs tendering. During most of his growing up years the 
figure of the parent looms large, that of course being his first contact with a world 
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he is a stranger in. So much of what a child becomes depends on the kind of 
environment he has been brought up in and the first set of lessons being taught at 
home, the parent being the book at hand which contains guidelines on living in the 
world. For some, their parents become their role models while for some others, 
especially those who have had a difficult childhood, they grow up with the desire 
to not become the persons that their parents were or are. The role of the parent in 
a child's life is crucial and it is in no way minimal. 
Most children are reared within a family, the conception of a family being very 
different across cultures and societies. While in the West, the nuclear family 
model which consists of parent(s) and child(ren) is the norm, in the East, 
especially India and China, the extended family model which consists of mostly 
two generations living in close proximity, still continues to be the standard model. 
It may be noted that within the extended family system, it is usually a group of 
women, the grandmothers and aunts, who bring up a child. In some homes, 
children grow up calling their aunts and uncles similar words that they use to call 
their parents. For instance, if the father is addressed as "Papa" then the father's 
older brother would usually be called "Bade Papa" which literally means " Elder 
Father" and similarly for the aunt who is the father's older brother's wife "Badi 
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Mummy". This is not to say however that the father or the mother are given any 
less importance or respect by the child. It is merely to acknowledge the role that 
the aunts and uncles have played, in some cases almost equally, in the rearing of 
the child. And the child is never allowed to lose sight of the fact that the 
biological parents are the `real parents' of the child and at the end of the day he 
has to return to them. The hallmark of a family is that it is a social unit with a 
degree of mutual inter-dependence, of the sharing of lives, of caring and love, of 
commitment and support. 
There have been various changes in the notion of the family from the traditional 
perspective of people having two parents, a mother and a father, each of whom 
contributed to the child's biological makeup to an acceptance of adoptive or 
foster parents, single parents, of cohabiting couples or partners not married to 
each other having children, to having surrogacy arrangements where a woman 
agrees to bear a child for an infertile couple, to using science and technology in 
the field of reproduction to carry out invitro fertilisation (IVF), to donating your 
sperms and ovaries at a bank for use by infertile couples. As the social 
arrangements have changed in our society and science has advanced in providing 
us with newer tools for reproduction, the questions of how to define a parent, 
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whom to assign parenthood and give rights and responsibilities, has not only 
become more complex and difficult but also gained more importance, especially 
in the context of the law. 
In the next section, I am going to deal with this very question of what it means to 
be a `parent' and discuss the different accounts of parenthood. 
4.2 What is parenthood? 
In law as much as in philosophy, there has been much argument and debate over 
an agreeable account of parenthood, the definition of a parent and the assigning of 
rights to parents. In the latter case, parents and children are often discussed as if 
placed in opposite camps. This often comes up in the discussions of children's 
rights - if the child has a right to do something, then it maybe argued that the 
parents cannot have the same right. But it must be noted that parenthood and 
childhood are not co-relative concepts. Parenthood denotes a relationship with a 
child; one cannot be called a `parent' unless one stands in some relation to a 
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person of a succeeding generation. Although parents may have created a child 
through procreation, parental status is derivative- it depends on the existence of a 
child. The concept of childhood however, is different. A `child' can be a person 
who is young, who stands in a particular relation to an adult who may or may not 
be his parent. So while parenthood denotes the state of being a parent and 
fulfilling the roles expected of parents, childhood means a state of being young. 
It may be that parenthood is a fragmented concept in itself. It is possible to 
distinguish various roles within it, any or all of which may be played by the same 
parent figure. The procreative or biological role is distinct from the social role; a 
person may provide the genetic material for a child's creation but play no part in 
the child's upbringing. Or as it happens in surrogacy arrangements, it is possible 
for a woman to act as the gestational mother and carry the child to term even 
though she is not the genetic mother and will not be the child's carer after birth. 
The social role may be carried out by a person who is genetically unrelated to the 
child while the `psychological parent' may be the one who provides the emotional 
bonding with the young child. It may be held that parenthood is an amorphous 
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concept, with roots in biology but the social construction of which changes with 
time, culture and the status of the observer. 89 
The concept of parenthood is far from being straightforward and it is no surprise 
that the law has a variety of understandings on being a parent. Bainhar has 
usefully explained that the law distinguishes between parentage, parenthood and 
parental responsibility. 90 Parentage is attributed to those who are genetically 
related to the child. So it technically refers to the man who provided the sperm 
and the woman who provided the egg, which were combined to produce the 
foetus which became the child. Parenthood on the other hand, is for those who are 
regarded in the law as parents. In many cases, they will be those who have 
parentage but it need not be so. The law may decide that a man who donates 
sperm to the clinic will not be legally regarded as the father of the child. Parental 
responsibility is different from parentage and parenthood, in that it is attributed to 
those who are to have the legal responsibilities and rights that are attached to 
being a parent. The legal parent in the case of a genetic father not married to the 
mother, lacks parenthood in the full sense, in that the law withholds from him 
89 Strathern, M., (1993), 'A Question of Context' in J. Edwards et al (ed. ) Technologies of 
Procreation (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
90 Bainharn, A., ( 1999), ' Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet 
Important Distinctions' in A. Bainham, S. Day Sclater and M. Richards (eds. ) What is a Parent? 
(Oxford: f fart) 
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parental responsibility. Thus it is necessary, at least from a legal perspective. to 
distinguish between being a parent and having parental responsibility. 
In this thesis, the usage of `parent' will be limited to referring to someone who 
has the primary responsibility for and rights over a child. There has been much 
discussion on what is at the heart of the concept of parenthood. There are four 
main approaches to parenthood: genetic account, gestational account, intentional 
account and causal account. In the next section, I am going to discuss each one of 
them. 
4.3 Grounds for granting parenthood 
4.3.1 Genetic account 
This account claims that the core notion of parenthood is genetic parenthood. So 
the main ground of parenthood is in the relation of direct genetic derivation. 
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Hence, parenthood falls into the category of other familial relations like being a 
sibling, a cousin and so on. The vast majority of genetic parents are parents in law, 
although not all genetic fathers are awarded parental responsibility. However, if 
genetic parentage were at the heart of legal parenthood, it is surprising that the 
law does not take stronger steps to determine genetic parentage. If it were that 
important, the legal system would require the genetic testing of all children born 
in order to ensure that their paternity is known, but it does not. Also, the genetic 
account may appear inconsistent with our attitudes to sperm and egg donors who 
are genetic parents but do not acquire the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. 
The main arguments for the genetic account that have relied upon in favour of 
biology 91 rest on genetic identity and genetic contribution. 
It is argued that our genetic parents play a crucial role in our self-identity. The 
strongest evidence for this is in relation to adopted children who often seek to find 
information about their genetic parents. However, this could be taken to involve 
two issues: a curiosity or an interest shown by adopted children in knowing where 
they come from and gaining knowledge of why these genetic parents did not bring- 
them up, why they were abandoned, why they were not one of the many who were 
91 l lill, J., (1991), ' What does it mean to be a "parent"? The claims of biology as the basis for 
parental rights', , Vt'1+ York University Law Revier, 66 , pp. 
353-420 
born and brought up by those whose genetic material they carry. This curiosity or 
interest cannot be taken as a sure indicator that adopted children suffer- from 
problems regarding their identity. Some also argue that the genetic link is 
important because the child has been born out of the genetic contribution of the 
parents and the child's being results from this and hence, should be acknowledged. 
One might want to argue against this by taking into account the fact that a child's 
physical being is not the only thing that matters, its social and psychological being 
matter much more as it grows and the role of the parent is crucial in developing 
these and there is no clear reason why a mere genetic link, as in the case of a 
gamete donor should contribute towards his/her parenthood with regard to being a 
mere contributor of a physical being. Also, it's not obvious that genetic parents do 
provide the material from which the child is constituted since the bulk of the 
matter from which the child is formed derives from the gestational mother, not the 
genetic parents. It cannot be denied that the genetic material from the genetic 
parents gives structure to that matter but to acknowledge only the contribution of 
the genetic material in the child's physical existence without taking into account 
the role of gestation would be a case of prioritizing form over matter and it's not 
obvious that this can be done. 
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Hall92 defends the genetic account of parenthood by appealing to the Lockean 
notion of self-ownership. The argument goes that since the genetic parents own 
the genetic material from which the child is constituted, it follows that they have a 
claim to the child. This argument treats the parent-child relationship in proprietary 
terms and I have dealt with it in greater detail, criticising this view in a later 
section. 
4.3.2 Gestational account 
Some authors have argued that the primary ground of parenthood is the 
gestational relation. 93 In the reproductive context, where a child's gestational 
mother differs from its genetic mother, as happens in gamete donation and 
surrogacy arrangements, it is the gestational mother who has the primary claim to 
parental rights and responsibilities. The law is regarded as having a commitment 
to gestationalism since the husband of the gestational mother is presumed to be 
the father of the child. It could be argued that the law favours this account with 
the intent to save children from the stigma of illegitimacy, which was quite 
92 Flail, B., (1999), 'The origin of parental rights', Public Affairs Quarterly 13, pp. 73-82 
93 Rothman, B.. (1989), Recreating Motherhood. "Ideologv and Technology in a Patriarchal Societe 
(New York: \V. W. Norton) and Feldman, S., (1992), ' Multiple Biological Nlothers: The Case for 
Gestation', Journal of Social Philosophie 23, pp. 98-104 
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dominant in the earlier years. However, the gestational account of parenthood 
suffers from an inherent problem, that if gestation is required to grant parenthood 
then how can men ever be parents. 
There are two arguments justifying gestationalism. The first is a consequentialist 
one, that since the gestational mother unlike the genetic mother is guaranteed to 
be identifiable at birth94, it is in the best interests of the child that the gestational 
mother be regarded as the mother. The second one rests on the unique relationship 
that is supposed to exist between the gestational mother and the child. The mothci- 
and foetus are obviously related physically with the foetus being inside the 
mother's body and also a part of it; it is dependent on the gestational mother in a 
way that it is not dependent on anyone else including the genetic parents. The 
mother also invests a substantial amount of effort into the account, undergoing 
considerable discomfort, effort and risk in the course of pregnancy and childbirth. 
The third argument for the gestational account of parenthood appeals to gestation 
being a process that can foster emotional and effective bonds. This however, is 
quite a controversial point. One might be in a position to grant that the gestational 
94 Annas, G., (1984), 'Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws', 
The Hastings Ceiitt'r Report 51, pp. 50-52 and Charo, R., (1990), 'Legislative Approaches to 
Surrogate Motherhood' in L. Gostin (ed. ) Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privuci 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 
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mother does undergo a lot emotionally and physically during the course of the 
pregnancy but it's questionable whether this relationship that ensues is such as to 
give the gestational mother a unique claim to parenthood. It might be the case that 
the woman's partner has been highly supportive in helping her deal with the 
stresses of pregnancy, undergoing a considerable amount of discomfort and effort 
himself, and has therefore developed a strong bond with the child through 
indirectly caring for it. The gestational account leaves no room for the father's 
claim to paternity, disregarding all his efforts and any bond that he might have 
developed with the foetus which he dreams would be his future child. 
4.3.3 Intentional account 
Some theorists have argued that less emphasis should be placed on genetic 
parentage and that instead, the intent to be a parent is of far more importance. A 
parent is a parent only if he or she intends to be a parent. So this third approach to 
parenthood appeals to intentions as the ground of parenthood and this has been 
very popular with legal theorists. According to Hill, one of the supporters of this 
theory, the more fundamental basis of the parent - child relationship is not 
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biology as such, but intentionality, which is usually but not always, signified by 
the biological relationship. He identifies three conditions that must be met by 
intentional parents95 : (i) They must desire and intend to have a child prior to the 
conception of the child which they claim to be their own (ii) They must take 
morally and legally permissible measures pursuant to this intention which results 
in the conception of the child (iii) They must possess the intention and the ability 
to care for the child. This account of parenthood based on intention certainly has 
the strength of supporting the view that voluntary action is the ground of 
responsibilities. The intentional account also helps to resolve cases like that of the 
misplaced sperm96 in which a person's sperm gets swapped with that of a sperm 
donor's at a sperm bank and is used by a woman to produce a child. Certainly, the 
person who was only storing his sperm cannot be said to acquire rights and 
responsibilities over the child that has come into being. 
The supporting argument for the intentional account is that the child would not 
have been born were it not for the intentions and initial actions of the intending 
parents. However, there are problems in emphasizing intent when considering the 
most common origin of parenthood, where normal sexual intercourse is involved. 
95 11111, J. L., (1990), `The Case for Enforcement of the Surrogate Contract', Politics and the Lift 
Sciences 8, p. 155 
96 Guardian 11'c'ck/ti', (2002), 'Donor joins IVF sperm mix-up case'. 26-31 July, p. 1 1 
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It could be argued that to have sexual intercourse reveals an intent to be a parent. 
But surely this cannot be the case given the rising number of unintended 
pregnancies. However, it could also be argued that given the availability of 
contraception and abortion, a case in which the couple still do decide to go ahead 
with the pregnancy manifests an intent to be a parent. But the cases can be tricky 
if people's moral or religious beliefs come in the way of their using contraception 
or aborting an unwanted and unintended pregnancy. Hence, the decision not to go 
ahead with birth control or abortion may not be a sure indicator of a couple's 
intent to become parents. It could also be argued that each time a couple engage in 
sexual intercourse they willingly accept the risk of becoming parents, and that this 
is a sufficient condition for parenthood. 
There are a few problems with this account which makes one wonder what 
precisely is the exact content of the intentions that are supposed to ground 
parenthood. For instance, if someone sees a neighbour and on finding that she is 
pregnant, decides that he would like to act as the father of the child, he cannot 
claim an intent to be the child's parent, which should be recognized by the law. 
One could also imagine a case where a couple realize that they are pregnant by 
accident and decide that they would go through the pregnancy and upon delivery, 
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put up the child for adoption rather than bring it up themselves. They carry on 
with the pregnancy as decided but a short while after the birth of the child, they, 
decide against what they had initially intended and decide to rear the child as 
theirs, themselves. It is difficult to say that for the short while after the birth of the 
child when they still had the intention to put it up for adoption, they were not the 
parents of the child since they did not intend to parent it. Also, how does one 
prove one's intent to be a parent and what exactly does this intention constitute? 
The intentional account could be a good argument that could be useful where 
there are competing claims based on biology, as often happens in surrogacy 
arrangements. It would also permit more than two people to be the parents of a 
child and they need not be of the opposite sex. 
4.3.4 Causal account 
The causal account of parenthood holds that causing a child to exist is a ground 
for granting parenthood, for generating parental rights and responsibilities. It has 
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been advocated by Nelson 97 , Bigelow et al 
98 and Blustein 99. An important 
distinction that needs to be made here is that the causal account differs from the 
intentional account in that one can cause something to happen without intending, 
to bring it about. It could be that a particular state of affairs or chain of events are 
brought about without one being aware of the resulting consequences or possible 
effects of one's actions. In this case, teenagers without adequate sex education 
could end up in a situation where they haven't grasped the connection between 
sexual intercourse and pregnancy and thus become the cause of a child's existence. 
Hill'00 ties in the intentional and causal accounts of parenthood when he argues 
that the intending parents are the first cause of the procreative relationship, they 
being the ones who have engineered the birth of the child. It is their desire and 
intention set into motion that leads to the creation of a child. He argues that what 
is essential to parenthood is not the biological tie between parent and child but the 
preconception intention to have a child, accompanied by undertaking whatever 
action that is required to bring a child into the world. Hence, it is the 
97 Nelson, J. L., (1991), `Parental Obligations and the Ethics of Surrogacy: A Causal Perspective', 
Public . -t 
ffairs Quarter/ ,5, pp. 49-61 
98 Bigelow, J., J. Campbell, S. Dodds, R. Pargetter, E. Prior and R. Young, (1988), `Parental 
Autonomy', Journal of Applied Philosophy 5, pp. 3-16 
99 Blustein, J., (1982), Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 
100 Hill, J. L., (1991), 'What Does it Mean to be a Parent? The Claims of Biology as the Basis of 
Parental Rights', , Vrtit- York Univc'rsiti Law Review 66, p. 414-416 
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preconception intention coupled with the preconception and postconception 
actions that make a parent. Hill further maintains that while all the players in the 
procreative arrangement are necessary in bringing a child into the world, the child 
would not have been born but for the efforts of the intended parents. So, he argues, 
the status of parent should go to the persons who constitute the "but for" cause of 
the child's birth. 
Even though the causal account is able to account for the genetic, gestational and 
intentional accounts, it is riddled with its own set of problems ranging from what 
exactly is meant by causation to what the implications of this theory would be. It 
could be that my mother during the first few years did not want a child but after 
persuasion from my grandmother decided to finally try conceiving. So, I would 
not have been born had my grandmother not intervened and influenced my 
mother's decision on this issue. Now, one could say that it is in fact my 
grandmother who is the first cause of me being present in this world, but would 
she be considered my parent on that account? Also, it could be that my 
grandmother wouldn't have herself existed had India not gained independence and 
India would not have gained independence had it not been due to the actions of 
Mahatma Gandhi. So, could one argue then that Gandhi was my father? Arguing 
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on the basis of the first cause could take one on a loop of causes, regressing 
infinitely. 
4.3.5 An account of earned parenthood 
It can be argued that parenthood must be earned. That is the mother, through 
pregnancy has demonstrated a commitment to the child and has formed a bond 
with the child. If the father has married the mother and can therefore be presumed 
to have offered the mother support through the pregnancy, this also indicates a 
commitment to the child. But the unmarried father has not earned the parenthood, 
as he has not shown commitment to the mother and child by marrying the mother. 
It could be argued that this account does not provide a sufficient explanation for 
who is a parent. A genetic father can be regarded as the father even though he has 
done nothing to `earn the parentage'. Also, it rests on an assumption that marriage 
is the only way that a man can show commitment to a woman who is going to 
have his child and also, to his child. 
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4.3.6 An account of social parenthood 
Psychologists have stressed the importance of psychological parents. This has led 
some to argue that the law should recognise the day to day work of parenting, 
rather than the more abstract notions of genetic, intentional and other accounts of 
parenthood. In light of the psychological evidence we have, the child seems to 
develop an emotional relationship with the person who provides their constant 
care for him/her and it is this person who is most important for the child. The 
emphasis on social parenthood would also appeal to those who would argue that 
the law should emphasise and value caring interdependent relationships between 
parties. 
Each of the above accounts has its own plus and minus points, each of the 
positions can be endorsed in a number of forms. These accounts are not mutually 
exclusive and hence, a monistic account of parenthood would not work. Whereas 
in ancient times, biology was considered as the only ground of parenthood, the 
advancement in science and technology have forced us to broaden our horizons 
and think of other grounds on which parenthood could be sufficiently based. 
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Parenthood should be considered as a multicriterion concept rather than a 
unicriterion one. 
Before I go on to discuss the connection between parenthood and the right to sex 
selection, I would like to take an overview of the sorts of rights that are already 
given to parents. 
4.4 Parental rights 
A distinction that needs to be made here is between a right to be a parent and the 
rights of a parent. The right to be a parent is the right to stand to a specific child in 
the relationship of a parent. The rights of a parent are the rights of custodianship 
over that child which helps to specify the relationship. So, when talking of 
parents' rights, one needs to remember the rights that a parent might have as a 
human being, like the right to life, free speech etc. and the rights that a parent may 
have because he or she is a parent. Following is a set of rights that are assigned to 
parents by the law in virtue of their relationship with a specific child. 
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At common law, a parent has the right to possession of his child. A person who 
had parental responsibility could require any other person who had possession of 
the child to hand him or her back. While the child remained in another's care, the 
parent could also rely on this right to control the child's movements. Parents have 
the right to control or direct the child's upbringing. This right however is 
dependent on the child's stage of development. The person with parental rights 
could determine what education, if any, the child would receive, the kind of 
school they should attend. A parent is also given the right to discipline his child. 
A person with parental responsibility has the common law right to determine the 
child's religious education and may by statute require the child's exclusion from 
religious studies lessons and school assembly. This freedom of religion is 
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. Parents also have, at 
common law, the right to the domestic service of their unmarried minor children. 
A parent has the right over his child's property together with such rights as a 
guardian of the child's estate would have. A person with parental responsibility is 
prima facie entitled to act in the capacity of a representative of the child in legal 
proceedings. A person with parental responsibility has some rights to consent to 
the treatment of his children but treatment may be given or refused against such a 
person's wishes. One of the grounds for doing so could be taking into account the 
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best interests of the child. A parent has the right to consent to marriage of his 
children though parental refusal could be overridden by the court. It has been 
asserted that a parent has a common law right to contact with his children, subject 
to the welfare of the child. Parents also have apart from other miscellaneous rights, 
the right to choose the name of their child. 
4.5 A ritht to sex select 
A right to sex select would involve couples having a right to choose the gender of 
their offspring. Such a right could be generated on account of the different 
theories of parenthood and parental rights that we examined in detail above. There 
could be four arguments for purporting such a right to sex select and these are : (i) 
That the law of the land or the natural law grants such a right (ii) That such a right 
is a part of the nature of parenthood, that this right comes attached with the 
parental role and responsibility (iii) That parents own their children and hence, 
have this right just like they have various other parental rights that enable them to 
make decisions regarding their children (iv) That a right to sex select is a part of 
one's personal autonomy, that it is an extension of procreative liberty and 
reproductive autonomy -, ranted to parents. 
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One often wonders if there is a right to be a parent. It is hard to claim a positive 
right to procreation, not least because natural procreation involves two people. 
Few people would seriously suggest that the state should be obliged to provide 
partners for anyone who wishes to produce a child. Article 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights states that `men and women of marriage age have 
the right to marry and according to the national laws governing the exercise of 
this right found a family'. There is little here however to suggest that this is an 
expression of a positive right to procreate or become a parent. It can be said that 
there is a right not to have your natural abilities to procreate removed by the state. 
Hence, in this it is only a negative right. The second sense in which one might 
claim a right to procreate is to argue that one should not be denied fertility 
treatment without a good reason, for example, that gay or lesbian people should 
not be denied treatment because of their sexual orientation. Hence, it could be 
argued that this does not provide a sufficient ground for granting a right to sex 
select because what the European Convention asserts is the right to found a family, 
not what kind of a family and certainly not what kind of children one should or 
should not have. 
126 
Then it could be argued that it is in the nature of parenthood, that the roles and 
responsibilities of being a parent form a basis for grounding such a right. Since on 
the birth of a child, the mother and father are under legal and moral obligations 
concerning the child, they have the right to care for the child. So if the children 
are going to be in the custody of the parents, then they should have a say in what 
kind of children they want to bring up, adhering very closely to the parents' 
preferences and desires. This does not seem like a plausible argument for a right 
to sex selection since there is nothing specific in parenthood, the roles or 
responsibilities that parents have regarding their children that establishes a 
connection between the gender of the child and the kind of support and care that 
they should provide them. Parenthood in itself ought to be gender neutral. 
The third argument is that children can be seen as the fruit of the parents' labour 
through procreation and therefore as the property of the parent. This could be seen 
as the basis of parental rights. If the proprietarian argument is valid, then by virtue 
of parents owning their children, they could possibly have the right to choose the 
gender of their children as well. I am going to deal with this argument of children 
as property in greater detail in the next section. 
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Lastly, one of the main arguments given to support a right to sex select has been 
the argument from reproductive autonomy and procreative liberty. This right is an 
extension of the right to self determination or autonomy that we as human beings 
possess, the right to make decisions about our lives without interference from 
third parties. It could be argued that a right to reproductive autonomy grants a 
person who is to be a parent the right to sex select since it falls under the right to 
individual autonomy or privacy that we generally possess. This argument will be 
examined in the next chapter, with a view to how the concepts of harn and 
interests can limit individual liberty. 
The next section deals with the question of why only parents and not strangers are 
given certain rights over their children. I am going to call this the `Children as 
Property' claim. 
4.6 Children as property 
One explanation for the unique privileges that parents have with regard to their 
children is that children are the property of those parents: just as I own my arms 
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and legs, or, more controversially, my genetic information, so I own the children 
that issue from me. There is something very uncomfortable about this thought: to 
accept it would be to accept that every child is born into a kind of slavery. But if 
one accepts certain prominent theories of property ownership, then it is difficult to 
avoid accepting this approach to parental rights as well. 
And there are good reasons to avoid accepting this view of parental rights. The 
relationship between an owner and the thing she owns is generally one 
characterised by rights rather than responsibilities. If I own a car, the rights that I 
have over it are not conditional upon my taking care of it: I can smother it with oil 
and adoration or leave it to slowly rust into oblivion, or strip its innards and 
transplant theirs into another car according to my merest whim. In general, we 
don't think that we owe anything to the things that we own. There are some 
exceptions to this general rule: if I own a house that is listed because of its 
perceived historical value, I might be bound by the conditions of my purchase to 
preserve it in particular ways. This is presumably because, unlike other privately 
owned possessions, which are supposed to be of importance exclusively to the 
owner (at least in ways that the law would recognise), society in general is 
thought to have an interest in the preservation of its heritage, and this interest 
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impinges upon the absolute control that owners generally enjoy over their 
property. Children might be seen in a similar vein: the rights that their parents 
have in them, (which might still constitute a kind of ownership right) are limited 
by the interest that society has in their wellbeing. However, we do think that 
parents owe their children certain things and consider that the way they treat their 
children should be governed by more than their personal whims, but by a respect 
for, and desire to protect, their children's welfare. Ownership doesn't seeirr to 
encapsulate the subtle weave of rights and responsibilities that tie parents and 
children together, but, despite its problems and distastefulness to the modem, 
(Western) ear, many theorists of parenthood have been persuaded by this kind of 
claim. Aristotle cited ownership as one of the reasons to preserve the institution of 
the family: `for the product belongs to the producer. . . but the producer does not 
belong to the product, or belongs to a lesser degree' 101 , and Filmer 
famously 
argued for the right of ownership of father over son102, much to the abhorrence of 
his critic Locke. So, despite its lack of common currency now, at least in 
academic writing, the great historical significance of the notion that parents own 
their offspring renders it ripe for study: what was appealing about this idea to so 
many and for so long- and why does it seem so unpalatable now? 
101 Aristotle, : \'icomachean Ethics, 1161b19, quoted in Blustein, J., (1982). Parents and Childre17 
The Ethics o/ the Family, (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 42 
102 Blustcin, J., (1982), Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family (New )'ork: Oxford 
University Press), p. 75 
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Despite his opposition to the ownership account of parental rights, it is Locke's 
theory of Just Acquisition that has become the lynchpin in the construction of the 
parental property position in modem literature. Barabara Katz Rothman suggests 
that Locke's theory of ownership is so central to the issue of child-bearing that it 
has become embedded in the very words we use to describe it when she writes... 
"reproduction", a word that implies that making babies is a form of production- 
raw material transformed by work into a product. ' 103 Whilst Locke himself denied 
that children are the property of their parents, arguing instead that God owns all 
people and that parental rights are the rights of a guardian rather than an owner, 
his account of how private property comes about can be directly applied to child- 
bearing and rearing, and his insistence that it ought not to be is based on highly 
questionable foundations. I will focus this discussion around the Lockean account 
of property acquisition and consider the problems that such an account raises for a 
theory of parental rights. 
1Q' Katz Rothman, B., (1990), `Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in American 
Society' in Dorothy E Vawter and Arthur L Caplan (eds)Bevond Baby At Ethical Issues in New 
Reproductive Te chnologie. s, (New Jersey: Humana Press), p. 9 
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Locke's Theory of the Just Acquisition of Property, detailed in the Second 
Treatise of Government, is essentially that: 
"when one acts to mix one's labour with X (X being unowned) one justly obtains 
X... [J]ustice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry" 104 
The reason that Locke gives to support this is that each individual owns his or her 
own body, and therefore the product of that body, that is, the labour it performs, 
also belongs to that individual. There are two conditions governing what one can 
rightly mix one's labour with in such a way as to create ownership rights. Firstly, 
there must be `enough and as good' of the resource being appropriated left for 
others to use or to create property rights of their own in, because the earth and all 
its bounty were given to all mankind equally, and each should have an equal 
chance to acquire some of it for himself. Secondly, one may only appropriate 
resources that one can use before they spoil. 
104 Locke, J., (1980), Second Treatise of Goverment, (USA, I Jackett Publishing Company, ), 
Chapter 5, Of Property 
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It is easy to see how this theory of property acquisition could be applied to the 
covetable resource that children represent. Because individuals own their bodies 
and their labour, the product of that labour is theirs, provided that no-one else's 
claim is unfairly impinged upon. If the product of the labour in question happens 
to be a child, then surely that child belongs to the persons whose labour was 
invested in its production. In the absence of conditions of extreme overpopulation, 
it would not be plausible to hold that one couple's conception of a child interferes 
with any other couple's ability to also conceive, and the second condition upon 
property acquisition; that one take only as much as one can use, also appears 
inapplicable to procreation (although this condition might seem to suggest that a 
couple should only conceive children that they can `use', the rationale behind it, 
which is to prevent resources being stockpiled and wasted by miserly individuals, 
does not apply. ) Although advances in reproduction have opened the door to 
procedures like the donation of sperm and ova and gestational assistance via 
surrogacy, all of which assist infertile couples to conceive, in general, I do not 
deprive others of an opportunity or possession that they might have otherwise had 
by electing to use my reproductive capacities myself, to bear a child. So, it would 
seem that, according to Locke's theory of Just Acquisition, every child that is 
conceived and born is the justly acquired property of his or her biological parents. 
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It is plausible to hold that ownership rights in children are not merely as 
justifiable as ownership rights in other resources, but that they are even more 
justifiable. The reason for this is that a child is created solely through the bodily 
material of the procreating man and woman: their labour is not mixed with 
external objects which are held in common with all humankind, but with the 
labour and genetic material of their partner. None of the standard objections to 
individual instances of appropriation are likely to apply in the case of children: 
questions like how much labour must be mixed to generate ownership rights, or 
whether enough of a given resource will be left to render an appropriation valid 
are not relevant in the case of the conception and nurture of a child. Childbirth is 
not an act of appropriation so much as one of creation: if one can own the things 
that one mixes labour with, surely one can own the things that one manufactures 
from scratch using only one's labour and one's body (which, according to Locke, 
one owns) and those of your willing partner. 
These arguments are especially powerful in the case of the mother, whose labour 
extends far beyond conception and whose physical contribution is not limited to 
the initial provision of genetic material. The mother's body houses, supports and 
nourishes the ovum into existence and through gestation: few tasks could involve 
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more intensive labour than this and few instances of labour could create a more 
complete claim to ownership than those in which the claimant actually supplies 
the physical goods with which her labour is then mixed. 
Despite the strength of the case for thinking that Locke's Theory of Just 
Acquisition creates the most unassailable case for ownership rights in the context 
of production of children, Locke himself disputed the theory's application in this 
case. The grounds he cites for this exception are weak, but other more plausible 
ways to position children outside the realm of ownership might be found. I will 
consider two ways in which to avoid the conclusion that children are the property 
of their parents. 105 
There are two ways of disputing parental ownership rights in children that may 
fare rather better than those that Locke advances. One is to challenge the Theory 
of Just Acquisition itself; the other is to assert that children are not valid objects of 
that theory. I will start with the former and discuss the general weaknesses in 
105 Sec Locke, J., (1967), Second Treatise of Government, op cit, chapter six, Of Paternal Powcr, 
'First Treatise of Government' in Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed. ) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), sections 52-54, and Archard, D., Children: Rights and Childhood op 
cit, p. 8-9 and Nozick, R. (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Oxford: Blackwcll), p. 288 
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Locke's Theory itself before making an argument for children as an exception to 
it. 
The first way to deal with the prospect of parental ownership rights is to 
undermine the Theory of Just Acquisition, the acceptance of which leads to the 
conclusion that such rights exist. Robert Nozick provides a powerful critique of 
the theory which he encapsulates thus: 
"Why does mixing one's labour with something make one the owner of it? 
Perhaps because one owns one's labour, and so one comes to own a previously 
unowned thing that becomes permeated with what one owns. Ownership seeps 
over into the rest. But why isn't mixing what I own with what I don't a way of 
losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't? If I own a can of 
tomato juice, and spill it into the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so 
I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own 
the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice? " 106 
1o6 Nozick, R., (l 974), Anar"ch1, State and Utopia, op cit, pp. 174-5 
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Nozick goes on to consider the possibility that, if the addition of your labour 
creates extra value in the thing that you labour upon, this might give you some 
claim to the thing itself, by virtue of your contribution. But, once again, it is not 
obvious why that claim would extend to the whole of that thing, rather than to the 
extra value for which you are responsible, or some equivalent. This is a 
substantial problem for the Theory of Just Acquisition, and is enough, in my view, 
to discredit it entirely, unless a defender is able to provide some convincing way 
of explaining why labour is different from tomato juice when property rights are 
in question. 
Nozick's work provides good grounds to reject the Theory of Just Acquisition 
with regard to objects and entities in the world that an individual might mix her 
labour with and thereby come to own. But it doesn't apply so neatly to the labour 
that parents invest in the growth and development of their children. This is 
because the labour involved in conceiving a child is not mixed with anything 
external, in the way that a carpenter's might be mixed with a stump of wood, so 
that we may think, like Nozick, that the carpenter's rightful assets could be 
depleted (llc loses his labour), rather than multiplied (he gains a stool), through his 
act of mixing. Reproductive labour is different in the sense that there is no 
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external object, such as a stump, upon which the procreating partners have no 
prior claim, but which is nevertheless smuggled into their possession through the 
contribution of their labour. In ordinary cases of reproduction (assisted conception 
techniques such as IVF and also surrogacy can complicate this a bit, as the 
resources and labour of third parties are also involved), the only resources 
required are the labour and bodily matter of the procreating partner, all of which 
are already `owned' by them. At the time of conception, those contributions are 
more or less equal, and equally essential. The gestating mother obviously goes on 
to invest a great deal more (direct) labour in the production of the child than her 
partner is able to, but the labour that her partner does invest initially is essential to 
the creation of the zygote or foetus that exists for the mother to labour on at all. 
The contributions that the procreating couple make in conceiving a child are 
unlike the contributions that a carpenter makes when he fells a tree and fashions a 
stool from it, or a fruit picker makes when he forages for raspberries and turns 
them into jam: in these cases, the labourer combines what they do have with 
something that they don't in order to make the something that they don't have, 
become theirs. But the procreating couple's contribution is complete in the sense 
that evcry element of the process, from the raw material that they labour upon to 
their labour itself, is provided and owned by them; nothing in the outside world is 
appropriated. 
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So Nozick's criticism, which strikes such a fatal blow to the Theory of Just 
Acquisition when applied to objects in the external world, doesn't really touch 
parental rights, earned through the creation and nurture of children. It might be the 
case, then, that Locke's theory, which he so earnestly intended not to apply to the 
relationship between parents and children, might be nowhere so convincing as it is 
with regard to this very relationship. We tend to think that we own the things that 
we create from scratch (the existence of and healthy trade in intellectual property 
law reflects this and often deals with instances similar to that of procreation, in 
that the labouring parties are responsible for the creation of a good or resource 
without the direct use of external objects), or at least that nobody else has a 
greater claim to these things than we do. If this general intuition is justified, we 
could reject the Theory of Just Acquisition with regard to jam and wooden stools 
and other things that are created through the addition of labour to an external 
object on the grounds that Nozick delineates, whilst accepting it in the case of 
parental labour (and intellectual labour). 
It is important to note at this point that Nozick's objection is only defeated here 
with regard to the labour involved in producing a child, not the labour involved in 
raising one. The genetic parents of a given child (except in cases of assisted 
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reproduction) are the only people that can claim to have donated both labour and 
raw material to this act of creation, so, on the grounds discussed in the above 
paragraph, their parental claims fall outside the realm of Nozick's objection. 
Even if a stepmother or a grandparent or a foster parent does the majority of the 
nurturing and caring for a child after birth, the fact that they cannot claim that this 
child is the product of their body and labour means that their claim with regard to 
that child will always be susceptible to Nozick's objection. This really limits the 
types of labour that can ground valid claims to parental status if one accepts the 
ownership account of parental rights. The only people who can ever claim 
ownership rights over children, on this account, are their genetic parents, because 
only the labour that they invested in their creation, together with the contribution 
of their genetic material, can justify such a claim. 
So far so good, it would seem, for the application of the Theory of Just 
Acquisition of Property to children, except, that is, for one highly significant catch. 
Reproductive labour may seem to meet the Lockean conditions of ownership in 
textbook fashion, but maybe children don't qualify so neatly as objects of 
ownership. Perhaps it is the case that children are simply not the kinds of things 
that can be owned. This approach constitutes the second way of disputing the 
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application of Locke's theory of ownership to children, and to my mind it is the 
more convincing. 
It is possible to deny that parents own children without refuting Locke's views on 
property acquisition (at least with respect to reproductive labour) by holding that, 
whilst labour in general might justify ownership claims (although reasons to doubt 
this have been presented), parental labour does not, on the grounds that children 
are simply not the sorts of thing that can be owned. Archard expresses this 
position thus: 
"[there is] the far more productive suggestion that what is different about the 
production of a child is that it is the bringing into being of a human life. Now 
what matters is not that human life is ultimately God's gift, nor that its creation is 
a mystery to us, but that to be or have a human life is to be in possession of rights 
to continued life and liberty. "107 
This position appears natural, even obvious, to the modern mind, yet, interestingly, 
it is not the position that Locke takes. Locke does not even hold that fully matured 
107 Archard, D., (2004), Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge), pp. 8-9 
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adults are the kind of things that cannot be owned: although humans cannot 
deprive other humans of their liberty, that liberty is always limited by the fact that 
God, as the Creator, owns us all. 108 
The view that it is the character of the product rather than the labour that blocks 
ownership claims with respect to children, can be cashed out as follows. 
Ordinarily, when we take possession of a thing according to the conditions of the 
Theory of Just Acquisition, we are laying claim to something that doesn't have 
rights of its own. In some cases the thing in question is considered eligible for 
some rights (if it is a higher order mammal, say), but not the kind of rights that we 
think are contravened by our taking possession of it. It is widely thought that 
children, on the other hand, do have the kind of rights that prevent ownership and 
a defence of this conviction can be mounted through reference to their personhood 
or high moral status. For the same reasons that slavery is morally wrong, parental 
ownership of children is morally wrong: it violates the rights of children. 
108 This argument is used to sustain Locke's position on suicide. Locke, John, Second Treatise of 
Goveº-nment, op cit, Il. ii. 5 
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4.7 The parent-child relationship 
If children are not owned by their parents then why is it so that parents are given 
rights and duties with regard to their children? My answer would be that parents 
and children share a special relationship. This relationship is based on trust, on 
intimacy, on friendship and on love. The basis for this relationship is genuine 
interest in the welfare of the other, loving and caring for that being you choose to 
bring into the world and raise. Parenthood is a role, a social role. It is a 
relationship in the context of society, a large group of people. It is a socially 
recognised role and the rights and duties that parents have towards their children 
and with regard to them all stem from this role and relationship. So parenthood 
can be defined as a social phenomena embedded in a network of socially 
meaningful relationships. The norms and duties arise from the social meaning of 
the institution to which the role belongs or within which it operates. 
The meaning of parenthood, the point of it is the care, the rearing, and education 
of children so that they become capable, independent adults. One might want to 
ask how biology fits into all this. A plausible answer could be that it is due to 
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mere habit and the overwhelming historical precedent we have. We are sexually 
reproducing animals and our young cannot care for themselves. We do make 
exceptions, for example, when we take care of stepchildren, adopted children and 
those that come into being by the use of new reproductive technologies, those that 
do not carry our genes. In all of these cases, we opt to be in a position where we 
can care for the young child. Another way of looking at it would be in terms of 
the `telos', the end of this relationship. Parents have to undergo a lot of sacrifices 
and difficulties for their young ones. Nature gives us an instinct to rear 
successfully a child into an adult. The parent-child relationship exploits the 
natural instinct that people have. A third way of looking at it would be to view it 
from the perspective of posterity, that people have a desire to continue their own, 
have children who are their own and share their life with them. 
Contemporary parenting is not simply a matter of education and training. 
Emotions enter into good parenting in crucial ways. Love is important in 
successful parenting and one cannot be trained to love one's charges. So too are 
pride, anxiety etc. and none of these are to be instilled in a training course. 109 
These commonsense observations give a clue to the reason for a presumption in 
favour of natural parenting- parents are more likely to love, be proud of, worry 
109 Graham, G., (1988) Contemporary Social Philosophy (Oxford : Basil Blackwell), p. 149 
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about their own children than they are about other people's, and the presence of 
these emotions makes for better parenting. This is why natural parents are likely 
to be better custodians of the interests and welfare of their own children than any 
state appointed guardians, however well trained, could reasonably be expected to 
be. 110 
The family is an institution formed in all societies that are committed to their 
biological and social reproduction. The Latin origin of the word family or familia 
implies domestic, or household -a group habitually sharing a common dwelling. 
The family can have several aspects based on different criteria - locational, 
kinship, functional, biological, reproductive focus. ' i1 
In most human societies, the family is the fundamental unit of sexual and social 
organisation- largely through selected mating on the pattern of monogamy. 
Families can supply a collective well-being for all their members: for children, 
this means parents meeting adequately a multiplicity of needs. The family, as the 
first instrument of socialisation and education for the young, can contribute to the 
1 10 Ibid. 
111 Ulanowsky, C., (I 988), The Family' in Ruth Chadwick (ed. ) Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics 
(San Diego: Academic Press) v. 2, p. 233 
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well-being and stability of the society of which it is a part. Psychological studies 
suggest that the family from which people originate and the one that they might 
create have the potential for influencing significantly what individuals are and 
what they might become from birth to death. 112 
Self-centred, atomised individuals will create self-centred, atornised societies, and 
parents as the first and most critical role models have the potential to influence 
their children in the way they think best. Functioning with integrity and altruism, 
and directing their energies to positive ways both externally and within the home, 
it is argued that parents can contribute through example, to their children's moral 
well-being and ultimately to the future well-being of the society of which they are 
a part. 
Personal relationships are fairly long standing relationships between individual 
persons who know each other to a substantial degree and who normally have 
some degree of emotional attachment to one another. Aristotle gave friendship a 
central place in his ethical theory. Personal relationships can be wholly 
involuntary, as in the relationship between child and parent. They can be wholly 
' Ibid., p. 234 
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voluntary in the sense that it is entirely up to the individual whether to enter- into 
them or not, e. g., marriage and friendship. There maybe cases in between, such as 
the relation of parent to child; the parent may choose to have a child, but does not 
choose to have the particular child he or she does end up having. But the 
voluntariness of entering into these relationships is not paralleled by a complete 
voluntariness in exiting from them. 113 
To act from friendship is to act for the sake of one's friend. The value of personal 
relationships is not just their general value as components of human good. Rather, 
each particular friendship has its own unique value; each relationship is 
incommensurable with any other. The value of friendship involves the 
irreplaceable and non comparable value of each particular friendship. 114 A second 
source of interest in personal relationships, as a distinctly moral phenomena 
comes from recognising that there are many kinds of special moral relationships. 
The paradigm, and in an ultimate sense only, moral relationship in impartialist 
ethical thinking is of persons regarded simply as persons, human beings, rational 
113 Blum, L., (2001), `Personal Relationships' in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker 
(eds. ) Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York : Routledge), p. 1299 
114 Ibid., p. 1300 
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beings, or the like. This perspective is insufficient in that we are subject to certain 
norms, responsibilities, and perhaps duties to specific other persons in virtue of 
the type of specific relationship we stand to them - professional to client, friend to 
friend, and parent to child. This point of view can be associated historically with 
intuitionism (advocated to W. D. Ross) and discussed by Sidgwick. The intuitionist 
perspective involves a multiplicity of distinct and irreducible principles, not all 
applicable to all persons simply as persons. 
While accepting that there can be norms and obligations in, for e. g., professional 
relationships, some nevertheless object to seeing personal relationships in this 
way. For, they say, action on behalf of friends and family must stem from 
personal affection or caring. If it stems from duty or obligation, something is 
wrong: this is not what our friends, spouses and children need or want from us. 
Yet we do speak of duties at least of parents toward their children (to nurture, 
support, take care of). Sidgwick 115 suggests that we do have duties to have 
affection for our friends and family but that in the absence of such affections we 
also regard parents as under a duty to provide certain goods to their children. 
Many goods however, within personal relations, like a child's self-esteem or a 
ll` Sidgwick, 11., (1901), The Methods of Ethics (London : MacMillan and Co. ), Book III, Chapter 
IV, Section 1 
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friend's self- confidence cannot be brought about by the parent or friend unless 
doing so is motivated by certain emotions or emotional attitudes , of 
love, care, 
valuing, rather than by duty. Perhaps it can be argued that there are duties of 
personal relationship, but that discharging those duties requires motives other than 
duty itself. 
There seem to be grounds for saying that moral norms operate within personal 
relationships, though these norms sometimes involve emotion and feeling in ways 
that norms do not do in other relationships. In addition, an ethic for personal 
relationships will have to be decidedly more particularistic than so far indicated, 
and more particularistic than the way obligations are portrayed on standard 
accounts. For if there are duties to friends, these are not just general duties but 
ones very specific to the particular relationship in question. 
Just as each personal relationship has its own irreplaceable value, so each has its 
own unique history, character, and set of implicit and explicit understandings 
about what is to be expected of the parties. What I ought to do for my friend or 
149 
child or spouse, is often not what I ought to do for any friend in comparable 
circumstances but rather depends on the particularities of the relationship. 
The normal motivation for interacting with our families is different. We often do 
things for our family not to promote our own interests, but rather to promote theirs. 
Strong family relationships are based on love. Love is a gift, and, as in giving a 
gift, we do not expect it to be reciprocated. That explains why, English claims, 
grown children do not owe anything to their parents. Healthy family relationships 
are not governed by moral rules, but by care. Of course, if parents had good 
relationships with their children, then we would anticipate that the children would 
care for and help their ailing parents. However, that is a prediction of how we 
think children will act; it in no way implies that the children are obligated to do so. 
Jane English"6 argues that love for others does call for caring about and caring 
for them. Some other parental requests, such as for more sweeping changes in the 
child's lifestyle or life goals, can be seen to be insupportable, once we shift the 
justification from debts owed to love. The terminology of favours suggests the 
reasoning, "Since we paid for your college, education, you owe it to us to make a 
career of engineering, rather than becoming a rock musician. " This tends to 
116 I'nglish, J., (2002), `What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents' in Hugh La Follete 
(ed. )Ethics in Practice. -An ., Inrholo, (,,,, ti" (Oxford: 
Blackwell), pp. 15? -I 55 
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alienate affection even further, since the tuition payments are depicted as 
investments for a return rather than done from love, as though the child's life 
goals could be "bought". Basing the argument on love leads to different reasoning 
patterns. The suppressed premise, "If A loves B, then A follows B's wishes as to 
A's lifelong career" is simply false. Love does not even dictate that the child 
adopt the parents' values as to the desirability of alternative life goals. So the 
parents' strongest available argument here is, "We love you, we are deeply 
concerned about your happiness, and in the long run you will be happier as an 
engineer". 
1 17 
The many kinds of love that humans experience can be differentiated and 
categorised in several ways. First, we can distinguish loves in terms of its objects, 
those pieces of the world that are the recipients of our love. We can love our 
spouses, parents, siblings, children, pets, country, abstract ideals, geometrical 
theorems, God, food, movies, books, nature, personal belongings. In some cases it 
is possible for these items to return our love. Second, loves can be differentiated 
by their basis, that which accounts for the existence of the love or grounds it. 
Loves can also be differentiated by their typical or constitutive causal effects, 
whether, say, the love leads to a desire to benefit the beloved or to a desire for 
117 Ibid., p. l5,5 
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union with the beloved, or to a desire to possess the beloved. Some languages 
partially distinguish different loves by using different nouns. The ancients made a 
linguistic, philosophical and theological distinction among the Greek terms eros 
(romantic love), agape (Christian giving love) and philia (friendship love). 118 
We commonly both want something and like it. We want it, usually because we 
like it. We do not like it because we want it. There are times, however, when we 
do like something just because we want it. Similarly, there is a correlation 
between our loving something and our finding value in it. Do we love this thing 
because we find value in it, or do we find value in it because we love it? In 
particular, the correlation between our love for persons and the value they have 
can be understood in two ways 119 : 
a) Person X loves person Y because X finds the property of Y to be 
valuable/attractive (e-type love) 
b) X finds properties of Y to be valuable because X loves Y. (a-type love) 
118 Soble, A., (1998), The Philosophy of Sex and Love: An Introduction (St. Paul: Paragon I louse). 
95 
119 Ibid., pp. 95-96 
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The love that forms the foundation of the parent-child relationship should be an a- 
type love, the love a parent feels for his or her child should be an unconditional 
one, the child's merit, properties, characteristics should be irrelevant to their love. 
The child should be loved because it exists not because it is of a particular sex or a 
particular height. If love is conditional, it would only provide for love of that 
abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities or 
the ones that are preferred or valued by the parent. But this is not the kind of love 
that ought to characterise a parent-child relationship. The love that parents should 
strive for is an unconditional acceptance of the other person, the child, only then 
would the whole of this other being, the child be loved and appreciated. Loving 
someone or something essentially means or consists in, among other things, 
taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests. A parent loves his 
or her children not because of any special merits or virtues they have but because 
they are his children. It is this unconditional acceptance that forms trust, the 
foundation of the parent-child relationship. 
The most fundamental calling of parents to their children is to love them. Children 
are to be loved and cherished by their parents, not to be used or manipulated by 
them for mere personal advantage. Parental love should be understood as an 
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unconditional commitment to nurture one's child, providing it with the care, 
affection and guidance it needs to develop its capacities to maturity. This 
understanding of the parent-child relationship informs our understanding of 
parental rights and duties. Parental rights are trusts, which they must exercise for 
the sake of the child. The proper exercise of parental rights includes the making of 
those choices and the acting in such ways that promote their shared life as a 
family, realizing the shared interests of parents and children. 
The unpredictability of the child produced is an intrinsic feature of human 
reproduction. The set of characteristics that one's child will possess at a particular 
time is inherently unpredictable. Even if a child's genetic make up was entirely 
known, the immense complexity of every child's environment necessarily makes 
his or her characteristics unpredictable to some extent. In the case of most 
naturally conceived children, for example, we would have no idea which of a 
range of hair colours the child would have aged eight. Even if the precise genetic 
determinants of hair colour were known, some unpredictability would always 
remain; the environmental factors to which the child was exposed (perhaps sun 
exposure in the hair colour example) would inject a degree of randomness into the 
characteristic actually displayed. Also contributing to the inherent unpredictability 
of evcry child's characteristics are the environmental events that produce traits 
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without any genetic input. A child may, for example, be blinded by an accident or 
made anaemic by the non-availability of particular foods. So it is an intrinsic 
feature of a child that his or her characteristics will be, to some extent, 
unpredictable. 
Because a child's characteristics are unpredictable, acceptance is a parental virtue. 
The flourishing of the child is facilitated by the parent's embracing of the child 
regardless of his or her specific characteristics. Unless the parents act acceptingly 
toward the child's characteristics, the child's contentment and self esteem, and the 
parents' ability to enjoy that child, are all in jeopardy. Thus, just as courage is a 
human virtue because it is conducive to flourishing in light of the fact that humans 
are subject to pain and challenge, acceptance is a parental virtue because it is 
conducive to flourishing in light of the fact that human reproduction inevitably 
produces a child whose characteristics are unpredictable. Because of the way that 
children are, the good parent (in part) is one who has the character trait of 
acceptance with respect to his or her child, an accepting attitude that transcends 
the child's specific characteristics. 
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Accepting one's child, regardless of his or her particular current characteristics, is 
already perceived as a necessary characteristic of the good parent. When someone 
becomes a parent, we expect him or her to maintain that role regardless of the 
specific features of his or her child at any particular time. We would think 
extremely badly, for example, of parents who severed their relationship with their 
daughter once she developed leukaemia, or even treated their son differently 
purely on the basis that the blond hair of his childhood had now darkened to 
brown. Thus the claim that acceptance is a parental virtue is a compelling one, 
both in terms of its relationship to the fact of unpredictability in reproduction and 
its consistency with current prevailing attitudes. 
The child's sex is a characteristic that falls within the scope of this parental virtue 
of acceptance. Sex selection defies the loving and trusting relationship that forms 
the cornerstone of family life because parents who want to select the sex of their 
children change camps from a-type love to the property based e-type love. They 
will have a child only if it has a particular property, and that is a specific gender. 
Values such as love, loyalty, intimacy, steadfastness, acceptance, and forgiveness 
are crucial to well-functioning families, which are also the most robust settings for 
raising children to become confident, competent, loving and emotionally resilient 
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adults. With control and choice over the traits of our children, trait and sex 
selection fails to acknowledge the values at the heart of family life and a good 
parent-child relationship. Sex selection ignores the role that enduring relationships 
based on love and trust play in our flourishing as human beings. 
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5. Reproductive Autonomy and Harm 
Defenders of sex selection argue that people have a right to reproduction and this 
gives them the liberty to make all kinds of reproductive choices including 
choosing the gender of their offspring. This, they consider, is an indispensable 
part of parental rights, that couples can make decisions regarding their children. 
They posit individual choices, like procreation, as holding supreme and do not 
approve of any interference from the state regarding these decisions. In this 
chapter, I am going to look into the concepts of reproductive autonomy and 
procreative liberty, and examine the claim made above regarding sex selection in 
the light of notions such as autonomy, liberty, rights, the right to reproduction, 
harm and where sex selection fits into this. 
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5.1 Autonomy 
As outlined by Gerald Dworkin 120, the usage of the word `autonomy' is extremely 
broad. It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty, sometimes as equivalent to 
self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is 
equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility and 
self-knowledge. It is identical with qualities of self-assertion, critical reflection, 
freedom from obligation, absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's 
own interests. It can be applied to actions, beliefs, reasons for acting, to rules, to 
the will of other persons, thoughts, and to principles. He goes on to say that 
autonomy functions as a moral, political and social ideal and in all three cases, 
there is value attached to how things are viewed through the reasons, values, and 
desires of the individual and how those elements are shaped and formed. Common 
to the different ways in which the word is used, is a shared assumption of what 
and who a person is. What makes an individual the particular person he is is his 
life's plan, his projects. In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one's life, one 
constructs its meaning; the autonomous person gives meaning to his life. In 
particular, then, autonomy is used to oppose perfectionist or paternalistic views. 
120 Dworkin, G., (1988), The Theori' and Practice of . autonomi" (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 6-20 
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It is also related to a principle of respect with a correlative right to choose. To 
respect an autonomous person is, at a minimum to acknowledge that person's 
right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values 
and beliefs. Dworkin concludes then that autonomy is a term of art introduced by 
a theorist in an attempt to make sense of a tangled set of intuitions, conceptual and 
empirical issues, and normative claims. 
As a moral notion, it has been shared by philosophers like Kant, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Royce, Hare and Popper. The argument supporting the moral notion is 
about the necessity or desirability of individuals choosing or willing or accepting 
their own moral code. We are all responsible for developing and criticising our 
moral principles, and individual conscience must take precedence over authority 
and tradition. There is a notion of the self which is to be respected, left 
unmanipulated, and which is in certain ways independent and self-determining. 
The central idea that underlies the concept of autonomy is indicated by the 
etymology of the term: autos (self) and nomos (rule or law). The teen was first 
applied to the Greek city state where a city had `autonomia' when its citizens 
made their own laws, as opposed to being under the control of some conquering 
power. 
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The same concept is presented by Berlin under the heading of "positive liberty": 
"I wish to be an instrument of my own, not other men's acts of will. I wish to be a 
subject, not an object... deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not 
acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or 
a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies 
of my own and realising them. " 121 
5.2 Liberty and autonomy 
The question then arises of the relationship between liberty or freedom of an 
individual and his autonomy. One wonders if these are two distinct notions, 
whether, say, interference with liberty is always interference with autonomy. For 
John Stuart Mill, liberty is a necessary condition for the full development of the 
individual as a human being. By saying that the goal of self-development is 
`individuality', he placed high value on the fact that each individual should be 
making their own choices and following their own inclinations rather than 
slavishly following public opinion or custom. For Mill, individuality meant a 
121 Berlin, I., (1969), Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 131 
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certain sort of autonomy, the capacity to make judgements and choices that are 
genuinely one's own and not merely a reflection of the judgements and choices of 
others. Mill's argument is that liberty, in the sense of freedom from pressure to 
conform to the views of others, is a necessary condition for the exercise and 
development of certain central human faculties that are employed in making 
choices. Hence, his view is that liberty is self-mastery. 122 
If we take liberty to be the ability of a person to do what he wants, to have 
significant options that are not closed or made less eligible by the actions of other 
agents, the typical ways of interfering with the liberty of an agent, through 
coercion or force, would seem to also interfere with his autonomy, the power of 
self-determination. If we force a Jehovah's Witness to have a blood transfusion, 
this not only is a direct interference with his liberty, but also a violation of his 
ability to determine for himself what kinds of medical treatment are acceptable to 
him. So then it seems, autonomy cannot be identical to liberty for, when we 
deceive a patient, we are also interfering with his autonomy but deception would 
not be a way of restricting liberty because it does not literally reduce one's 
options but only one's beliefs about one's options. Gerald Dworkin thus argues 
122 Ross, A., (1996), `J. S. Mill and Durkheim on Individualism' in R. Bellamy and A. Ross (ed. ) A 
TeXtual Introduction to Social and Political Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 
pp. 281-284 
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that autonomy and liberty are related but distinct notions; that libert}y, power, 
control over important aspects of one's life are not the same as autonomy, but are 
necessary conditions for individuals to develop their own aims and interests and 
to make their values effective in the living of their lives. 123 
He goes on to state that autonomy is a second-order capacity of persons to reflect 
critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the 
capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences 
and values. Hence, by exercising such a capacity, people define their nature, give 
meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of 
person they are. 124 On the view that he defends, autonomy is a capacity that is 
constitutive of what it is to be an agent. It is a capacity that we have a 
responsibility to exercise and that grounds our notion of having a character. Our 
notions of who we are, of self-identity of being a particular person is linked to our 
capacity to find and refine oneself. The exercise of the capacity thus is what 
makes a life mine. 
12 ` Dworkin, G., (1988), The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 18 
IN Ibid., p. 1 _0 
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"Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign... the only 
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others". 125 But for Mill, as well as other libertarians too, individual 
liberty has certain limitations. Mill's harm principle insists that one individual's 
liberty may be restricted where this is necessary to prevent harm to others. lie 
recognises the importance of society, saying that everyone who receives the 
protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in a 
society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line 
of conduct towards the rest and that this conduct consists in not injuring the 
interests of one another and that where there is a definite risk of damage, the case 
is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law. ' 26 
5.3 Reproductive autonomy 
Procreation involves three main elements: begetting- which is producing offspring 
that are one's own - gestating, and rearing children. 
' 27 However, what makes 
procreation such an important part of one's life is the intention, the desire, the 
125 Mill, J. S., (18S9), On Liberty (London: John. W. Parker &Sons, \1 . 
Strand), pp. 21.22 
126 Ibid., pp. 134,147 
'27Strong, C., (I997), Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine, . -1 New 
Framework (\cw 
Haven and London: Yale University Press), p. 13 
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want to rear a child. Reproductive freedom involves, first, uncoerced choice about 
whether to procreate at all, or more precisely, whether to participate in procreativc 
activity with a willing partner. This includes choices intended to lead to or prevent 
reproduction. Secondly, the advent of modern methods of contraception and 
procreation makes the choice of when to reproduce an increasingly important 
component of reproductive freedom and so is the control over the decision about 
how many children to have. One of the most controversial components of 
reproductive freedom however, is the freedom to choose what kind of children to 
have and it is this particular aspect of procreative autonomy that needs discussion 
for our purposes. 
As discussed by Buchanan et al128, the proper moral protection that reproductive 
freedom should have depends on what moral interests or values support 
preserving and protecting it. The first moral basis for the importance and support 
of reproductive autonomy is individual self-determination. The second moral 
basis is the utilitarian view taking account of the important contribution that 
reproductive freedom typically makes to individuals' good or well-being. The 
Buchanan 
,A., 
Brock, D., Daniels, M., Wilker, D., (2000), From Chance to Choice: Genetics 
and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 214-221 
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third moral basis appeals to a principle of equality, equality of expectations and 
opportunities between men and women. 
People's interest in self-determination is their interest in making significant 
decisions about their own lives for themselves, according to their own values or 
conceptions of a good life, and having those decisions respected by others. John 
Rawls 129 has characterised this interest as based in people's capacity to form, 
revise over time, and pursue a plan of life or conception of the good. By having 
their choices about the life they want for themselves respected by others, in the 
sense of not being interfered with even if others disagree with them, people arc 
able to take some responsibility and control for their lives and the kind of persons 
they become. The exercise of self-determination is the process by which 
individuals help shape their own unique destiny and the capacity to be 
autonomous is a central condition of personhood. A second line of moral 
argument in defence of reproductive freedom appeals to the contribution it makes 
to the welfare, well-being or good of the individuals concerned. Securing and 
respecting individuals' reproductive freedom makes a positive overall 
contribution to their happiness, since competent individuals are the best judges of 
'29Rawls, J., (1971), --A 
Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press) 
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what reproductive choices will best promote their happiness. Reproductive 
freedom also serves equality by helping mitigate unjust gender disadvantages that 
women suffer that are specifically tied to reproduction as also those that are not. 
However, having said all that, it is worth adding that though respect for individual 
choices in reproduction hail supreme, there are certain boundaries that need to be 
drawn on this individual liberty. This freedom extends only so far as it has no 
significant harm on others and does not come into conflict with what would be 
good for the individual whom their self-determining decisions would affect. 
5.4 The right to reproductive autonomy 
This leads us to ask our second question - what are rights and what is the right to 
reproductive freedom. Rights are claims, powers, liberties or immunities. Joel 
Feinberg130 points out that to have a moral right is to have a claim, the recognition 
of which is called for by moral principles. To have a claim, in turn, is to have a 
case meriting consideration, to have grounds that put one in a position to demand 
130Feinhcrg, J., (1970), 'The Nature and Value of Rights', Journal of I'aloe Inquiry 4, pp. 243-257 
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one's due. Some rights are powers, like the Principal of a school has rights which 
give him the power to suspend a student from school. Other rights are liberties, 
like an Indian citizen has the right to religious freedom, that is the liberty to 
practise any religion and worship in the way he likes. The right to reproductive 
freedom would be more of an immunity rather than a claim, power or liberty, an 
immunity from society and other individuals to make personal choices regarding 
procreation. A right to reproduce is included in widely accepted manifestos of 
fundamental human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, issued in 
1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Article 16, paragraph 1, 
states, "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and found a family ". 131 
Various criteria for possessing rights have been discussed from time to time, like 
the ability to have interests, capacity to suffer, possessing reason and the capacitN, 
to make a voluntary, independent choice and lastly, the requirement of being a 
person. There are certain rights which are claimed to be absolutely fundamental 
like the right to life whereas others are given to us by way of our membership to a 
particular group or nation, like the right to equal access to health care enjoyed by 
"'Meltzer, M., (1979), The Human Rights Book (New York: Farrar. Straus and Giroux) , pp. 172- 
178 
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British nationals or the right to vote. Rights have been justified on the social 
contract theory, by utilitarians like Mill as contributing in the long run to 
happiness and by philosophers like Alan Gewirth as necessary for humans to be 
able to function as moral agents, displaying autonomy in the exercise of choice. 
The right to reproduction is more of a negative right, in the sense of a valid claim 
to non-interference with activities or states of affairs. Interference with such a 
right is justifiable only if there is a sufficiently weighty moral reason supporting 
the interference. 132 This implies that negative rights are prima facie claims, that 
others should avoid interference but, in special circumstances, involving not just 
utility considerations, though, such presumptions can be overridden by other 
moral concerns. Positive rights on the other hand are valid claims to be provided 
with something by others. As is evident, the right to reproduction does not mean 
that as a part of this right, I can force someone to have sex with me. It might to 
some extent involve some assistance from the State to provide for medical help 
and care to ensure safety during pregnancy and delivery. But again, this would not 
mean that the State has a duty to see to it that every couple who wants a child has 
one and in case of infertility, provide for infertility treatment. 
132 Dworkin, R., ( 1977), Taking Rights Serioush" (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press) , pp. 
184-205 
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5.5 The meaning of harm 
Our most cherished ideals of individual autonomy and the right to choose 
preclude an unambiguous condemnation of sex control. Our society, to be sure, 
deeply cherishes liberty and rightfully gives a wide berth to its exercise. But 
liberty is never without its limits. What puts a limit on liberty is harm. In this 
section, I would like to examine what it means to `harm' someone. 
The concept of harm is very intricately tied up with interests and rights. A 
necessary element of all harming is that it has an adverse effect on someone's 
interests or in another way, violates someone's rights. According to Feinberg133 
having an interest in something means to have a stake in it. This only means that 
the person stands to gain or lose depending on the nature and condition of X. If I 
say that something is in my interest then I am implying that I will be better off if 
the things in which I have a stake, flourish or prosper. Now what we have a stake 
in is defined by our concerns and there seems to be a legitimate connection 
be twwween interests and the capacity for conscious awareness. Our interests are after 
131 Feinberg, J., (1984), Har» r to Others (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 34 
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all compounded out of beliefs, aims, goals and concerns and conscious awareness 
is a prerequisite to desires, preferences, hopes, aims and goals. 
We can have obligations regarding mere things but these obligations are not to 
them. We have no obligations to them because it does not matter to them how we 
treat them. It is not for their sake that we take steps to preserve them, but for the 
sake of beings who can have interests in them and such beings can be existing 
people, animals with higher capacities or future generations. 
So we would then be correct in asserting that a being can have interests only if it 
can matter to the being what is done to it. Such beings can often be wrong about 
what is in their interest but this would not mean that the being cannot have 
interests. If someone asserts that he does not care about X, then it is not the case 
that X is not in his interest. It might only be that though X is necessary for the 
being or person to achieve a certain goal, the person is unaware or ignorant about 
the connection between X and his goal. However, if we have a being to whom 
nothing can possibly matter, then that being can have no interests. On Feinberg's 
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account, biological life alone does not endow a being with interests. Permanently 
nonsentient and nonconscious beings cannot have interests. 
Most discussions regarding trait selection are about children who are not yet 
conceived or born. They are only possible children and hence, it is often 
questioned how such children, who are only possible now, can have their interests 
jeopardised or be harmed. Ethical discussions of sex selection often have to 
encounter a pitfall that centers on this problem often termed as the wrongful life 
problem134. Often parents are criticized for bringing into the world a child who is 
physically or mentally damaged in some way that seems very likely to cause that 
child a degree of suffering greater than that of normal children. Some writers 
however argue that this criticism is misplaced because counter to our intuitions, 
no one has actually been harmed, as the child could not have existed were it not to 
be born in this state. Thus unless the child's suffering is so great and his existence 
so terrible that he would have been better off never having being born, he has not 
been harmed by being born in this damaged state. To illustrate this problem, let's 
take the example of a couple who are told by their doctor that if they get pregnant 
in May, they have a very great likelihood of conceiving a child who would be 
1" Steinbock, B., (1986), `The Logical Case for the 'Wrongful Life", Hastings Center Report 
0(2), pp. 15-20 
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born with a missing limb, however, if they waited until June, their risk for a child 
with a birth defect would be no greater than that of the general population. The 
couple go ahead and conceive; a baby girl Mary is born with only one leg. 135 
Most of us would be highly critical of this couple. Yet the question that is raised 
by the wrongful-life problem is: who is harmed? Mary could not be harmed 
because if her parents had waited an extra month, she would not have been 
conceived. The only option for her was to be born in this damaged state. Mary 
could not have been born in any other state but this. An alternative to being born 
in this state was not being born at all. Had her parents waited an extra month, they 
might have had a nondamaged child but this child would be a different individual 
and not Mary. So unless one were to believe that life with only one leg is worse 
than no life at all, Mary herself has no cause for complaint and has not been 
harmed. This is an objection that has often been raised in discussions of deaf 
couples wanting to select for a deaf child. 
135 This is a hypothetical example, a different version of it was originally put forward by Derek 
Parfit 
, (1984), 
Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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In the case of the deaf child being selected, an objection raised against it is that 
this selection is wrong for the sake of the child itself. John Robertson136 asserts 
that this kind of claim can only be sustained in very horrible instances, because it 
relies on the assertion that the child's life will be so terrible that it would have 
been better off not being born at all. One must be cautious to distinguish between 
cases where the parents are genetically deaf and those who are not. In the former 
case, deafness is a part of their genes and therefore, if they used PGD to select t 'or 
a child, Mark who carried their genes for deafness, there would be no alternative 
for Mark but to be born deaf. Mark could not have been born hearing. However, 
now imagine another deaf couple who are deaf due to nongenetic reasons. If they 
were to increase their chances of having a deaf child, they would have to 
deliberately expose the foetus to some teratogen like German measles to ensure 
that the child was born deaf. In this case, it would be easier to show that the child, 
Emily, has been harmed since she had two possibilities: to be born with hearing or 
deaf. Her parents deliberately did something to ensure that she was not born 
hearing. If being born deaf is less desirable than being born hearing, then Emily 
would have been harmed by her parents' decision. 
136 Robertson, J., (1986), `Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty': The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction', Southern California LawRevie 59, pp. 987-1000 
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Going back to Mark's and Mary's case for a moment, when a child is born in less 
than ideal circumstances or is partially disabled in ways that do not make for a life 
of horrendous suffering, there seems no way to argue that the child, Mark or Mary 
has been harmed. This may appear to entail the conclusion, counter to our own 
moral sense, that therefore no harm has been done. "A wrong action must be bad 
for someone but a choice to create a child with its handicap is bad for no one". 137 
One could offer a partial solution by saying that by simply waiting for another 
month to conceive, Mary's parents could have had a child who probably would 
have experienced less suffering than will Mary. Thus harm has been done, even 
though one cannot attach it to a specific entity, such as Mary. In Mary's case, it is 
easy to see that no one really gained any happiness from Mary's missing leg, and 
also that being born with two legs is preferable, despite the many ways in which 
Mary might grow up to overcome her handicap. In the case of Mark however, his 
parents made a deliberate choice to have a deaf baby and they are the ones who 
stand to gain happiness from this state of his. So there are two issues to deal with 
here: the question of whether being able to hear is better than being deaf and one 
1" Brock, D.. (1995), The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic I{arms-The Case of Wrongful 
Handicap', Bioethics 9, p. 84 
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also needs to balance the satisfaction that his parents feel in raising a deaf child 
like themselves against the limitations experienced by Mark. 
One of the reasons why this debate regarding selection has proved to be so 
difficult is because of the way it has been discussed, in mostly legal terms, from 
the narrow perspective of procreative liberty. John Robertson, a law professor, 
who has been a strong voice in this debate, is a proponent of procreative liberty 
and his arguments tend to rely heavily on the constitutional protection of 
procreative liberty. His main point is that the state can limit procreative liberty 
only when its exercise places a substantial burden on others. Unavoidable harm to 
the children expected to result from trait selection techniques certainly qualifies as 
a reason for the state to limit procreative liberty if the harm is likely to he 
substantial. But if the only way this child could be born at all is through the new 
technology, in order for the child to be harmed, it must be put in a state so bad 
that nonexistence would be preferable. 138 Robertson's argument covers very 
narrow ground, his analysis offering little on the part of the ethical evaluation of 
the various uses of assisted reproductive technologies, or evaluating couples' 
reasons and motives behind such selection procedures. 
13' Robertson, J., (1986), `Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction', Southern California LawRcview 59, pp. 989 
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Ronald Green points out that "harms can occur without someone being made 
worse off than they were before.. . there are forms of conduct we are unwilling to 
tolerate that do not make people worse off in the strict sense"39. A number of 
philosophers working in applied ethics have tried to deal with the harm 
conundrum. Dan Brock argues from the principle that it is morally good to act in a 
way that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the world. 140 A 
parent violates that principle if, due to her negligence, her child loses a hand to 
blood poisoning. But she also violates that principle if, through her negligence she 
conceives a child with one leg when she could almost as easily have conceived 
one without any disability. Without getting drawn into the complexities of 
comparing two periods of time in a child's life, that of his present state and his 
hypothetical state as a nonborn being, it can be held that a life with serious, but 
not devastating deficits, could be bad. It would be a mistake to equate the harm of 
nonexistence, which is really no harm at all, with the harm of death. To say that I 
will allow myself to get pregnant now, even though I live in a house with asbestos, 
both my husband and I are out of work, I already have two very young children , 
139 Green, R. M., (2000), 'Much Ado about Mutton: An Ethical Review of the Cloning 
Controversy' in Paul Lauritzen(ed. ) Cloning and the Future of Human Embr-yo Research (New 
York: Oxford University Press), pp. 114-131 
140 Brock, D., (1995), `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms-The Case of Wrongful 
Handicap', Bioethics 9, p. 274 
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because, after all, whatever child I have in the present conditions would be better 
off than had it not been born at all, is an absurd conclusion. 
In the next section I focus on the harm done to children when parents significantly 
limit the range of choices open to them when they become adults, whether that 
limitation is due to a physical disability or due to intensified parental expectations 
engendered by their parents' ability to use modern technology to create children 
with desired traits, such as gender. 
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5.6 Procreative liberty, harm and the right to sex select 
Let us see how this overview of liberty, reproductive freedom, rights and harm 
applies to sex selection. As has been pointed out earlier, the issue of defending 
sex selection on the grounds of reproductive liberty is a complex one. John 
Robertson characterises procreative liberty as the "freedom in activities and 
choices related to procreation" 141, but it is to be noted that the term does not tell 
us what activities fall within its scope. Applying the above discussed concepts, we 
need to first ascertain whether a right to select the sex of one's child is a valid 
claim. 
A right to reproduction exists because it is imperative to human beings and to the 
progress of human civilisation. It is an important part of people's control over 
their own body and helps fulfil their desires to bring a life into the world which is 
the symbol of the love and relationship between two partners. If we grant that 
people have a right to pre-select the characteristics of their children as a part of 
their reproductive liberty, then we would be thereby also granting people the right 
'41Robertson, J., (1986), ` Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the 
New Reproduction' , 
Southern California Law Review 59, p. 955 
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to `design' or `engineer' their offspring according to their own needs, desires, 
expectations and conception of what a `good' or the `perfect and best' human 
being ought to be like. What is troubling about this is that these are decisions 
being made for someone else, decisions which affect the life of a potential human 
being in a way that does not take into consideration the welfare or the interests of 
the person to be. Reproduction involves a future life and choices such as whether 
or not to reproduce, and how many children to have do not trample the interests of 
the child to be in the same way as predetermination of sex does. 
As pointed out earlier, procreative liberty, like any other, is constrained by the 
requirement that its exercise should not pose a risk of harm to others, in particular 
to the children thus conceived; and it is worth noting that JS Mill remarks that for 
this reason the application of the principle of liberty to family life is not 
straightforward: 
"It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle 
to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's 
children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, 
180 
so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and 
exclusive control over them. " 142 
In the case of actions that are purely self-regarding, i. e., actions that affect only' 
ourselves - society tends to give the greatest protections to individual autonomy 
and liberty. But as we move outwards, away from purely self-regarding actions to 
those actions that affect others, our liberty is necessarily more liable to restraint. 
Sex determination clearly does not belong in the category of purely self-regarding 
action. The parents' actions (their choice of a boy or a girl) are directed not 
towards themselves but towards the child-to-be. One might argue that, since each 
child must be either a girl or a boy, the parents' actions in controlling sex do not 
constitute much of an intrusion on the prospective child's freedom and well being. 
But the binary choice among highly natural and familiar types hardly makes the 
choice a trivial one. And having one's sex foreordained by another is different 
from having it determined by the lottery of sexual union. There is thus at least a 
prima facie case for suggesting that the power to foreordain or control the nature 
of one's child's sexual identity is not encompassed in the protected sphere of 
inviolable reproductive liberty. 
142 Mill, J. S., (1989), On liberty' in S. Collini (ed). On Liberty and Other Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 105 
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Joel Feinberg143 talks of the concept of a child's `right to an open future'. an idea 
that parents have a moral responsibility to help their children during their growth 
to adulthood to develop capacities for practical judgement and autonomous choice, 
and to develop as well at least a reasonable range of skills and capacities 
necessary to provide them with the choice of a reasonable array of different life 
plans available to members of their society. Hence, on this view, it would be 
wrong for parents to substantially close off most opportunities that would 
otherwise be available to their children, in order to impose their own particular- 
conception of a good life or in order to continue their own community that is 
committed to that conception of a good life. 
By preselecting the gender of one's offspring, parents are doing just that, not 
giving their child the opportunity to develop into an autonomous human being 
because with their choice of sex selection comes the baggage of expectations and 
gender stereotyping of how they envision their children to be. Predetermination of 
sex is a harm to the child who may be born because it concretizes the parental 
gender expectations and thus makes it difficult for the children to escape gender 
stereotypes. Since they have made use of expensive painful techniques to ensure 
143 Feinberg, J., (1980), ` The Child's Right to an Open Future' in W. Aiken and H. LaFollettcled. ) 
4"hosc' Child: ' Children's Rights, Parental Authority and State Power (Totowa NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield), pp. 124-153 
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that their child is of a particular sex they would see to it that their children turned 
out to be what they had imagined and more so, `wanted' them to be, thereby 
putting the child under immense pressure to conform to their expectations. Thus, 
they would not allow their son or daughter to grow according to their potential 
and develop their own personalities. Instead they would keep matching them with 
the image they had and the intention that prompted them to use PGD. 
In the case of the deaf child being deaf significantly limits the child's future 
options and is thus a harm to the child. Many deaf people and disability rights 
activists believe that deafness is a culture and therefore they have the right to 
protect it and bring a deaf child into the folds of that community and raise it in 
that culture. It can be argued that if deafness is a culture rather than a disability, it 
is an exceedingly narrow one. It is not very clear that children raised with Sign as 
their first language, will ever be comfortable with the written word since Sign 
itself has no written analogue and has a grammatical structure completely 
different from that of English. Some deaf children raised with Sign from birth do 
become skilled readers, but there is reason to question whether a deaf child has 
access to the wealth of literature, drama, and poetry that liberals consider the 
beauty of life and every child's birthright. If deafness is a disability that 
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substantially narrows a child's career, marriage, and cultural options, then 
deliberately creating a deaf child counts as a moral harm, because it so drastically 
curtails the child's right to an open future. If deafness is a culture, as deaf activists 
assert, then deliberately creating a deaf child who will have only limited options 
to move outside of that culture also counts as a moral harm. Society must defend 
the liberty not to be coerced into, or trapped within, ways of life. A decision made 
before a child is born that confines him or her forever to a narrow group of people 
and a limited choice of careers and lifeoptions violates the child's right to an open 
future. Parents ought not deliberately to substantively constrain the ability of 
children to make a wide variety of life choices when they become adults. Hence, 
the criticism is targeted at parents who have choices about the world they offer 
their children. 
Torn Baldwin, defending the HFEA's ruling on restricting sex selection to 
medical reasons only, offers us an argument that Habermas presents in his The 
Future of Human Nature. 144 Habermas argues that an essential ingredient of our 
conception of ourselves is that we should be able to regard our embodied 
character (Leibsein) as a natural phenomenon, and not something which has been, 
144 Baldwin, T., (2005), 'Reproductive Liberty and Elitist Contempt: Reply to John Harris'. 
Journal of'Medical Ethics 3 1, pp. 288-290 
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in some respect, deliberately imposed upon us by others, even by our parents. Of 
course, we must also recognise that in many ways we have been formed by the 
genes we have inherited from our parents; these genetic predispositions are, 
however, our bodily inheritance and there is no way in which a human being can 
be created without some such genetic inheritance. But where a fundamental 
characteristic such as one's sex has been deliberately selected for things are 
different: a central aspect of the character of such a child has been deliberately 
chosen by the child's parents-that the child be a girl or a boy. Unless its manner 
of conception is kept secret, which is itself ethically objectionable, the child \vill 
come to learn that it was deliberately created in a way which ensures that it is a 
certain kind of person - in a way which is so intimate and bodily that it cannot 
repudiate this mode of being, however much it might wish to do so. Thus there is 
an inescapable but alien intrusion into its subjective sense of itself. 
As discussed earlier, Aristotle145 is of the opinion that parents love their children 
as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being something from 
which they originate. People have argued in the past that since individuals own 
their bodies, they have a right to decide what they wish to do with it. They extend 
145 Aristotle, (1954), The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Sir David Ross, trans. (London: Oxford 
University Press), Book 8, Chapter 12 
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this argument to however propose that procreation and having children being 
directly linked to the body, as the craftsman owns his work, so do parents have the 
right to make decisions regarding their products, that is, their children, and so 
deciding what kind of children to have comes under the purview of reproductive 
liberty. As I have argued earlier, surely, even if we think that people own their 
bodies, they do not own their children. They are their guardians and may bear 
responsibility for their upbringing, but an individual cannot be owned by anyone 
but himself, and so no man owns another. To say that a right to reproduce or 
reproductive freedom gives people the right to select gender is too easy an 
assumption to make, since a right to gender selection does not logically follow 
from the possession of a right to reproduction. 
When parents commit themselves to bringing another life into existence, they also 
thereby undertake the responsibility and obligation to consider the interests of the 
child when making decisions regarding him, and especially if it is a feature like 
gender which has immense importance in one's life. Once they decide to become 
parents, they cannot act on motives that are of pure interest to them, ignoring what 
the child's good would lie in. Imagine a single woman in the first world who 
wanted to have a daughter just because she felt she wanted a like companion and 
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experience of bringing up a daughter. First of all, this child would be subjected to 
gender role-playing, and if this daughter turned out to be more `boyish', 
preferring cars over dolls, not only would the aspirations of the mother- be doomed. 
it would also have a detrimental effect on the treatment of the child and might 
cause a strain in the relationship which was `meant' to be of a `certain type'. 
Hence, parents' reproductive rights, whatsoever they may encompass, come in 
conflict with or encroach upon the child's right to be an individual and thus, 
cannot be given weight. 
Even a fundamental constitutional right like freedom of speech is curtailed when 
it abuses another's rights or causes great harm. Holding that rights cannot always 
be absolute, Brenda Almond believes that rights are compatible with social 
responsibility in that the assertion of rights necessarily involves the recognition of 
the rights of others as well as one's own. 146 The thought underpinning the above 
arguments is that parents are committed to bring about the welfare of their child, 
and it is his interests which are crucial in deciding about his life, and individuals 
are better off in life with having more choices offered to them than less, to 
develop into autonomous human beings. Time and again, we have witnessed child 
146 \lmond, B., (1991), ' Rights' in P. Singer (ed. ) .4 Companion to Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. ), pp. 259-268 
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prodigies who often succumbing to parental pressure, earn fame, money, respect 
and admiration in society at an early age with the result that they fizzle out later in 
life and go into severe depression or turn suicidal because they have not been 
allowed to develop other aspects of their personality. They become failures as 
individuals since their life is centred around one aspect only and this deprives 
them of an opportunity to develop a wholesome perspective to either their 
personality or life. 
Coming back to our cases, what happens when a couple go in for PGD and select 
the sex of their child only to avoid a sex-linked genetically inherited disease? In 
such cases, the decision to opt for sex selection is an outcome of the decision to 
avoid pain, disability, a miserable life, limited experiences and opportunities and 
early death to the child and this is the primary concern of the parents rather than 
the sex of their child. Such decisions are thus based on the interests of the future 
child and supported by a woman's right to procreative autonomy and bodily 
integrity. So the mother decides on behalf of a child who has not yet come into 
existence about the kind of life he would want to avoid, keeping in mind the real 
facts about the disease and the cripplement that it would cause. Therefore, sex 
selection, in my view, is not morally objectionable for avoiding very serious, life- 
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threatening diseases. It might thus be said that the prima facie right to choose the 
sex of one's child is linked here to whether it is used to benefit the child. In this 
context, it may be argued by a sexist in India that a female child would be better 
off not being born in a community where socio-religious reasons make a woman's 
life miserable and that sex selection would thus be, in this case, used to benefit 
this child, by not bringing her into a world which would devalue her. There is, 
however, a distinction that needs to be made between the disease and the sex 
selection case. While sex is no disease, in the latter, it is the society with its man- 
made barriers and so-called rules for valuing people and requirements for earning 
merit in life, that plays a major role in the decision. But these rules have no sound 
basis and can be removed, whereas, with the disease there are real, physical 
problems which cannot be removed. Preventing lower caste children from being 
born can hardly be justified by saying that the social conditions are not congenial 
for their progress. The day science advances to that stage when serious genetic 
diseases can be treated or removed and the pain and misery resulting from it are 
alleviated, sex selection on such grounds would become unnecessary. 
Now let us examine the case of those couples who wanted to pre-select the sex of 
their child as a matter of personal preference, just like preferring pink over blue 
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they prefer boys over girls and justify it using the terminology `right to make 
reproductive choices'. I will also include in this class those couples who want to 
use PGD for either family balancing reasons or who say that they want to have a 
particular child rearing experience linked to the gender of the child. Now, all these 
are reasons to want to exercise the right to gender selection and determine lhmv it 
is exercised; they are not reasons why people should have the right. All the 
reasons given for exercising the right have far reaching effects not only on the 
individual who would be born as a result of sex selection techniques but also on 
society as a whole. 
People enjoy the right to make reproductive decisions because we recognise its 
importance in their life and their interest in self-determination, in being valuing 
agents, able to guide their own lives in the way they choose. I lowever, one of the 
determinants of the value of autonomy and individual choices in different 
situations is the nature of the decision, the subsequent action in question and its 
impact. Deciding what colour dress to buy and what to have for lunch is obviously 
less significant than deciding what career to pursue, whom to marry, whether or 
not to procreate and when and how many children to have. The more central the 
impact of a particular decision on an individual's life, the more substantial a 
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person's autonomy or interest in making it. This is why self-determination is so 
important in many of the choices that comprise reproductive freedom. But when 
people's reasons are as frivolous as a mere preference for a particular sex, the 
fulfilment of a desire to have a complete, balanced family wtiwhen the notion of 
completeness is in itself vague in this context and does not in any respect 
comprise having children of both the sexes in the family, or a reason to think that 
bringing up a child of a particular sex would be a more enriching experience than 
the other; all these reasons do not stand up to scrutiny when we consider giving 
such a right to parents in the light of the child's well-being who would be born to 
do certain role-playing for his parents. A right to pre-select sex does not fit in 
rationally with the goals of society or with the good that people say it adds to their 
life. 
While reproductive freedom does centrally affect women and their male 
reproductive partners, they also affect others - most importantly, the person 
created by their choice but other persons as well. Virtually nothing that people do 
has no effects on anyone, no matter how insignificant their actions or their effects, 
and autonomy would be empty of moral importance if it were limited to such 
cases. Instead, the impact of people's actions on others is understood as a 
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competing moral consideration that sometimes places limits on the exercise of 
individual liberty. This point is important for all aspects of reproducti\ e freedom 
that involve creating and thereby affecting other beings. Shaping the genetics and 
the nature of one's children greatly affects a person's own life and so is properly 
encompassed by procreative autonomy. However, it is not primarily a matter of 
individual self-determination but as well and more importantly, the determination 
of another. In most societies, parents are accorded discretion and control in the 
raising of their children, including decisions about education, religious exposure 
and training, and more generally the values passed on to them. The fundamental 
interests of the child, as discussed earlier, place moral limits on this parental 
control and autonomy. 
Fhe more difficult issue is whether, and if so to what extent can society 
legitimately claim a role in such decisions. Consider the decision whether to let 
one's child watch television, how much and which shows. This is not a purely 
'self-regarding' decision. 147 The collective effect of individual decisions by 
parents to pre-select the sex of their child, to prevent undesired traits or enhance 
desired traits may have a substantial impact on the nature of the overall society of 
147 Steinbock, B., (2002), `Sex Selection: Not Obviously Wrong', Hastings Center Report 32(l), 
pp. 23-27 
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which they are members. Moreover, the decisions do not solely, or even 
principally, affect the parents. Their primary impact is on the nature of the persons 
created through this prevention or selection of genetically determined traits or 
conditions, that is on those who will be the future members of the society. 
Moreover, although PGD to manipulate sex may be regarded by some as an 
expression of personal privacy and autonomy, it reflects sex based discrimination 
and comes in conflict with larger societal goals to eradicate injustice done to 
individuals on the basis of race, sex, colour, religion etc. and also in consideration 
are the harms and disadvantages suffered by the child in the future. 
So in a broad sense, parents help shape the nature of society in the future. Thus, a 
couple's interest in procreative autonomy, understood as in part, the making of 
significant decisions about their life with respect to reproduction, cannot establish 
any absolute right to decide whether to opt for sex selection or not because these 
decisions help shape the nature of the society in which others will live and so 
there is a strong case for collective decision making. 
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There is another argument for being given the right to select sex, and that is for 
religious purposes. We take up the case of the situation in India where people give 
religious and socio-cultural reasons for preferring the male sex over female and 
regard it as their right to exercise this choice. Now, in general, people over the 
world, in most societies have the right to practise whichever religion they w islh 
and worship in the manner they like. However, it is one thing to say that I have 
the right and freedom to follow my religion and, another to say that since my 
religion requires me to sacrifice girl children at birth, I have the right to do so as a 
part of my religious freedom. 
Again, it is difficult to assign something the status of a right on the ground that a 
religion or cultural norm requires it because this does not say anything about the 
correctness or the moral requirement of such a practice. To burn a widow alive 
after her husband's death may be a practice in certain societies since centuries but 
this does not make it either right or seem a valid reason to give people the right to 
do so. Also, with religions and cultures, a difficulty arises in interpreting what the 
texts truly mean. Since most of them are written in the form of aphorisms and 
parables, the knowledge being imparted through it being of an esoteric nature it is 
difficult to decipher what the real meaning is supposed to be. Being open to 
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various interpretations, people make religion their pillar of support to propagate 
their own ill-founded beliefs. Some people often say that a woman bears a 
daughter as a result of her misdeeds in life. But surely one can see the absurdity, of 
such claims which were considered to be true in India a few years ago \\, hen 
people were ignorant. Culture changes over time and what may have been 
relevant fifty years ago, though not justified or rational in any way may no longer 
be so because of the changes that have taken place in the society. 
Fifty years ago in India, when women were married off, they were considered to 
be somebody else's property being totally cut off from their parents but that may 
have been because of the lack of transport and other means of communication and 
also the condition of women in that society which prevented them from 
maintaining contact with their families. But now when most women are educated, 
independent and have started working, it seems ridiculous to even harbour such a 
belief. With the abolition of practices like dowry, sati and widow remarriage, 
there no longer seems any reason why a woman should still not be considered a 
part of her parent's family, why the family name cannot be passed on through her, 
why she cannot inherit her parent's property. The women's movement gaining 
strong hold in patriarchal India and social reform having borne its fruit, those who 
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treat women as mere objects or the weaker sex, have no valid reason to claim -cx 
selection as their right. We cannot be given rights to justify unjust practices of the 
past and to further claim it in the future. 
Another interesting fact about reproductive freedom is that it involves making 
voluntary, uncoerced choices. Mary Anne Warren 14S points out that some 
feminists have argued that a woman's use of sex selection is virtually always 
socially coerced, in so far as she would probably not have made that choice in a 
society where sons and daughters are equally valued. So women cannot benefit 
from the right to make such a choice since to speak of a "right to choose" in this 
context is to obscure the reality of coercion. A woman in a poor or lower middle 
class Indian family hardly ever has a say in matters related to her own life, let 
alone household matters. So even though she may want a daughter as a 
companion and helper, she knows that others in the family will view a female 
child as a useless drain on their resources and may therefore neglect and abuse her. 
So though she may not be directly coerced into undergoing sex selection 
procedures, she may perceive no alternatives to submission. In this situation, her 
''' Warren, M. A., ( 1999), ` Sex Selection : Individual Choice or Cultural Coercion? ' in 11. Kuhsc 
and P. Singer (ed. ) Bioethics:. 4n. 4 ntholoD7 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. ), p. 140 
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`choice' is arguably no choice at all and her `right' to make such a decision is a 
mockery of reproductive freedom. 
Sex selection is not morally unobjectionable on grounds of reproductive liberty. It 
is not clear that such a right exists first of all and the reasons that people give for 
opting for sex selection are not good enough to give them the right to gender 
selection. Children are not the property of their parents and therefore as a part of 
their parental rights, they cannot decide the future of their children without taking 
into consideration their future interests, the benefit and harm of their choices on 
their offspring. Also, reproductive freedom is not an absolute right and there can 
be restrictions on individual choice, keeping in mind the effect sex selection 
would have on the child who would be born and also the impact of such collective 
choices on society in the long run. Moreover, it is pretty much evident that in 
cultures where gender bias is predominant women hardly ever make voluntary 
decisions with regard to reproduction. Hence, it cannot be justified on the grounds 
that it is the woman's right to choose what kind of offspring to have. 
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6. Commodification, Discrimination and Sex Selection 
In contemporary debates in bioethics, a common phrase that one often comes 
across, especially to oppose new reproductive technology is that `human beings 
are treated as means and not as ends, which makes them into commodities'. 
However, most non-philosophers while using such dictums seldom understand the 
implications of what they are saying. They take it for granted that the sentiments 
behind the phrase will be understood by everyone, and that would be enough to 
justify their viewpoint. Similar commodification arguments have also been used 
to oppose sex selection and I shall in the first half of the chapter, without 
undertaking an exegesis of Kant's philosophy, try to clear up the confusion 
regarding the `Means and Ends' Formula, and will rely on some of his arguments 
to support my position. In the second half of the chapter, I will undertake the task 
of arguing whether pre-selection of gender can be opposed on the grounds that it 
amounts to discrimination. I will attempt to resolve this issue step by step, 
exploring the meanings of words which are important here, 
`selection 'and 'discrimination' and then judge whether the reasons discussed in 
this thesis for sex selection involve discrimination, and whether this constitutes a 
good objection against sex pre-selection. 
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6.1 An understanding of Kantian ethics 
Kant's philosophy and writing is extremely complex and difficult to understand 
and there have been various interpretations of it. However, to undertake a detailed 
study of all of them is beyond the scope of this thesis. I just propose to draw on 
some of his thoughts and examine whether sex selection can be opposed on the 
basis of Kantian ethics. 
The second formula of Kant's Categorical Imperative states: "Act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always as an 
end and never as a means only". 
149 Thus, the second formula enjoins that 
everyone has a fundamental dignity simply as a person, and no one has the moral 
right to interfere with the lawful freedom of others or to use them merely for his 
or her own purposes. For Kant, persons are "an end against which we should 
never act" 150 and this limits the ways in which we may satisfy our desires. So the 
149 Kant, I., (1959), Foundations of the Metaphvvsic of, 11orals, L. W. Beck, trans. (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merril), 429, sec 433 
150 Ibid. 437, sec 430 
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second formula commands every person to "treat himself and all others, never 
merely as a means, but in every case as an end in himself'. 151 
It might be worth pointing out that for Kant, the formula applies as much to 
oneself as to others. Kant was no libertarian, allowing oneself to do whatever one 
willed with his body and life. Human personality, according to Kant, finds its 
essential basis in the ability to reason and will. It follows from this that any 
volitional act that undermines, erodes or destroys reasoned willing is somehow 
self-contradictory. In the Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals 152 , 
Kant offers 
suicide as the epitome of this use of ourselves as a means only. Even when 
undertaken "in order to escape a painful situation", he tells us, it implies the 
willingness to dispose of oneself as a thing that is no longer useful for one's 
purposes. 
The second formula makes us wonder what Kant meant when he used terms like 
`means' and `ends' in his moral theory. What does it mean to treat someone 
151 Ibid. 433 
152 Ibid. 429 
153 Green, R. M., (2001), `What Does it Mean to Use Someone as "A Means Only": Rereading 
Kant', Ke'nnedlr Institute of Ethics Journal 1 1(3), pp. 247-261 
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merely as a means and not as an end in himself? First I shall look into the question 
of what Kant had in mind when he talked of `ends'. By `ends' he did not mean 
any individual desires or wants that people happen to have but only those that are 
given to us by rational nature and shared by all human beings in virtue of their 
rationality, autonomy and freedom. Hence, Kantian ends are those that can be 
universalised and carried out by all rational agents because they follow from our 
capacity for "reasoned willing". 
When Kant explained his second formulation, he wrote movingly of the radical 
difference between persons and mere things. Things are regarded as only 
relatively good, as valuable only in so far as someone happens to desire them and 
regard them as valuable. Things therefore have a price, determined by what 
people will give and take in exchange for them; and when something can be 
replaced by something else of equivalent value, it clearly has no unique, absolute, 
and intrinsic worth. Persons, on the other hand, are self-existent, having intrinsic 
and objective worth simply by the fact that they exist, apart from any and all 
subjective prudential considerations. Things are only contingently desired and 
possibly valued by someone but persons necessarily always and universally 
should be regarded as having objective value, whether or not they also happen to 
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be desired because they contribute in some way to anyone's happiness. We should 
not regard or treat ourselves or any other person only or merely as a possible 
object of our desires. '54 
Coming to `means', an object is commonly a means by virtue of what is done 
with it. Some objects may also be means by virtue of what they do, as long as this 
issues from an action. So a telephone is a means of communication, in that it is 
used to communicate with people and also by way of `what it does', meaning that 
it is a means because it transmits sound waves from one end to another. Nov in 
what ways can a human being be treated as a means? A person is a means in both 
ways. If someone is a means by which a note is delivered, he is so both because 
he is given the note with a request to deliver it and because he gives the note to 
the party for whom it is intended. Hence a person is like some objects in being a 
means by way of what he does. But he is unlike any object in that what he does as 
a means is an action. Since agency is just what sets persons apart from objects, 
what the telephone "does" would not count as an action. As long as a man is used 
by way of his unencumbered actions, he has not been wronged. Actions which are 
voluntary and the person either knows or shares the purpose for which he is used 
S4 Sullivan, R. J., (1989), Immanuel Kant's Moral Theon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 193-21 1 
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or if he does not know, he would still act as a means if he did know, are 
unencumbered. 
155 But surely for Kant, a notion like consent had no importance 
with regard to using someone as a means, for his ends were not personal desires 
based on will but that which could be universalised by rationality. So a man who 
wanted to sell himself would still be regarded as degrading himself on Kantian 
grounds even though he might want to do that, because it violated the principle of 
dignity of a human being. 
As Sullivan156 points out, Kant admits as well that persons can be and often arc 
regarded as having conditional value too, in so far as they are regarded as useful, 
likeable, loveable or admirable. Since we are dependent beings, we do have both 
the need and the right, subject to moral limitations, to attend to our own needs and 
the needs of those we care about, and to do so we often must use others; likewise, 
other people frequently have to use us to achieve their purposes. So we can and 
necessarily often do treat others as means to our ends, as good in so far as they are 
useful to us. When we think of people in terms of their skills and abilities, as in 
business, we often regard them as more or less `marketable' and their time as 
having a price. Kant does not hold that this is morally wrong. However, thinking 
155 Flemming, A., (1978), `Using a Man as a Means', Ethics 88, pp. 282-298 
156 Sullivan, R. J., (1989), Irmnanuel Kant's . 1/ora! Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ crsity 
Press), pp. 193-211 
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of our ability to set our own ends only in terms of greater utilitarian advanta, cs 
means regarding others and ourselves only as having extrinsic value, and that is 
wrong. 
Here, it would be useful to clarify an often misunderstood feature of the Kantian 
formulation, that is the prohibition against using others not just as means but as 
"mere means only". It has become commonplace to employ the second 
formulation to criticise any "use" of another person that aims at satisfying one's 
own desires, or that does not place foremost the other person's welfare. But this 
represents a misunderstanding of the Kantian formula. I use someone as a "means 
only" not when I employ their bodies or talents primarily as an instrument of my 
purpose, but only when I do so in ways that they could not also impartially accept. 
So what those who oppose having a child as a tissue donor must show is not that 
the child is being treated instrumentally. Rather, they must show that impartial 
rational persons would hold that no child should be brought into the world for 
such reasons. 1 57 
"' Green, R. M., (2001), `What Does it Mean to Use Someone as "A Means Only": Rereading 
Kant', Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1 1(3), pp. 247-261 
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What the second formula thus stipulates is that we may not treat others or allow 
ourselves to be treated only as instrumentally valuable, merely as a means to 
satisfy someone's desires, merely as a source of pleasure that is in other respects 
morally impermissible. If I marry a rich man just to enjoy the comforts that come 
accompanied with his wealth and leave him the day misfortune strikes him and his 
financial situation deteriorates, I would be using him as a mere means to m), 
selfish ends. However, in all relationships, as in all interactions in society, there is 
to a certain extent some `using' of others to fulfil our own needs. A husband who 
asks his wife to wash his dishes or who leans on her when he is emotionally 
distraught is not using her as a mere means to his end. There are certain emotions 
on which the relationship is based, of love and respect and this understanding of 
each other's needs makes it morally permissible to use other people in society to 
fulfil our needs, so long as we do not treat them as mere tools, stripped of respect 
and dignity, to serve our purposes. Even if we do keep a paid domestic servant at 
home, we have no right to abuse and degrade him. Positively, respect for others 
means recognising and appreciating their interests. 158 Every human being, Kant 
held, has two necessary ends or interests. As moral beings, we are obligated to 
158 Kant, 1., (1959), Foundations of the , %letaphisic of . lIorals, 
L. W. Beck, trans. (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Mcrril), 430 
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strive for our own moral well-being, that is, virtue; and as moral beings with a 
physical nature, we all inevitably want natural well-being, that is, happiness. 159 
6.2 Kantian ethics and sex selection 
The mention of respecting other's interests brings us to a point that is relevant for 
our topic of sex selection. When Kant wrote his moral philosophy, he could not 
have imagined that different kinds of reproductive technologies would come up 
which would not even require sexual intercourse. He wouldn't have thought that 
his dictums would be applied to examine and judge complex issues like the moral 
status of the embryo and whether research on foetuses is ethical. So when Kant 
talks about preserving the dignity of the person and treating them as ends in 
themselves, it is unclear what this would mean for people who hadn't yet been 
born or gained consciousness, that is whether we could speculate about bringing a 
human being into the world for our own needs and if yes, whether this could 
violate the principle of dignity of persons. He however did regard children as 
159 Sullivan, R. J., (1994), An Introduction to Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 65-83 
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moral beings, though without attributing the full rights of citizenship to them. '6° 
There is an implication though that life begins from the moment of conception 
and that anything which is characterised by rationality deserves respect. So even 
though a child or a foetus cannot will and make one's life plans, it does come 
under the class of persons or moral agents since it is reason per se, which 
characterises them as a class and makes them different from all other creatures. 
Peoplc have children for all sorts of reasons, to save a failing marriage, to fulfil 
one's desires to continue oneself, one's line and species, to give significance to 
one's relationship with another human being, to have an experience which most 
people regard as rewarding, challenging and enriching, as a source of personal 
renewal, a way of expressing appreciation for one's own life, to participate in 
something beyond oneself, that is, the activity of creation or just because it is a 
cultural norm. Some also view children as a vehicle of status, as compensatory 
substitutes, as a justification for self-abnegation, as a source of consumable 
entertainment, as objects of love who cannot refuse that love, as an excuse for 
greater accumulation of and absorption in possessions and power, providing a 
160 Kant, 1., (1965), The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of The . tlc'taphi'sics o%A/orals, 
J. 
Ladd, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril), 314-315 
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false and illusory sense of immortality and sometimes just to fit in. 161 Now there 
might be nothing wrong with having children for some of these reasons even 
though they might seem purely selfish. 
What is disturbing about sex selection is that decisions about procreation, about 
whether to have children start becoming masked by what kind of children to have, 
by the specifications of the child to be born, who is merely an instrument to fulfil 
his parents' desires. If a child who is brought into the world to patch up a failing 
relationship fails to do so, the child would not be rejected on such grounds but 
imagine a couple who went through the physical, psychological and financial 
troubles to have a boy and that boy failed to fit into the role for which he was 
designed. The child would lose out consequently on the love which sustains 
familial ties. Those who oppose such reasoning and say that even normal children 
fail to live up to their parents' expectations but that does not mean that their 
parents stop loving them, forget that these are babies of parents to whom the 
gender of their offspring and the related fulfilment of associated desires meant so 
much that they went for painful, expensive and risky sex selection techniques. 
161 Alpern, K. D., (1992), `Genetic puzzles and Stork Stories' in K. D. Alpern (ed. ) The Ethics of 
15 Reproductive Technology (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1 ,157 
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There is a difference between the two cases, and in the case of the couple who 
think that having a child will save their marriage from breaking, there is still room 
to treat the child not `merely' as a means but also as an end, which is not the case 
with sex selection. This is so because when a couple decide to gamble on a rocky 
marriage by having a child, it is not so much of an expectation that they have from 
the child to do certain things. Rather, it is they themselves who expect that with 
the coming of a person who they share, there would be improvements in their 
inter-personal relationships and a greater scope to bond again with each other. 
Hence, the child is not expected to carry out its `designated task' whereas in sex 
selection for personal reasons, like family balancing, to have a particular child 
rearing experience, to have a soccer companion or to attain salvation, the child has 
to do something, his life is `meant' to arouse certain experiences which have to 
be, in effect different and it `has' to fill certain gaps. With sex selection, love, 
respect, dignity become tied to the gender which bestows utility to people's lives, 
and if that particular feature of the product is not satisfied, its value is lost. With 
choosing a child for other reasons, respect at least remains bound to the whole 
persona of the individual. 
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Suppose that you come to London from India to shop for a machine which is 
important for your work and when you have taken it back home, it doesn't 
function well or has certain defects, then you immediately contact the company 
for a replacement. Now if we consider that the refund or warrantee period is over, 
then the value of the machine in terms of its utility for your purposes is zero and if 
you can't make use of it, you just discard it or shove it away in some forgotten 
corner of the house. In the case of parents who get their children, so to say 
`ordered by choice', any kind of defect in the functioning of the person would 
immediately lead to intolerance and disappointment, coupled with perhaps a 
neglect of the child. Such children are used as mere means to fulfil their parents' 
expectations and desires and the child is not treated as an end in himself because 
had it been a child of the opposite sex, she would have been devalued and 
disrespected. It is the gender of the child which makes it valuable and not the 
child in itself. A `male' child in India is valued only because of his \' 
chromosome which is mistakenly supposed to give him more dignity as a human 
boing than a bearer of two X chromosomes. So the male child is only loved 
because of his gender and the female abhorred because of hers. He is used as a 
means to perform those functions which only he because of his `: ender can 
rightfully do. However, if he happens to, for some reason, either because of a 
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handicap or other such reason not be able to shoulder the responsibilities, he loses 
out on his social worth. What kind of a calculation of value is this? 
6.3 Commodification and sex selection 
This brings me to my next consideration, that of commodification. A 
commodifying attitude comprises a denial of subjectivity, instrumentality and 
fungibility. '62 The basic idea is that some actions treat persons as a mere means, 
as a commodity because they separate out some physical aspect of the person for 
use or gratification. They are wrong not because they eclipse reasoned willing, but 
because they ignore the individual's physical-spiritual integrity and diminish the 
person's dignity by locating his or her value in an inferior body part or activity. '63 
With regard to sex selection, people attach value to a particular aspect of the 
child's personality and disregard the opposite of it on no rational grounds. They 
alienate the gender of the person from his whole and only consider that worthy. 
162 Wilkinson, S., (2000), 'Commodification Arguments for the Legal Prohibition of Organ Sale', 
Health Care Analysis 8, pp. 189-201 
163 Green, R. M., (2001), 'What Does it Mean to Use Someone as "A Means Only": Rereading 
Kant', hc'iiirrdl Institute of Ethics Journal 1 1(3), pp. 247-261 
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This is also the case with commodities, they are valued only because of their 
particular functional capacity; a washing machine because it does laundry without 
effort, a driller because it makes drilling perfect and the desired sized holes into 
the wall easier, a T. V because it provides entertainment, a coffee machine because 
it makes the perfect coffee and now a perfect child with perfect combination of 
characteristics to make life complete, balanced and happy, with a son to carry on 
my family name, to fulfil my religious duties, to take care of my property, to fulfil 
all those requirements for which a human being is essential and a machine can't 
take over. 
The quest for perfection, for getting everything that I want, with all details of 
phenotype adhered to, makes a child into an asset rather than a human being who 
has interests of his own and who has the right to formulate his own life plans. And 
so this whole business of gender designing, of catering to people's wishes for the 
kind of child they want, takes on a consumerist turn, and life and family becomes 
a market where the forces of demand and supply operate, babies are designed by 
choice, they are manufactured like goods and sold with a price. The child no 
longer remains a surprise gift, like one you ask Father Christmas for, something 
which you can ask for but there is no control over whether you get what y, ou ask 
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for. It becomes more like a Harrods List. It is common nowadays for people 
getting married to provide a list of those things that they . would like to receive as 
wedding gifts. This list is then given to the store and those giving the gift can tell 
the store which they will give. There is a sense then in which the recipients have 
chosen their own gifts. There is an idea that gifts not on the list will not be 
accepted, so that the gift is then compelled. So the gift list then just becomes a 
shopping list in disguise, the only difference being that the receiver is then not the 
one paying for it. 
' 64 So people in this age of rapid consumerism, go `baby- 
shopping' and reduce their own offspring to the status of mere products that make 
life easier and enjoyable. 
It's interesting to go a little deeper into this area and see why we have 
apprehensions about such changes that technology is bringing into our family life 
and relationships. As with Kant165, the act of procreation is one by which we bring 
a person into the world without his consent and on our own initiative, and for this 
deed parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition so 
far as they can. They cannot destroy their child as if it were something that they 
164Marshall, S. E., (1995), `Choosing the Family' in C. Ulanowsky (ed. ) Family in the . -a e of 
Biotechnology (Avebury: Aldershot), pp. 105-117 
165 Kant , 
I., (1996), The ; tlctaph sic of Nforals, M. Gregor, trans. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press), 6: 282.283 
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had made or as if he were their property, nor can they just abandon him to chance, 
since they have brought not only a worldly being but a citizen of the world into a 
condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even just according to 
concepts of rights. From this duty also arises the right of parents to manage and 
develop their child, so long as he has not yet mastered the use of his members or 
of his understanding: the right not only to feed and care for him but also to 
educate him, to develop him both pragmatically, so that in the future he can look 
after himself and make his way into life, and morally, since otherwise the fault for 
having neglected him would fall on the parents. 
But a man only has a duty of perfection towards himself and not others, so the 
parents only have a duty to help develop their children into moral persons who are 
capable of leading life, who have the ability to face situations in life and deal with 
them, but this in no way entails that parents have to engineer their children 
according to what they think as individuals would be best, what they want their 
children to do for them. Parents' rights over their children cease at the time of the 
child's emancipation. They must bear in mind that their children are not objects at 
their disposal, whom they can make use of as and when they want. They are 
human beings who have interests of their own and sex selection particularly 
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ignores this aspect of parental choice. It places so much more stress on the 
fulfilment of parental desires that it completely overlooks the state of the child, 
who is then made a scapegoat of his parents' expectations and desires. 
One last case that I take up in this regard is choosing the gender to avoid 
genetically inherited sex-linked disease. Kant, we know, from his suicide 
example, would never allow killing oneself or another even in a state of utter- grief 
and pain. Here, I would like to disagree with Kant and state that it would be an 
affront to the dignity of a human being, to be brought into the world to live a life 
marred by such pain, disability and helplessness, a life that is doomed to end soon 
and whatever time one has, is filled with excruciating pain and agony, in some 
cases even a state of lack of consciousness about one's own identity. In such a 
case, if the disease cannot be avoided in any other way but by sex selection, then 
in my view there is no valid objection that can be raised against the procedure. 
I have thus argued that sex selection, except in the case of serious, genetic 
disorders treats children as products, which can be designed by choice, and this 
ignores the interests of the child to be born, stressing only on the aspect of 
parental desires, thus making children into vehicles for the fulfilment of parental 
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hopes and aspirations, which have no overriding reasons for justification. In the 
next section, I examine discrimination, which I argue is an effect of sex selection 
and thus, not only harms individuals but also society in general. 
6.4 The meanings of words : `selection' and `discrimination' 
To examine the connection between sex selection and discrimination, I would like 
to go deeper into the meanings of certain words. First of all, what does `selection' 
mean? What do we do when we choose between options presented to us" What 
does this choice mean to us? Let me attempt to answer these questions in a way 
that is suitable for our purpose. 
All meanings of `choose' or `select' mention ` picking out the most suitable, most 
fit, for excellence'. 166 So this implies that when we select something, it is 
necessarily an expression of our preference for something that we think is more 
suitable or fit. It is difficult to imagine that anyone, in making a decision 
166 The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1978), 6 `h ed., J. B. Svkes (ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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intentionally, chooses the least advantageous route. Our preference maybe with 
relevance to our thoughts, desires, attitudes, particular life situations or societal 
circumstances, but whatever it may be it certainly is something that is of 
importance to us. And the fact that we prefer something to another implies that the 
preferred choice or its outcome is of more value to us. 
So, to choose deliberately brown eyes, must imply a preference for brown eves to 
other possible colours. As Soren Holm 167 says, the assumption that to prefer 
something is to value it more highly than the other possible options plays a major 
role in rational choice theory when the implicit value structure of an individual is 
determined from his explicit choices and preferences. This entails that by 
choosing a specific characteristic I signal that it is more valuable to me than the 
other possible options. 
The next question to ask would be, what is wrong with our highly valuing 
something that we prefer. This question is relevant to us because it helps us to 
answer our main query regarding sex selection involving discrimination. 
107 1lolm, S., (1998), `Ethical Issues in Pre-implantation Diagnosis' in J. Harris and S. liolm(ed. )The 
Future of Human Reproduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 176-190 
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The word `discriminate' means `to make a clear distinction, distinguish, 
differentiate'. 168 But do all acts in which we differentiate culminate into a moral 
wrong? Obviously not. When certain features that are not morally relevant for our 
purposes or judgements are taken into account to justify our preference, it 
amounts to discrimination. Suppose that I as the Manager of a software company 
decide that I would hire someone for the post of a program developer wtiwho has the 
best qualifications in computer engineering and relevant work experience in 
reputed firms, then I would not be discriminating against those who do not get the 
job, either because their qualifications were not good enough or their experience 
was not sufficient. This is so because I am taking only those features into account 
which are important for a computer program developer. However, if I decide that 
I am going to hire someone who comes in a `sari' or `kurta' for the interview, the 
Indian national dress because my mother is an Indian and sari/kurta is my 
favourite dress, then I am making a judgement, a preference on the basis of 
characteristics that do not count towards saying anything about the ability or 
intelligence of the candidate. My criterion for judgement is irrelevant and I would 
certainly be discriminating against those candidates who haven't dressed in a sari. 
"" The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1978), 6 `h ed., J. B. Sykes (ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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With regard to discrimination, it might be worth analysing whether it is always 
wrong to take some characteristics like sex, skin colour, race into account. Surely, 
when considering a case of sexual violence, the defendant's gender would play an 
important role in the handling of the case. So there are certain institutions in 
which decisions have to be based on such characteristics, and this we would agree 
is acceptable. But if we do make decisions on which characteristics matter in our 
judgements, is it always acceptable to base our judgements on the criteria set by 
an institution or practice? Certain institutions could themselves be sexist like the 
army, till a few years ago the police force and the fire fighting squad. Certainly 
these are fields requiring people who are physically strong and who can take up 
strenuous tasks. Even though it maybe statistically proven that females on average 
are weaker in physical prowess than men, to categorically deny women such jobs 
would be discriminatory. There might be women who through training and 
exercise have built up their strength to the required level and there might be men 
who cannot match up to them or are weaker than these women but just because 
they fall into the `right sex', they are given the opportunity to be considered for 
the job. Let us now take up a situation where it would be acceptable to base a 
decision on someone's sex. If I run a strip club, catering to the entertainment of 
my heterosexual male customers, my purpose would be defeated were I to employ 
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a male stripper. So in the context of the present situation, it would not be 
discriminatory to reject a male candidate when employing a female stripper. 
So what we have arrived at is that it would be discriminatory to deny people fair 
equality of opportunity and to make judgements about them in isolation, treating 
them on the basis of morally insignificant dispositional traits like skin or hair 
colour, or purely on the grounds of their membership of a group, pertaining to 
either a race or sex, which is seen by the dominant part of society as inferior in 
some way. The principle of equality admits that humans differ as individuals but 
there is no compelling reason for assuming that a difference in race, sex, colour or 
height etc. between two people justifies any difference in value we bestow on 
them or, in the amount of consideration we give to their interests. 1 69 
6.5 Discrimination and sex selection 
In the light of the above discussion, let me take up my main question. Does pre- 
selection of sex lead to discrimination? The most eloquent argument against 
169 Singer, P., (1993). Practical Ethics(New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 16-54 
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gender selection comes from the Catholic Church, which states that gender 
selection is contrary to the personal dignity of the human being and his or her 
integrity and identity. ' 70 
The fundamental premise of gender selection is that one sex must be preferred 
over another. Before birth, before parents can possibly know anything about their 
progeny, gender figures in the calculation of a child's worth. It is this, which is 
bothersome about sex selection, that it forces parents to value gender, something 
that we in our professional and daily lives are encouraged and legally required to 
ignore. 
As J. M. Berkowitz 171 points out, preconceptive sexual manipulation constitutes 
sexism, which is the belief in the superiority or supremacy of one sex over another, 
prejudice or discrimination against members of one sex and the fostering of 
stereotyping of social roles for members of a given sex. What is wrong with 
sexual discrimination is that it violates the moral right of people to equal respect. 
170 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, (1987), `The Church's Instruction on Rc. shcct for 
Human life in its origin and on the Dignity of Procreation ', 22 Feb. 1987 
17' Berkowitz, J. M., (1998), 'Two Boys and a Girl Please and Hold the Mustard', Public Health 
114(l) , pp. 
25-44 
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A person has the right to be judged on character and abilities rather than 
stereotypes which is a mere set of attributes ascribed to a group and believed to 
characterise its individual members simply because they belon g to that group. 1 72 
So, sexism is a consequence of assumed sex appropriate social roles, which are of 
human invention and not genetically determined, often inaccurate over 
generalisations. 
The fundamental problem with sex selection is that the term `selection', by 
definition, suggests that nothing more momentous is taking place than a choice by 
parents between, say, pink and blue. But that is emphatically not the case with sex 
selection, where the very purpose (unconscious or not) of the selection is to 
exercise a large degree of control and authority over the nature and identity of 
one's offspring or of the next generation. After all, if the choice were completely 
indifferent, completely free of consequences, biological ramifications, or implicit 
social meanings, there would scarcely be a reason for making it in the first place. 
Quite the contrary: The parents expect certain things to follow from their 
`selection' - from their control of the sex of the child. They are not merely 
selecting but determining - in the sense of foreordaining - something in their 
172 1limma, K. . 
M., (2001), `Discrimination and Disidentification : The Fair-Start Defense of 
Affirmative Action', Journal of Business Ethics 30(3), pp. 277-289 
222 
offspring, and something, moreover, that is not trivial but central to the child's 
lifelong identity. To capture these defining aspects of what takes place in abortiii z 
a foetus because it is male or female, or preselecting an embryo for implantation 
because of its sex, or choosing to impregnate a women with X- or Y-bearing 
sperm only, it would not be wrong to say that it is not just `sex selection' that 
these parents are wanting but rather `sex control'. 
Let us now look more closely at the reasons given for sex selection to see whether 
they amount to discrimination. Very often, people go in for such techniques to 
avoid a genetically inherited sex-linked disease. It would not be discriminatory, 
for example, if a couple went in for PGD to avoid having a male offspring who 
would be afflicted with haemophilia. This use of sex selection is permissible 
because it does not devalue a person of a particular sex. The parents' purpose in 
using the technique is to avoid the disease rather than the `wrong sex'. Hence, it is 
not the gender that is at issue here, but only the disease and in the absence of the 
possibility of inheriting the dreaded disease the couple would not have opted for 
sex selection. Since their choice does not attribute lesser value to anyone on the 
basis of a morally insignificant characteristic like sex, it does not amount to 
discrimination. 
ý_ ý 
However, if we were to look at countries where sex selection is already practised, 
for the sake of social, traditional, religious reasons, though mostly illegally in the Z7 - 
form of abortion or infanticide, it is a completely different story. In countries like 
India or China where there is widespread gender discrimination and a clear 
evidence of general preference for males, would allowing sex selection promote 
the already prevalent sexual inequalities? I believe that it would. If social coercion 
or cultural norms make having a male offspring preferable to a female offspring, 
there certainly is some kind of discrimination going on which is a cause for 
concern. If your social customs value a boy more than a girl, then it requires some 
thinking as to how and why in such circumstances should sex selection be allowed. 
The bearer of the family name, the one who lights the pyre of his parents, who 
inherits his family's wealth, all require a male offspring. But just because social 
customs validate our preferences, does it mean that they are good reasons for 
allowing for sex selection and should we allow such practices, which have no 
sound basis and are inherently discriminatory, to prevail? Such choices 
irrationally place lesser value on the female sex, thus depriving them of respect 
and dignity, which they as a part of the human race command and deserve. Hence, 
it disadvantages women and denies them equal rights, on the basis of sex, which 
arbitrarily assumes importance in some societies. 
24 
Mary Anne Warren173 however, is of the view that if a woman in India chooses a 
son over a daughter, citing the reason that it would be better for her not to be born 
into a world in which she will be abused and devalued, then this is not a sin of 
sexism on her part because her motivations are rational, partly altruistic and must 
be seen as a symptom of sexist institutions and ideology, something for which she 
is personally blameless. But I would like to argue that even if she makes a 
decision keeping in mind the best interests of the girl child in not being born, and 
she adheres to the norms of the society, she cannot be said to be acting out of 
good will. By being party to an existent moral wrong, she is furthering 
discriminatory interests. Her choice made under social coercion directly 
challenges women's confidence in their own sex and the value they give to 
females which enables men to ask them to collude with the reproduction of 
inequality in the next generation. 
In India, it is estimated that 10 million girls have gone missing over the last two 
decades due to parents choosing to abort female foetuses in such large numbers. 
'-; 
Although gender based abortion and prenatal sex determination tests are banned, 
in the last twelve years only one doctor has been convicted of such a crime. The 
173 Warren, M. A., (1992), The Ethics of Sex Preselection' in K. D. Alpern(ed. ) The Ethics of 
Reproductive Technologl"(Ncw York: Oxford University Press), pp. 232-246 
174 Prasad, R. and Ramesh, R., (2007), `India's Missing Girls', The Guardian . 
28 February 
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latest estimate of India's sex ratio at birth (SRB) can be gleamed from a sample 
registration system that covers 1.3m households. For the two years up to 3004, 
India had just 882 girls per 1,000 boys. Only China is worse. Beijing's harsh, vt 
effective, family-planning policy limited urban couples to a single child -which 
was usually a boy. China's sex ratio stands at just 832: 1,000.175 
This hidden tragedy surfaces not only in the statistics of skewed sex ratios, but 
also in the back yards of clinics that hoped to bury the evidence. Earlier this 
month, the police arrested two people after the discovery of 400 pieces of bones 
believed to be of female foetuses in the town of Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh. Last 
September, the remains of dozens of babies were exhumed from a pit outside an 
abortion clinic in Punjab. According to investigators, that clinic was run by an 
untrained, unqualified retired soldier and his wife. To dispose of the evidence, 
acid was used to melt the flesh and then the bones were hammered to smithereens. 
176 
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Last year, in a series of reports entitled `Kokh Me Katl', or `Murder in the Wti omb% 
two journalists working for India's Sahara Samay television channel found 100 
doctors, in both private and government hospitals, who were prepared to perform 
illegal terminations of girl foetuses. In the grainy TV pictures, doctors from tour 
states and 36 cities talked with chilling casualness about how to dump the remains. 
Many weren't bothered about the foetus's age, just that it was a girl that could be 
got rid off. The average cost of the procedure was a few thousand rupees (around 
£30). 
Although ministers in India have woken up to "a national crisis", the response has 
been to condone the abandonment of female babies. "If you don't want a girl, 
leave her to us, " Renuka Chowdhury, India's minister of state for women and 
child development, said recently. The government "will bring up your children. 
Don't kill them". The announcement was a desperate response to stem India's 
dramatic deficit of women. There are advertisements in local newspapers and on 
TV and billboards everywhere informing people about the current law regarding 
sex selection in India and how Indians should view the girl child not as a burden 
but as a gift. 
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Amartya Sen, delivering the first foundation lecture of the Institute for Human 
Development in India, said that there is systematic discrimination in society and 
one of the examples of it is female foeticide. He pointed out that even though 
India had managed to bring down infant mortality, natality discrimination still 
continues and needs to be tackled. 177 
One might be curious to know what effect this discrimination and sexism has on 
the level of society, that which goes beyond the individual. In China, it is 
estimated that by 2020, a massive 25 million men will have no wives owing to the 
huge gender imbalance in the country. 178 Currently, there are 119 boys born for 
every 100 girls in China. The question for India is what sort of future it faces 
without enough women. One dystopian answer, given by academics Valerie M 
Hudson and Andrea den Boer, is that a generation of men unable to find wives has 
already emerged. In their book, Bare Branches, they write of men who will never 
marry and have children. It is these men, they say, who are already largely 
responsible for social unrest in those areas where women are in short supply. 
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Indian scholars, they say, have noted a growing relationship between sex ratios 
and violent crime in Indian states. When potential wives are scarce, it is the least- 
skilled and educated men who are left on the shelf. Hudson and Den Boer put 
forward a scenario where large areas of India could be overrun by this under-class, 
with marauding groups of under-educated testosterone-high youths wreaking 
havoc. "It will mean a stronger masculine and macho culture, " says Den Boer, co- 
author and lecturer in International Politics at the University of Kent. "Men do 
change their behaviour when they settle down. Those growing pools of men that 
don't are more likely to congregate to take part in stealing, gangs, bootlegging and 
terrorism. ' 180 
In villages across the flat plains of north India, two decades of widespread female 
foeticide is already felt by thousands of families who cannot find brides for their 
sons. One local leader in the state of Haryana likened the lack of marriageable 
women to the shortage of grain in a famine. It is an apt simile, given that the 
response to the catastrophe has seen women from poorer states being traded like a 
commodity by bride traffickers. As little as 10,000 rupees (L125) is paid to 
impoverished families in Bihar, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh for a daughter 
ego Ibid. 
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who will supposedly be found a job in a more prosperous part of India. The reality 
is that she will be sold into a forced marriage to a family in a richer state. ý`ý 
India's paradox is that prosperity has not meant progress. Development has not 
erased traditional values: in fact, selective abortion has been accelerated in a 
globalising India. On the one hand there has been new money and an awareness of 
family planning - so family sizes get smaller. But wealthier and better educated 
Indians still want sons. A recent survey revealed that female foeticide was highest 
among women with university degrees. The demographic consequences of mass 
female foeticide are most pronounced in the most developed parts of India. In 
Delhi, one of the richest cities in India, there are just 827 girls per 1,000 boys 
being born. Not far away, in the wealthy farming belt of Kurukshetra, there are 
only 770. 
At the heart of the matter lies the most sacred institution in Indian life: marriage. 
New money has raised the price of wedlock, a ritual still governed by the past. 
Not only do most Indians believe in arranged marriage, in which dowry payments 
181 Ibid. 
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are made; there is also a widespread acceptance of the inequality between bride- 
givers and bride-takers. 
Robyn Rowland had once said, "Women are the most exploited, manipulated, 
oppressed and brutalised group in the world, yet we have the numbers. What 
would our status be as a vastly outnumbered group? "182 In Asia, the numbers have 
dwindled and the condition of women has only got worse. It is high time that 
women took the matter in their own hands, broke out of their shells and fought 
gender bias at its very root, by refusing to be a part of unjust practices, which are 
based on illogical explanations given for gender preference. 
In the last decade or so, India has seen a great change of attitude towards women 
and if sex selection were to be allowed, all efforts to bridge sexual inequalities 
would be futile. A movement, which has begun to usher in change, 'ill be stalled. 
In the past too it was only because some revolutionaries voiced their dissent over 
practices like sati, of widows burning themselves in the funeral pyre of their 
1S2 Rowland, R., (1987), `Motherhood, Alienation and the Issue of `Choice' in Sex Prselection' in 
G. Corea et al (ed. ) R1cnr-Made Women: Hotiv, Vi'w Reproductive Technologies .1 ffect 3 nrt'n 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 83 
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husband, that laws were formulated to abolish it. Participation on grounds of 
socio-economic, religious or cultural reasons would have hardly provided a valid 
justification for it. An Indian man might turn around and accuse me of having 
fallen victim to Western ideology, of harbouring liberal values and imposing a 
Western culture on another which I do not understand. Yes, it is true that 
traditions, cultures, religions, vary from place to place and people from different 
backgrounds might consider some of the rituals and practices extremely bizarre 
and stupid. However, I agree with Nussbaum' 83 when she says that certain values 
like dignity, respect, equality and love are universal, notions which apply to all 
human beings. One does not have to belong to any religion to deserve it. She also 
talks of the universal importance of protecting spheres of choice and freedom, 
within which people with diverse views of what matters in life can pursue 
flourishing according to their own lights. 
Let us now turn to the group of parents who wish to pre-select their child's gender 
because they already have three sons and want one daughter now, or because they 
want to balance their family by having children of both the sexes. It is not 
immediately clear what makes a family balanced. And this prompts us to ask 
where the notion of a complete family comes from. With this concept being vague, 
183 Nussbaum, M., (2000), Se. \ and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Pres,, ), pp. 3-25 
23'_ 
we do not know how having children of both the sexes completes or balances the 
family. If there are three sons, one is left clueless about how having a daughter 
completes the family. It seems that such couples are aiming to have `perfect' 
families but we hardly have an idea of what this perfection consists of. Going by 
their logic, had there been three sexes, a balanced family would be one with 
offspring of all three. This concept of `family balancing' surely is obscure \vith 
hardly any rationale behind it. What lies at the root of such desires is an unspoken 
belief that the two sexes are different in at least some way that our family remains 
incomplete without having both, and a vague expectation that what three sons 
could not provide, one daughter would. Wertz and Fletcher184 also endorse this 
point by saying that the desire for a balanced family assumes sex role stereotyping. 
Why desire to balance a family unless you already hold stereotypes about sex? 
Exactly, if both the sexes have equal value in your life then why desire to have a 
daughter after three sons? 
Even more troublesome, the desire to have a child of a particular sex often reflects 
parental expectations of dominant gender based behaviour. So, the woman who 
desires to have a girl as a cooking companion or a man desiring a son to play 
'84 Wertz, D. C. and Fletcher, J. C., (1992), `Sex Selection Through Prenatal Diagnostic 
Techniques: A Feminist Critique' in H. B. Holmes and L. M. Purdy(ed. )Feminist Perspectives in 
, Ife(ical Ethic. s(Bloomington : Indiana University Press), pp. 240-249 
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cricket with on Sundays may seem prima facie harmless but such desires are 
manifestations of attitudes which give preference to sex. To express such desires, 
it must be assumed that by virtue of being a girl she would be expected to be 
inherently a preferable shopping or cooking companion. According to Hoskins 
and Holmes 185, treating people according to the sex role we envision instead of 
according to their individuality is unethical and an act of sexism, for what is more 
sexist than to `create' a person to fit a sex role ideology. 
Into the above class would also fall those couples who recognise and prefer one 
type of childrearing experience over the other. The very desire for a `specific' 
bearing and companionship experience places insufficient value on the child of 
the other sex since it gives the message that the other sex would not provide `as 
good' companionship or `less rewarding' childbearing experience. Often we hear 
single women wanting to have a girl child because they harbour a feeling that 
boys are more violent, boisterous and difficult to manage than girls who are 
considered more obedient, gentle and warm. Such concerns speak of prejudices, 
which are very common, and they show explicitly how people value the two sexes 
unequally. Such preferences are based on unfounded generalisations of 
1S5 Hoskins, B. and Holmes H. B., (1984), ` Technology and Prenatal Femicide' in in R. Arditti. 
R. D. Klein and S. Minden (eds. )Test-Tube Women: What Future for . 11othc'rhood (London ; 
Boston: 
Pandora Press), p. '_84 
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characteristics supposed to be belonging to every member of the class. Even if we 
do accept that such generalisations were correct and boys tend to be more violent, 
to judge that an individual boy will be more violent would be discriminator, since 
we would then be extrapolating from group characteristics, without judging the 
individual on his own sake. 
Bayles 186 thoughtfully points out that feminist movements are trying to break 
down gender stereotypes and that widespread adoption of sex selection would turn 
back the clock on such gains. It is true that unlike the inability of men to become 
pregnant, there are no genetic barriers to girls fishing or boys shopping. Any 
normal pleasure that can be enjoyed with a child of one sex can be experienced 
with the other too. Also, even if it were acceptable to choose a foetus because of a 
well-founded expectation that she would be interested in dolls, it would not mean 
that if the resulting little girl was not interested in dolls, the parents would be 
justified in not fulfilling their obligations towards this child. Even if they did 
harbour some expectations that remained unfulfilled, by bringing another human 
being into the world, they have undertaken some commitments towards her life. 
1X6 Bayles, M., (1984), Reproductive Ethics(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p. 35 
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Lastly, we discuss those parents who wish to use PGD to have a child of a sex, 
which they just happen to like. Just as somebody prefers the colour red to blue, so 
do they think that they happen to like girls more than boys, as a matter of mere 
personal liking, without harbouring any sexist feelings. But it must be noted that 
here we are not talking about cars which we can buy of our favourite colour, red. 
Our choice here concerns a child who will come into existence, it is about 
someone whose life will be influenced by this decision, and we certainly cannot 
make such decisions on the basis of flippant reasons. If I like girls and I am on a 
committee which awards scholarships on the basis of ability and research 
potential of candidates, I cannot decide to give funding only to girls because there 
is a certain framework of the scholarship awarding body within which I have to 
work and so is the case with society and life. When we are talking of human 
beings whose life has a value, nothing gives us the reason to choose its gender on 
the basis of a mere preference which has no sound basis. In earlier chapters, 
have dealt with the question of extent of parental control over children and their 
right to choose for them and related to some of the ideas discussed above, about 
the possible treatment of children as things. 
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Questioning the motives of this last group, Berkowitz'87 feels that individuals 
vary in their ability to articulate motivation and it is difficult to imagine that any 
decision, especially one involving the time, risk and expense of pre-conceptiv c 
sex selection, would be made without anticipating gain. And to anticipate `gain, 
one must predict the consequences of a decision. In gender selection, predicting 
gain necessitates assumptions to be made which are dependent upon the sex of the 
child. So to choose a boy or a girl, parents must have preconceived notions, 
however vague, about the ramifications of having a certain sexed child, notions 
that are fundamentally sexist since they are predicated upon anticipated gender 
based behaviour. 
Thus, pre-selection of sex is disturbing because it can be used as a vehicle for 
parents to express spoken or unspoken sexual prejudices which may prove 
detrimental to the child. Bonnie Steinbock' 88, though disagreeing with the fact 
that sex selection would lead to gender discrimination, voices concern about what 
such choices can imply and calls for reflection on what it means to be a parent, 
187 Berkowitz, J. M., (1998), 'Racism and Sexism in Medically Assisted Conception', 
Bioethics 12 (1), pp. 25 -44 
188 Steinbock, B., (2002), 'Scx Selection: Not Obviously Wrong', Hastings Center Report 3-1 (/) 
pp. 23--17 
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what kind of parents we should strive to be and what role, if any, does gender play 
in the parent-child relationship. 
I thus conclude that apart from reasons for avoiding genetically inherited disease. 
pre-selection of sex undermines the value of human beings and places insufficient 




In this thesis, I have tried to examine the ethical issues raised by sex selection 
from three different perspectives: that of the individual, that of the family and that 
of society. This thesis has been in essence about parents and children and the 
guiding factor in the relationship between them. But this thesis has also been 
about society, that whole in which the individuals, the parents and children live. It 
is natural that the individuals will be affected by the climate in which they live 
and it is also natural that society in itself will be influenced by the collective 
actions of the individuals who make it a whole. 
As pointed out earlier, there were two questions that needed to be answered in this 
thesis regarding the morality of sex selection: (1) the question regarding the 
techniques being used to achieve the end, that of sex selection and whether the 
available technology raises any ethical problems, and (2) the second and more 
important of the questions, was that regarding the morality of sex selection, in and 
of itself, irrespective of the technology being used to achieve it. Having reached 
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the end of this thesis, I would like to say that I have found the answers to my 
questions, No to (1) and Yes to (2). 
The main claim of my thesis has been : It is immoral for parents to select the sex 
of their offspring for non-medical reasons and my main argument in support of it 
is that parents ought not to place value on gender when it comes to their children 
since gender is a morally irrelevant factor in the parent-child relationship and 
parental love should not be conditioned by characteristics like gender. Hence, 
their preference regarding the choice of sex cannot be justified. 
This thesis started with an examination of the morality of the technology being 
used to achieve sex selection. There are two main techniques used to select for sex: 
sperm sorting which is pre-conception and preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) which is a post-conception technique. Sperm sorting does not involve any 
considerable risk and is an effective method to select for sex. PGD on the other 
hand involves the creation, screening, implantation and discarding of embryos. It 
is this aspect of PGD that has continued to raise ethical worries. In the thesis I 
have discussed and evaluated different positions on the moral status of the embryo 
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and argued for a gradualist position concluding that the earl}, embryo used in 
embryo selection or PGD does not have a moral status. Hence, discarding it or not 
implanting it would not be unethical. 
Undertaking a theoretical analysis and account of parenthood, I argued that 
parenthood is a role from which rights and duties stem. I looked at different 
theories for parental rights and duties, and critiqued the `Children as Property' 
claim. I also argued that parenthood is a relationship of love, and that parents 
ought not to place value on gender when it comes to their children, and that 
parental love should not be conditioned by characteristics like gender. 
Discussing the right to reproduction, I applied it to sex selection and arrived at 
harm as posing a limit on procreative liberty. I argued that a right to reproduction, 
reproductive freedom or reproductive autonomy does not entail a right to sex 
selection. I also discussed how sex selection could impact on children, children's 
rights to an open future, and sufficiently harm them. 
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Applying Kantian ethics, in particular the `Means and Ends' formula to sCx 
selection, I discussed how this could lead to commodification. I argued that the 
choice of a particular trait, like gender by a parent undermines the principle of 
respect for individuals and thus instrumentalises the value of children for their 
parents. Moving away from individuals, I focused on sex selection as a means of 
discrimination and the impact of sex selection on women and society. An analysis 
of the current situation in India and China where sex selection has led to a hugs 
gender imbalance revealed that gender stereotyping and discrimination could 
prove detrimental to society as a whole and the framework that holds it together. 
I have argued in this thesis that it is time for us as a society to move forward, to 
look beyond the stereotypes that are commonly prevalent around us, to change the 
way society thinks by changing how we think and act, to put an end to a system 
that is biased for all the wrong reasons and does not value an individual for what 
he or she is and rather finds his or her moral worth in traits like gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion that are morally irrelevant. Sex selection, in essence, destroys 
the delicate fabric of the family, the parent - child relationship and contributes to 
existing ills within society. The age we live in today, we need technology to better 
24') 
human life and the settings we live in, not to make society an even more 
prejudiced and divided one! 
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